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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the effect that market institutions have on economic outcomes such as 
employment and innovation. The market institutions under study are those that determine the 
conditions in product, labour and capital markets. Of particular interest is how the effect of 
institutional changes in one market depends on the conditions in another, or depends on the 
nature of innovation by the firm. The first chapter describes the matching of patents at the 
European Patent Office to firm accounts data for all registered firms across fifteen European 
countries. This constitutes a valuable new dataset for research in innovation that is used for 
much of the empirical work in this thesis. The second chapter investigates the impact of product 
market competition on unemployment, and how this depends on labour market institutions. It 
uses differential changes in regulations across OECD countries to find that increased 
competition reduces unemployment, more so in countries with strong unions. The third chapter 
investigates how the effect of product market competition on innovation depends on financial 
institutions. Using exogenous variation in competition in manufacturing industries this chapter 
finds that the positive effect of competition on innovation is larger in countries with good 
financial institutions. The fourth chapter investigates the effect of employment protection 
legislation on innovation. The theoretical effect of employment protection legislation on 
innovation is ambiguous, and empirical evidence is thus far inconclusive. This chapter finds that 
within multinational enterprises overall innovation occurs more in subsidiaries located in 
countries with high employment protection, however radical innovation occurs more in 
subsidiaries located in countries with low employment protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern industrial societies have entrusted the job of delivering economic growth to 
corporations. Governments determine institutions in product, labour and capital markets, leaving 
firms to choose optimal output and innovation based on competitive conditions and factor prices. 
Much of the recent effort by regulators to increase growth, has focused on the effect on firms’ 
incentives from institutional reform in these markets in isolation. The purpose of this thesis is to 
empirically investigate how the impact of reforms in one market (the product market, say) 
depends on the conditions in another market (the labor market, say).   
 
Recent academic work has found that institutions do affect economic outcomes. In general, less 
heavily regulated financial markets are associated with higher growth (see Levine 2005 for a 
survey), less regulated labor markets are associated with lower unemployment (Nickell et al. 
2005, Blanchard and Wolfers 2000) and, on average, more competitive product markets are 
associated with more innovation (Nickell 1996, Blundell et al. 1999). These results are reflected 
in the popular view of mainstream economics and form much of the current policies for reform 
(for example, the European Union’s Lisbon Agenda). There is, however, theoretical and 
empirical evidence of more complex relationships. For example, increased product market 
competition has negative effects on innovation in initially technologically backward sectors 
(Aghion et al. 2005). Strict labor regulations may lead to unemployment through higher wage 
costs, but they may also increase workers’ commitment to invest in productivity enhancing 
innovation (Acemoglu 1997).              
 
This thesis finds three main results that further our understanding of how changes in institutions 
have differential effects on economic outcomes. Each of these results are explained by 
conventional models of industrial organization and growth. The results are:  
•  Increased product market competition decreases unemployment, but more so where 
labour market institutions give workers high bargaining power; 
•  Increased product market competition increases innovation more so in economies where 
good financial institutions have facilitated a high initial level of technology; and, 8 
 
•  Employment protection legislation encourages simple low-tech innovation, but 
discourages high-tech innovation.     
 
In addition to the relevance for employment and growth enhancing policies, the work increases 
our understanding of and the support for models of firm incentives. Each chapter, although 
primarily empirical in nature, develops or describes a theoretical model to explain and motivate 
the results. The empirical investigations use cross-industry, cross-country and cross-time 
variation in institutional variables in conjunction with firm level innovation data. Fixed effects 
are used to control for permanent unobservable differences in countries, industries or firms, 
depending on the data available. The author constructed the dataset that underpins most of this 
empirical study. This highly valuable data source was constructed by matching firm level 
accounts data for all registered firms in fifteen countries to their patent applications.
1 The 
creation and description of this dataset is the topic of the first chapter.  
 
The thesis proceeds as follows: 
Chapter 1 | Matching Patents to Firms’ Accounts 
This paper describes a new dataset that matches patent applicants at the European Patent Office 
to firm accounts data in Amadeus for all registered firms across fifteen European countries. The 
result is a valuable source of information on innovation at the firm level, linking data on firm 
accounts, industry sector and ownership with patent counts, citations and inventor data. The first 
part of the paper describes the matching process on detail and quantifies its success. The second 
part of the paper describes the new dataset and: i) investigates how measures of innovation 
intensity based on patents relates to measures based on R&D expenditures from an external 
source; ii) investigates the relationship between patenting and firm size; and, iii) introduces a 
measure of scientific complexity based on citations and relates this to how patenting is 
concentrated across firms. 
 
                                                 
1 The dataset increase the selection of firm level patent datasets available to the researchers. It adds to the existing 
Leverhulme dataset for listed UK firms and the NBER dataset for listed US firms (Hall et al. 2001). The new 
dataset’s usefulness comes from the fact that the sample covers fifteen European countries and the fact that it 
contains both large listed firms and small unlisted firms.    9 
 
Chapter  2  |  Product  Market  Reforms,  Labour  Market  Institutions  and 
Unemployment (joint with Rachel Griffith and Rupert Harrison) 
We analyze the impact of product market competition on unemployment, and how this depends 
on labour market institutions. Theoretically, both firms with market power and unions with 
bargaining power are constrained in their behaviour by the elasticity of demand in the product 
market. We use differential changes in regulations across OECD countries over the 1980s and 
1990s to identify the effects of competition. We find that increased competition reduces 
unemployment, more so in countries with labour market institutions that increase worker 
bargaining power. We also find that competition increases real wages, but less so when 
bargaining power is high. 
 
Chapter  3  |  Product  Market  Competition,  Financial  Institutions  and 
Innovation 
This paper finds evidence of complementarities between product market competition and 
financial institutions, as determinants of innovation. Recent research has found that product 
market competition increases innovation, particularly in sectors that are technologically 
advanced, i.e. have high initial innovation rates. Financial institutions that reduce monitoring 
costs faced by investors are theoretically associated with higher innovation rates. We find that 
increased competition has a bigger effect on innovation in the presence of such financial 
institutions. We use exogenous variation in competitive conditions across manufacturing 
industries and European countries that arose due to the adoption of the Single Market 
Programme. The positive effect of competition on innovation is found to be bigger in countries 
with more numerous credit institutions and lower deposit insurance. The results are robust to 
controlling for other institutions that may affect the competition-innovation relationship.  
 
Chapter  4  |  Employment  Protection  Legislation,  Multinational 
Enterprises and Innovation (joint with Rachel Griffith) 
The theoretical effects of labour regulations such as employment protection legislation (EPL) on 
innovation is ambiguous, and empirical evidence is thus far inconclusive. EPL increases job 
security and the greater enforceability of job contracts may increase worker investment in 10 
 
innovative activity. On the other hand EPL increases adjustment costs faced by firms, and this 
may lead to under-investment in activities that are uncertain including innovation and other 
technologically advanced activities. In this paper we find empirical evidence that multinational 
enterprises locate more innovative activity in countries with high EPL, however they locate 
technologically advanced innovation in subsidiaries located in countries with low EPL.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
Acemoglu, D. (1997). “Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market”, Review of 
Economic Studies, vol. 64, pp. 445-464. 
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R. and Howitt, P. (2005). ‘Competition and 
Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 120, no. 
2, pp. 701-728. 
Blanchard, O. and Wolfers, J. (2000). ‘The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of 
European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence’, ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. 113, C1-
C33. 
Blundell, R., Griffith, R. and Van Reenen, J. (1999). ‘Market Share, Market Value and 
Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms’, Review of Economic Studies 66: 
529-554.  
Hall, B., Jaffe, A. and Trajtenberg, M. (2001). ‘The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, 
Insights and Methodological Tools’, NBER Working Paper no. 8498. 
Saint-Paul, G. (1997). “Is labour rigidity harming Europe’s competitiveness? The effect of job 
protection on the pattern of trade and welfare”, European Economic Review, vol. 41, pp. 
499-506. 
Levine, R. (2005). ‘Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence’, in (P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, 
eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth, ed. 1, vol. 1, ch. 12, pp. 865-934, Elsevier. 
Nickell S., Nunziata L. and Ochel W. (2005). ‘Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960s. 
What do we know?’, ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. 115, pp. 1-27.  
Nickell, S. (1996). ‘Competition and Corporate Performance’, Journal of Political Economy 104, 
 no.  4:724-746. 11 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 | MATCHING PATENTS TO FIRMS’ ACCOUNTS 
Gareth Macartney 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper describes a new dataset that matches patent applicants at the European Patent Office 
to firm accounts data in Amadeus for all registered firms across fifteen European countries. The 
result is a valuable source of information on innovation at the firm level, linking data on firm 
accounts, industry sector and ownership with patent counts, citations and inventor data. The first 
part of the paper describes the matching process on detail and quantifies its success. The second 
part of the paper describes the new dataset and: i) investigates how measures of innovation 
intensity based on patents relates to measures based on R&D expenditures from an external 
source; ii) investigates the relationship between patenting and firm size; and, iii) introduces a 
measure of scientific complexity based on citations and relates this to how patenting is 
concentrated across firms.     
 
 
Acknowledgements: The analysis contained in this paper was funded by the ESRC/EPSRC 
Advanced Institute of Management Research (AIM) and the ESRC Centre at the IFS. The 
creation of the dataset was part of a joint IFS-CEP (Centre for Economic Performance) project 
involving Laura Abramovsky, Sharon Belenzon, Nick Bloom, Rachel Griffith, Rupert Harrison 
and John Van Reenen, the author’s specific contribution was the matching and validation of the 
dataset described herein. The author would also like to thank Bronwyn Hall, Suzanne Prantl, 
Grid Thoma, Colin Webb and participants at the European Policy for Intellectual Property 2006 
workshop in Milan for helpful comments and suggestions. Responsibility for any results, 
opinions, and errors lies with the author alone. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many questions in economics focus on innovation by corporations. How do industry 
characteristics affect firms’ incentives to innovate? How do firms finance innovation? 
How do national institutions affect firms’ incentives to innovate? How much innovation 
is carried out by incumbents rather than entrants? How does firm ownership relate to 
innovation? Such questions call for firm level measures of innovation that can be linked 
to industrial sectors and accounting data, for a population of large and small firms, across 
different countries. This paper describes the creation of such a dataset, achieved through 
the matching of firm names in the accounting system Amadeus to applicant names from 
the European Patent Office (EPO). The dataset provides a measure of firm level 
innovation that is consistent across countries, as an EPO patent is a well defined object 
that follows strict administrative rules. As important is the sheer richness of patent data. 
Figure 1.1 shows a typical EPO patent document, containing information on the 
applicants, the inventors, the technology classification, the date of application, and the 
date of granting. Additionally, patents must cite other patents that they are 
technologically related to, giving a measure of the importance of the invention by way of 
patent citations. Patents also cite academic journals, enabling researchers to link patented 
technology to fundamental scientific research. Linking this information, as we have done, 
to time varying accounts data including firm ownership, asset size, employees, industry 
sector, indebtedness and cash flow for a very large population of firms gives a dataset 
able to facilitate very many research applications.
2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Amadeus is produced by Bureau van Dijk Electronic publishing (see 
http://www.bvdep.com/en/companyInformationHome.html). 13 
 
Figure 1.1: A Typical EPO Patent 
 
 
How good are patents as a measure of innovation? Griliches (1990) notes, patent statistics 
“…are available; …are by definition related to inventiveness, and … are based on what 
appears to be an objective and only slowly changing standard”. Our dataset has some 
advantages over a widely used measure of innovation in the form of declared R&D 
expenditure. Firstly, R&D expenditure is available at the aggregate industry level in the 
ANBERD dataset
3, but is often not available at the firm level, and certainly not for small 
and medium sized firms. Secondly, the tax treatment of R&D expenditure differs 
significantly across countries, whereas patent applications and grants at the EPO must 
adhere to an objective standard irrespective of the country of origin of the applicant.
4 
Thirdly, unlike patents, R&D expenditure data brings no supplementary information: we 
observe simply that a dollar was spent on research and development, we do not observe if 
an invention resulted, who invented it, where the research was performed, what type of 
technology was invented or anything else. Of course patents are by no means a perfect 
measure of innovation (see Griliches 1990 for a survey on the uses of patent statistics). 
Many productivity enhancing innovations do not require patenting and certain industrial 
sectors traditionally rely on secrecy as a way of protecting their intellectual property. 
                                                 
3 The OECD’s Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development database. See www.oecd.org. 
4 There are differences across countries in the value of holding a patent at the EPO in that, although 
technically EPO patents carry the same protection, when it comes to actual litigation this must be carried 
out in the country of infraction, the cost of which is subject to the efficiency of the courts in that country. 
See Chapter 3 for discussion.  14 
 
Patenting may be used by firms to deter entry rather than to protect real innovations, and 
the illegal strategy of repeatedly patenting the same technology has been observed. 
Furthermore, the economic value of many patents is very low and its distribution very 
highly skewed (Schankerman and Pakes 1986, Scherer 1998).
5 Both R&D expenditure 
data and patents data have been widely used in research and I show in this paper that our 
patent based measure is highly correlated at the country-industry level with R&D 
measures from OECD’s ANBERD.  
Three other datasets are closely related to ours. Firstly, the dataset of Hall, Jaffe and 
Tratjenberg (2001) which consists of listed US firms in the Compustat accounting system 
matched to patents at the United State Patents and Trademark Office (USPTO). Secondly, 
the IFS-Leverhulme dataset (see Bloom and Van Reenen 2002), which consists of listed 
UK firms in the Datastream accounting system matched to patents at the USPTO. 
Although the accounts information in these datasets is more detailed than that in 
Amadeus and has longer time series variation, our dataset has two advantages. One, it is 
available across a sample of countries, and two, the firm universe consists of both listed 
and non-listed firms. For researchers this enables the investigation of cross-country 
patterns of innovation and the investigation of how innovation varies across large and 
small firms. A third dataset that is very closely related to our dataset is that of Thoma and 
Torrisi (2007) which contains matches of Amadeus accounts for 2,197 listed European 
firms and their subsidiaries to patent applications at the EPO. Thoma and Torrisi (2007) 
differs from our dataset in that it focuses on matching a much smaller sample of firms 
using a sophisticated similarity string index. The current matching exercise builds heavily 
on the lessons learnt by the researchers on all three of these projects.               
The key challenge in the creation of the dataset is the matching of patent applicants in the 
EPO to firm names in the accounting system Amadeus. This is no small task given that: i) 
the matching can only be performed by comparing names, which have been keyed in to 
each system by hand; ii) company names, corporate extensions and characters sets are 
very different across countries; and iii) there is a large number of entities in both systems 
(1.7 million UK firms in Amadeus, for example). These challenges are met by writing 
computer software that includes a name standardization algorithm that cleans names and 
converts permutations of corporate legal extensions into standard formats. The match was 
                                                 
5 However, as mentioned, citations data can be used to distinguish high value patents from low value 
patents. 15 
 
performed at different levels of accuracy, including a full name match and a stem name 
match, and the level of accuracy of each match is recorded for the researcher. Where 
possible the Derwent (2000) industrial standard for converting corporate extensions to 
standard formats for many different countries was followed. Multiple matches are 
resolved using supplementary information, such as applicant/firm address, where 
available. Persistent conflicts and mismatches are resolved manually, and the software 
incorporates these corrections into the dataset. The design of the software is modular, in 
that separate components can be executed independently of one another. For example, the 
name standardization procedure can be called from any dataset simply specifying the 
variable that contains names to be standardised; the matching procedure will match any 
two datasets with the relevant variables. Therefore, this project makes two contributions 
for researchers in this area: firstly, the matched dataset and secondly, the matching 
software which, once publicly available, can be used to construct similar datasets. 
This paper separates into two distinct sections. Section 2 describes the data sources and 
the matching process in detail, and measures the success of the match. Section 3 
describes the dataset, providing summary statistics and: i) compares the dataset at an 
industry level to the ANBERD dataset based on R&D expenditure, finding a strong 
positive correlation between the two measures; ii) investigates how patenting relates to 
firm size, finding a positive relationship that is diminishing, suggesting that small firms 
value patent protection more than large firms, as is consistent with the existing literature; 
and, iii) introduces a measure of the scientific complexity of innovation based on 
citations, and investigates how this relates to the concentration of patenting across firms 
within industries. Section 2 and 3 are written to be standalone so that readers who are not 
matching aficionados can go directly to Section 3. A final section concludes. 
2. MATCHING 
2.1.  Data Sources 
2.1.1.  Patents 
Our source of information on patents is the recently created EPO Worldwide Patent 
Statistical Database (hereafter PATSTAT), described in European Patent Office (2006). 
This database has been designed to be the European patent research community’s 
strategic source of patent and citation information. The PATSTAT database is based on 16 
 
the EPO’s search dataset: the database used when searching for related innovations as 
part of the patent approval process. To facilitate this search it contains information on 
patent applications to the USPTO and all major national patent offices. Although not used 
in our dataset, PATSTAT is a potentially good source of information for these patents as 
well, although data quality appears to be less good for data from national patent offices. 
The PATSTAT dataset is related to other patent data sources. Another source of EPO 
patent applications is the EPO Espace Bulletin CD-ROM
6. This contains all bibliographic 
and legal status data on all European patent applications and granted patents, although no 
information on citations. Although very useful as a look-up tool this applications is not as 
conducive to large sample manipulation as PATSTAT, which was designed for this 
purpose. Another related dataset is the OECD’s Triadic database on the sub-sample of 
patents that are registered in all three main patents offices: the EPO, the Japanese Patent 
Office (JPO) and the USPTO. For triadic patents it is possible to match in detailed 
information on the underlying USPTO patents and companies from the Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2001) dataset and on the underlying EPO patents and companies from our 
dataset. Prior to the creation of PATSTAT the best available source for citations data was 
the OECD’s citations database.
7   
Our target population for matching consists of patent applications to the EPO filed 
between December 1978 and February 2004 by corporate applicants from fifteen selected 
countries. December 1978 is the date that the EPO first took applications for European 
wide patent protection, and February 2004 is the most recent month for which we have 
the PATSTAT dataset. The fifteen countries selected were those thought to innovate the 
most. Column 1 of Table 2.1 shows the total number of patent applications for each 
selected country and column 2 shows the total number of applications where at least one 
of the applicants is a corporation.  
 
                                                 
6 For a description of the dataset see the brochure at www.european-patent- office.org. 
7 For the OECD Triadic and Citations databases see www.oecd.org. 17 
 
Table 2.1: Patents filed at the European Patent Office, 1978-2005 
Country  Number of patent applications  Number of patent applications 
with at least one corporate 
applicant 
 (1)  (2) 
United Kingdom  87,786  75,757 
Germany 330,029 296,323 
Netherlands 59,848  55,841 
Finland 15,986  14,869 
Sweden 33,825  29,389 
Belgium 15,687 12,907 
Norway 4,849 3,854 
Spain 7,780  5,461 
Denmark 10,916  9,532 
Italy 54,043  46,688 
France 125,854  112,666 
Czech Republic  512  335 
Poland 566 354 
Portugal 421  304 
Greece 678 214 
Total 748,780  664,494 
 
Corporate applicants are identified as those names that either: i) contain a well known 
corporate identifier or; ii) do not contain a university or government identifier and are not 
written in the standard format in PATSTAT for an individual (usually an inventor). A 
random sample of the resulting classification is then checked manually. We can see from 
Figure 2.1 that there has been a significant increase in patent applications at the EPO 
since it was created in 1978. Figure 2.1 shows that this increase is wide-spread for 
applications from different European countries, the trend in part likely due to 
substitutions from national patent offices to the EPO and, in later stages, likely part of the 
well documented general increase in patenting. Figure 2.1 also shows this trend by 
corporate patent applicants. The evident close within country correlation of “all” patent 
applications and “corporate” patent applications in Figure 2.1 suggests that our somewhat 
approximate classification of corporate patenting is at least consistent over time. Patent 
applications are truncated at 2004. This is because we use the April 2006 version of 
PATSTAT which contains patents where the application has been published (note, this 
does not mean granted) and there is a time lag of 18 months between patent filing and 18 
 
publication of the application. Therefore 2003 is an upper limit to the useable sample 
period of the first version of our dataset.  
Figure 2.1: Number of Patent Applications by Year of Application 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the number of patent applications by application year, but only for 
patents that were eventually granted. Again the lines for “all” patent applications and 
“corporate” patent applications closely follow each other. In all countries the graphs are 
heavily truncated from around the mid 1990s, due to the lag between patent application 
and patent granting.     
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Figure 2.2: Number of Granted Patent Applications by Year of Application 
 
 
2.1.2.  Accounts 
Our primary source for European company accounts information is Amadeus. Each firm 
in Amadeus has a unique identifier called a BVD number.
8 Amadeus is available to us for 
the years 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2004 and 2006.
9 This dataset contains full 
accounts going back up to ten years for firms both ‘active’ and ‘inactive’ in these years. 
For each year active firms are those that have filed accounts in that year, whereas inactive 
firms are those that have not, but have filed accounts in at least one of the four preceding 
years. If a firm does not file accounts for five years that firm is dropped from Amadeus 
on the fifth year. Accounts are reported unconsolidated for subsidiaries, but are 
consolidated at the parent level. As well as accounts, information is held on ownership 
structure and industrial sector. Name changes are not recorded in Amadeus, but are 
available for UK firms only from the FAME database.
10 Table 2.2 shows the total number 
of firms for each country in column 1, the number which have an ultimate owner 
                                                 
8 Although broadly true we shall see that this number is not always a unique identifier of firms, due to poor 
data quality. 
9 It is very time consuming to download Amadeus data from the CDs, and because each CD holds account 
data for the preceding ten years and because when firms stop filing accounts (as a result of bankruptcy, say) 
BVD wait for four years before excluding them, we need not download data for 2002, 2003 and 2005.  
10 Financial Analysis Made Easy. Like Amadeus this is a Bureau van Dijk product, see www.bvdep.com. 20 
 
recorded by Amadeus in column 2, the number that are recorded as inactive in the most 
recent Amadeus version in column 3, and the number that appeared in earlier versions of 
Amadeus but were subsequently dropped due to a lack of account filings for a period 
longer than four years in column 4.  
 
Table 2.2: Firms in Amadeus 
Country 
  
Firms in Amadeus  With Ultimate 
Owner 
Inactive Dropped 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
United Kingdom  1,989,345  154,077  577,615  21,333 
Germany 893,245  39,970  0  109,810 
Netherlands 351,906  131,933  22,198  19,658 
Finland  90,203  7,095 0 8,940 
Sweden 255,428  45,399  11,328  4,110 
Belgium 343,439  28,490  11,356  16,263 
Norway 174,884  18,755  34,280  1,609 
Spain 818,928  37,200  51,580  11,375 
Denmark 158,654  27,700  25,298  1,018 
Italy 545,281  11,518  21,057  11,561 
France 957,429  59,024  29,931  24,289 
Czech  Republic  49,788  1,246 1,536 1,491 
Poland  35,924  2,719 2,025 8,218 
Portugal 82,421  4,089  4,758  0 
Greece  28,969  1,145 2 2,150 
Notes: (1) The number of firms present in at least one of the versions of Amadeus from 1996, 1997, 1999,  
2000, 2001, 2004, 2006. 
(2) Those in column (1) with an Amadeus ultimate owner.  
(3) Those in column (1) that are inactive- have not filed accounts for the last four years. 
(4) Those in column (1) that have been dropped from more recent versions of Amadeus. 
 
Although not shown here, the sample of firms increases over time. There are two reasons 
for this. Firstly, we miss firms that have died prior to 1992 as this is earlier than the 
earliest edition of Amadeus that we have, 1996, minus the four year retention period for 
inactive firm accounts. Secondly, the coverage for Amadeus increases over the sample 
period, with quite an increase in the 2004 edition. These factors mean that our matching 
success rate increases greatly with time. This may have serious implications for some 
research applications. Particular attention should be paid to this source of bias in 
applications where explanatory variables may be correlated with firm deaths, in studies of 
competition for example. A “safe” sample period in our dataset is 1995 to 2003, where 21 
 
the upper limit is defined by the truncation of patent applications.
11 Naturally, earlier and 
later years may be useful depending on the research application. It should be noted that 
we do not try to match on year of activity as well as name, the matching is performed on 
name alone, so that if a firm is observed in the accounts data from 1999 onwards, say, but 
observed filing a patent in 1990 then this firm would be successfully matched to that 
patent, the assumption being that the firm is active even though we do not observe its 
accounts. 
The Amadeus accounts information was downloaded and organised by Nick Bloom and 
Sharon Belenzon at the Centre for Economic Performance. Sharon Belenzon wrote an 
algorithm that improved the ownership information in Amadeus. For more information 
see Belenzon (2007).              
2.2.  The Matching Process 
The goal of matching is to match each corporate patent applicant uniquely to a firm BVD  
number in Amadeus. The key final output of matching is a list of patent applicant names, 
the number of patents they have filed, the firm name and BVD number to which they 
have matched and a code indicating the method by which the match was achieved. Given 
the very large population of firms in Amadeus we expect to match a very large proportion 
of corporate patent applicants. Amadeus contains all registered firms in Europe so, if the 
matching process were perfect, we would expect to match virtually all corporate patent 
applicants. Of course given the realities of manually entered data into two separate 
computer systems, PATSTAT and Amadeus, for applicant and company names in fifteen 
different languages there are significant challenges to be overcome by the process.  
The first step of the matching process is to create lists of standardised patent applicant 
names and standardised firm account names. The next step is to identify the target sample 
of corporate patent applicants, as non-corporate applicants cannot be matched to firm 
accounts. The standardised names are then matched together, in the first instance using 
the full string and in the second instance a “stem” name which has had the corporate legal 
identifier removed. Where this leads to multiple matches, these are resolved using 
ownership and address information, or by hand. As there is significant country specific 
processing the process runs country by country, UK applicants are matched to UK 
                                                 
11 At the EPO there is delay of 18 months from when a patent application is filed and when the application 
is published and therefore likely to appear in PATSTAT.  22 
 
registered firms and so on.
12 At the end of this automated matching process each country 
is checked manually, with an emphasis on ensuring that very large patenters are matched 
successfully and known big R&D spenders are accounted for (global companies that 
spend a lot on R&D are listed in the UK government’s R&D scoreboard).
13 The matching 
process therefore consists of four logical components: name standardisation; automated 
matching; resolution of multiple matching; and manual matching. A further component 
records how matching was achieved and measures success. This section describes each of 
these components in turn, detailing the steps in each process. The software is modular in 
that each component can be run independently of the others, if given the appropriate 
inputs. It is generic enough that, with some formatting, it can match any two lists of 
company names for fifteen different European countries. The actual code is not 
reproduced here but is available from the author on request, however the name 
standardisaion rules used in addition to the Derwent (2000) standard and the strings used 
to identify non-corporate applicants are listed in Table A1 and A2 respectively for 
reference (see Appendix). 
There are many idiosyncrasies in the storage of data in both PATSTAT and Amadeus. 
The general approach here is one of pragmatism: these quirks are exploited where useful 
and handled as practically as possible where troublesome. 
2.2.1.  Name Standardisation 
The key problem trying to match EPO applicant names to Amadeus firm names is that 
the names can be keyed in differently into each system. Therefore we first standardise the 
names in each system before matching. As a starting point we use the codification 
suggested in Derwent (2000)
14. This helps us greatly with standardising commonly used 
descriptors across the many European countries in our sample, and enables us to 
harmonise our matching software with other researchers in this field.
15 However, the 
Derwent list is not exhaustive and we supplement it with name standisation that we have 
found useful from experience.
16 Essentially, the standardisation involves replacing 
                                                 
12 The applicant’s country is recorded in PATSTAT and the firm’s country of registration is recorded in 
Amadeus. 
13 www.innovation.gov.uk/rd_scoreboard/downloads/2006_rd_scoreboard_analysis.pdf 
14 See Appendix 2 of Derwent (2000). 
15 The use of Derwent’s codification was agreed as a general approach at the EPIP “Patent Data for 
Economic Analysis” workshop of February 2006.  
16 Our own standardization is listed in Table 2.5. 23 
 
commonly used strings which symbolise the same thing, for example, in UK company 
names the strings “Ltd.” and “Limited” are replaced by “LTD”. The process also handles 
other issues concerned with spaces, punctuation and accented characters. The main steps 
of name standardisation are as follows: 
1.  Accented characters are widely used in many European countries. PATSTAT and 
Amadeus use slightly different character sets and so accented characters are replaced 
with non-accented equivalents, for example u umlaut becomes “ue”. 
2.  Convert to upper case characters. Convert “AND”, “ET”, “Y”, “UND” and so on, to 
“&”. Remove all other punctuation. 
3.  Create standard name by replacing corporate extensions with their commonly used 
acronyms. For example replace “LIMITED” with “LTD”, “SOCIETE ANONYME” 
with “SA”. Use first the Derwent standard and supplement with further conversions 
we know to be useful (Table A1). Note that the order in which these commands are 
performed is key: for example, we must try to convert SOCIETE ANONYME DITE 
to “SAD” before we can convert SOCIETE ANONYME to “SA”. 
4.  Create stem name by taking the standard name and removing corporate extensions, 
remembering that in some countries the extension can come at the front of the string. 
5.  Identify non-corporates. This is unnecessary for Amadeus as all entries are corporate. 
In PATSTAT identifying non-corporates is essential as many applicants are 
individuals and some applicants are universities and government departments which 
will not match to Amadeus. Non-corporate individuals are identified for PATSTAT 
as names without recognized corporate identifiers that contain at least one comma in 
the original applicant name, exploiting the observed pattern that inventor names are 
always entered in the format “Eddison, Thomas”. Non-corporate institutions are 
identified for both PATSTAT and Amadeus as names without recognized corporate 
identifiers that do contain recognized institutional identifiers, such as “university”. 
Non-corporates are not removed from the matching process, they are simply flagged 
so that the success rate of matching can be calculated conditional on corporate 
entities.    
6.  Strip out spaces from standard name and stem name. 24 
 
As an example, name standardization changes the name “British Nuclear Fuels Public 
Limited Company” to the standard name “BRITISHNUCLEARFUELSPLC” and the 
stem name “BRITISHNUCLEARFUELS”.   
2.2.2.  Automated Matching 
The matching process is country specific. For a specified country it takes all EPO 
applicants with applicant country equal to that specified and tries to match them to a list 
of Amadeus firms registered in that country. The process is iterative in nature, in that it 
initially tries to match at the highest level of accuracy and, if this fails, it tries to match 
using more relaxed criteria. The automated matching steps are as follows: 
1.  Take each patent applicant standard name and try to match to an Amadeus standard 
name. 
2.  For some UK firms the accounting system FAME contains up to four previous 
company names, which is useful as companies may have changed names since 
patenting. The matching process takes those UK applicants that have not matched in 
the first step and tries to match them to standarised old firm names.  
3.  Take those applicants that have still not matched and try to find an Amadeus firm 
with the same stem name. 
2.2.3.  Resolving Multiple Matches 
Multiple matches are identified as those where a patent applicant matches to more than 
one Amadeus BVD number. These occur quite frequently and for several reasons.  
Firstly, although rare, different BVD numbers can have the same standard name, 
particularly if punctuation is used as part of the name. For example the firms 
“1…Limited” and “1@ Limited” both have the standard name “1LTD”.   
Secondly, the less exact matching using stem name leads to multiple matches. Stem 
names can be common across more than one BVD number, for example across 
subsidiaries of the same parent firm. For example: “Accent Limited” and “Accent 
Investments Limited” have the same stem name “ACCENT”. Multiple matches like this 
can be resolved using address information, if the patent applicant has the same zip code 
as one of the Amadeus firm names. Or, failing that, the multiple match can be resolved 
using ownership information, if both firms are owned by the same parent or if one firm 
owns the other the patent is ascribed to the owner. 25 
 
Thirdly, due to poor Amadeus data quality, firms with different BVD numbers can have 
identical names. For example (name, BVD number): 
ADAMS ARMATUREN GMBH       DE405067458   
ADAMS ARMATUREN GMBH     DE4050067458 
Often supplementary information is exactly the same suggesting the entries are identical. 
In this example the date of incorporation is 08/11/1985 for both entries. But the first entry 
is listed as ‘dead’ and has a zip code, whereas the second is ‘live’ and does not have a zip 
code. Here the BVD is different only in that the second one has an extra zero. Similar 
examples occur many times for Germany and for some Eastern European countries, 
always with BVDs that differ only by an extra zero, where most times the record with the 
extra zero is live and the one without is dead. The exact reason for this is unknown, 
although it may be due to the merging of different company registration datasets in these 
countries, where some companies have been registered in more than one system, perhaps 
once at a local level and once again at a national level.
17 The approximate solution to this 
is to check if the BVD numbers differ only by an extra zero and if so, assign to the BVD 
with the extra zero. A similar pattern is observed for Poland although the BVD numbers 
tend to be different by more than one zero. In the case of Poland, in general where one 
record is live and the other is not, the live one tends to have the longer BVD, and 
therefore for Poland the multiple match is resolved by matching to the longer number. 
The matching algorithm resolves matches with the following steps, where the order is one 
of decreasing exactness. The manner of resolution is recorded for the researchers’ 
information. 
1.  Check if original PATSTAT applicant name (i.e. before standardisation) exactly 
matches original Amadeus name for one of the Amadeus BVD numbers. If yes, 
match to this name. This resolves a few rare anomalies such as the example of 
“1LTD” described above.   
2.  Check if BVDs have exactly the same firm name and one BVD number is longer than 
the other. The longer BVD number is more often listed as active than the shorter 
BVD number, therefore match to the longer BVD number. 
                                                 
17 This was suggested by Suzanne Prantl as a likely explanation for the case of Germany. 26 
 
3.  Check if zip code held for the PATSTAT applicant appears in the address of the 
Amadeus firms. If it appears for only one Amadeus firm then match patent applicant 
to that firm.
18    
4.  Check if the ultimate owner BVD numbers are the same for all of the Amadeus firms 
to which a patent applicant has matched. If yes then assign patent applicant to the 
ultimate owner BVD number. Similarly, check if one of the Amadeus firms to which 
the patent applicant has matched owns all of the other firms, if yes then assign the 
patent applicant to that BVD number. 
Unresolved multiple matches are always excluded from the final output. 
2.2.4.  Manual Matching 
The automated matching process can lead to two types of errors: 
Type I errors - Missed Matches 
These errors occur when the process fails to find a match for a patent applicant, where the 
correct firm does exist in Amadeus. This will be possible where the main part of the 
name has been keyed incorrectly into one of the systems (“Marconi” written “Manconi”, 
for example), and will always be a problem with the “exact” matching technique that we 
have followed. This is probably less of a problem if following the approximate string 
matching approach adopted by Thoma and Torrisi (2007), although presumably Type II 
errors will be more likely.  
Type II errors – False Matches 
These errors occur when the process uniquely matches a patent applicant to the wrong 
firm. This is most likely to occur with matches on stem name, as this uses a shortened 
version of the applicant/firm name.  
To handle Type I errors automatically would require a more advanced matching 
technique, such as the Thoma and Torrisi (2007) method. For the purpose of our project, 
which used such a large target population of firms from Amadeus, the cost of writing 
such advanced software was deemed to outweigh the benefits, especially given the high 
matching success rates that we have managed to achieve with our technique (as we shall 
see in the next section). Automatically correcting Type II errors is not really feasible 
                                                 
18 One other attempt was made to resolve matches based on the date of firm incorporation, the idea being 
that matches to patents filed before the firm incorporated must be invalid. This happened so frequently it 
was abandoned; it appears that many firms re-incorporate for reasons unknown and that the date of 
incorporation in Amadeus is useless as an indicator of firm birth.  27 
 
giving the patchy availability of supplementary data. For example, it is not desirable to 
only accept a match if the address information also matches as this data is not always 
available, and where it is, can be different for a variety of trivial reasons, such as small 
geographical relocations between the time of patent application and the time of most 
recent accounts filing. Therefore, both Type I and Type II errors must be checked 
manually. There is one exception to this in that matches of patent applicants that are 
identified as non-corporate to Amadeus firms are always discarded as they are always 
erroneous. For example the inventor name “Thomson, Martin” will match on stem name 
to “Thomson Martin Limited” although they are clearly unrelated. A report containing a 
list of non-corporates is produced by the automated matching process and is checked 
manually, to ensure that non-corporates have been correctly identified.  
Given human resource constraints the emphasis of manual checking has been on ensuring 
that very large patenters are matched correctly. Manual matching is facilitated by a report 
produced by the automated process listing patent applicant names, the number of patent 
applications they have filed, whether or not they have matched, and, if they have 
matched, the name and BVD number of the firm(s) that they have matched to. To 
eradicate individual manual matcher bias, a list of steps to be followed was circulated 
among the team of researchers who performed the manual matching.
19 Broadly, the steps 
followed were:  
1.  Attempt to match big patenters that have failed to match (handling type I errors). 
Take part of the applicant name and search in the unprocessed Amadeus files for that 
string. Search other data sources, such as the internet, for that applicant name. Has it 
been subject to acquisition? If yes, find new parent firm and assign patents to that 
firm. Has it been subject to name change? If yes, find new name in Amadeus and 
assign patent to that firm. 
2.  Check that firms identified in the R&D Scoreboard as large spenders on R&D are 
present in the dataset and have matched. If they have not matched then follow 
procedures in step 1 to find a suitable match. In some instances high R&D spend is 
not related to patenting; this is normally sector specific, for example there is very 
little patenting in the software industry as computer software is not normally covered 
by patent protection. 
                                                 
19 The manually matching was performed by researchers at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, namely Laura 
Abramovsky, Rachel Griffith, Rupert Harrison and Gareth Macartney. 28 
 
3.  Check that automated matching has matched big patenters correctly (handling type II 
errors). This is done by sight. Names are visually checked and supplementary 
information, such as addresses, are ensured to be consistent. 
4.  Attempt to resolve multiples matches for big patenters that were not resolved by the 
automated process (type I errors). This is done using external data sources, such as 
the internet, to find information on corporate structure that may enable resolution. 
5.  Check that multiples matches that have been resolved for big patenters have been 
resolved correctly (type II errors). This is done by sight. Specifically check that if 
resolved by ownership or address information that this data matches in some 
reasonable sense across the patent applicant and the matched firm. 
2.2.5.  Setting Match Codes and Reporting Success 
From the full matching process just described, matches between patent applicant and 
firms can be achieved by a number of methods, each of which indicates a varying degree 
of exactness. Unresolved multiple matches and matches of identified non-corporate 
applicants are excluded from the final output. However, researchers may be more 
comfortable using only matches on standardised name and excluding matches on stem 
name. Or they may wish to use only unique matches and exclude resolved multiple 
matches. Therefore a code that uniquely defines the type of each match is produced along 
with final output of applicant names and firm names and BVD numbers. This gives the 
researcher flexibility in choosing the level of exactness required for their application. The 
match codes are listed in Table A3 (see Appendix).  
The final step of the matching process is to measure success and a report recording 
success rate for each country is produced automatically. This reports: i) the proportion of 
corporate patent applicants that have been matched; ii) the proportion of patent weighted 
patent applicants that have been matched; and iii) the breakdown of these success rates by 
matching method. These success rates are discussed in detail in the next section.  
2.3.  Matching Results 
The first sub-section here describes the success of the matching performed following the 
process described in Section 2. The second sub-section briefly describes the final output 
of the process available to researchers.  29 
 
2.3.1.  Measuring Success 
Figure 2.3 shows graphs of matching success, measured as the percentage of corporate 
patents that have at least one applicant matched uniquely to an Amadeus firm, plotted 
against year of patent application.  
 
Figure 2.3: Percentage of Patents by Corporations Matched by Year of Application 
 
 
The year of application runs from the opening of the EPO in 1978 to 2003 (the years 
2004 and 2005 have been excluded from this graph as patent applications are heavily 
truncated after 2003, as discussed). The graphs are ordered by average success, with the 
most successfully matched country coming first and the least successfully matched 
country coming last. The most successfully matched country is the one that the 
researchers know most about: the United Kingdom. The ordering of success reflects 
another bias, namely that countries with a large volume of patenting were given priority 
over those with low patenting activity. The four least successfully matched countries are 
also the four lowest patenting countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal and Greece, 
see Table 2.1 for patenting activity), and their matching success rate shows great 
volatility over the time period. In the other 11 countries the matching success rate 
increases over the time period. This attenuated success rate in early years is due to firms 30 
 
that have filed patent applications and subsequently gone out of business, and are 
therefore not alive in our period of observation for firms, which is 1995 to 2006. With a 
constant hazard rate of death this is more likely to happen the further back we go from 
the observation period. In many cases we can see a levelling off of the success rate in the 
latter part of the time period, that is, in years when the observed firm sample closely 
relates to the true population of registered firms. In a number of countries the success rate 
starts initially high, this simply reflects the fact that we successfully match the very few 
patents applied for in the early years of the EPO, which may have been 
disproportionately applied for by large firms that are more likely to survive until the firm 
observation period. 
Table 2.3 shows the match results across countries for the entire time period, with the 
same ordering of countries by decreasing overall matching success (ordered by column 
9). Column 2 shows the number of unique applicants responsible for the patent 
applications observed for each country (where a unique applicant is one with a unique 
standard name). Column 3 shows the number of these applicants that are corporate and 
column 4 shows the number of these corporate applicants that have been matched to firm 
accounts for each country. Column 5 shows this as a percentage, so for the United 
Kingdom we can see that we have matched 70 percent of corporate applicants by all 
matching methods at our disposal. This success rate is considerably lower for other 
countries. Column 6 shows the number of these matched applicants that have been 
matched to a unique company account in Amadeus (or have been matched to multiple 
accounts in the first instance but resolved by one of the methods described in Section 
2.2.3) and column 7 shows the percentage of corporate applicants that have been matched 
uniquely. Column 8 shows the percentage of corporate applicants matched weighted by 
their patent applications, and column 9 shows the same figure for unique matches and 
constitutes our key measure of success. The higher weighted success rates indicates that 
the matching process in disproportionately more successful at matching large patenting 
firms than small ones. This is in part likely due to higher survival rates for large firms 
that file patents in early years and is in part likely due to a deliberate effort in the manual 
matching phase of the process to ensure that large patenting firms are matched. The 
weighted unique success rate is over 50 percent for 12 of the 15 countries in the sample, 
and over 70 percent for 7 of the countries.  31 
 
 
Table 2.3: Applicants for EPO patents filed 1978-2004 matched to Amadeus firms from 1996-2006 
Country  No. of Applicants  No. of Corporate 
Applicants 
No. Matched  % Matched 
(4)/(3) 
No. Matched 
Uniquely 
% Matched Uniquely
(6)/(3) 
Weighted % 
Matched 
w*(4)/(3) 
Weighted % 
Matched Uniquely 
w*(6)/(3) 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
UK 21,950  14,495  10,196 0.70 10,089  0.70  0.88  0.88 
DE 48,486  26,814  14,856 0.55 14,153  0.53  0.88  0.86 
NL 7,693  5,382  2,445 0.45 2,395  0.45  0.86  0.85 
FI 3,117  1,996  1,178 0.59 1,034  0.52  0.84  0.78 
SE 9,315  5,238  2,537 0.48 2,516  0.48  0.75  0.75 
BE 3,723  2,129  1,103 0.52 1,031  0.48  0.75  0.73 
NO 2,241  1,283  788  0.61 751  0.59  0.73  0.72 
ES 4,338  2,434  1,264 0.52 1,255  0.52  0.69  0.68 
DK 3,653  2,363  1,277 0.54 1,259  0.53  0.76  0.63 
IT 18,918  12,577  6,590 0.52 5,647  0.45  0.65  0.60 
FR 26,460  15,184  5,523  0.36 4,980  0.33  0.60  0.57 
CZ 370  182  80  0.44  78  0.43  0.54  0.53 
PL 465  243  75  0.31  73  0.30  0.47  0.47 
PT 296  165  60  0.36  59  0.36  0.46  0.46 
GR 637  148  37  0.25  35  0.24  0.28  0.26 
Notes: (1) UK: United Kingdom, NL: Netherlands, SE: Sweden, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, DK: Denmark, NO: Norway, IT: Italy, FR: France, BE: Belgium, CZ: 
Czech Republic, GR: Greece, PL: Poland, PT - Portugal. (2) The number of unique standardised applicant/proprietor names. (3) The number of applicant/proprietors that we 
have identified as corporates (not university, individual or government department). (4) Number of corporate applicants which we have matched to one or more entries in 
Amadeus 
(5) The percentage of corporate applicants which we have matched to one or more entries in Amadeus. (6) Number of corporate applicants which we have matched to only one 
entry in Amadeus. (7) The percentage of corporate applicants which we have matched to only one entry in Amadeus. (8) The percentage of corporate applicants which we have 
matched to one or more entries in Amadeus, weighted by the applicant’s total number of patents. (9) The percentage of corporate applicants which we have matched to only one 
entry in Amadeus, weighted by the applicant’s total number of patents. 32 
 
 
Our most successfully matched country is the United Kingdom with a weighted unique 
success rate of 88 percent. This number compares favourably with the results in Figure 
19 of Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001), which shows the percentage of patents matched 
to Compustat in the NBER data by grant year. Given that Compustat contains US firms 
the equivalent success rate is for US-assigned patents. This is less than 70 percent for all 
grant years, peaking in the late 1980s and declining below 50 percent by 1999 (since the 
Compustat firms are those existing in 1989). Our success rates are higher as we have a 
larger target population of firms, as Amadeus contains accounts for both listed and 
unlisted firms, whereas Compustat contains accounts for only listed firms. 
Table 2.4 breaks down uniquely matched corporate applicants from (column 2 of Table 
2.4 corresponds to column 6 of Table 2.3) into the method by which they have been 
matched, weighted by the applicant’s proportion of patents held out of matched patents. 
For example, for the UK, 84 percent (column 4) of those matched did so on standard 
name, 7 percent (column 6) did so on stem name, 8 percent (column 8) on old name (only 
available for the UK), and a very small percentage were manually matched, 13 firms 
(column 9). Column 11 shows the number of applicants, from all methods, that matched 
to dropped or inactive firms, and we can see that this is a large proportion, 18 percent 
weighted by patents for the UK, which illustrate the importance of the use of old versions 
of Amadeus. The pattern is similar for nearly all countries in that the majority of matches 
are achieved using standard name, although Belgium is a noted exception, with most 
matches there achieved using stem name. The proportion of applicants that match to dead 
or inactive firms varies significantly across countries and is very high in some countries, 
75 percent in Germany for example. Firms become “inactive” in Amadeus if they fail to 
file accounts for the most recent year, therefore it is an indication of accounting activity 
and is not an indication that the firm has ceased trading or other activities.
20 
                                                 
20 It is likely used in Germany to distinguish duplicate records in Amadeus, as discussed in section 2.2.3. 33 
 
 
Table 2.4: Relative importance of each match method for uniquely matched corporate applicants 
All  Standard Name  Stem Name  Previous Name  Manual Match  Of Which, Dead or Inactive 
Country No.  of 
Applicants  
Matched 
Uniquely 
No. by this 
method 
As weighted 
% of matches
w*(3)/(2) 
No. by this 
method 
As weighted % 
of matches 
w*(5)/(2) 
 
No. by this 
method 
As weighted % 
of matches 
w*(7)/(2) 
No. by this 
method 
As weighted % 
of matches 
w*(9)/(2) 
No. of 
applicants that 
Matched to 
Dead Firms 
As weighted % 
of matches 
w*(11)/(2) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
UK 10,089  8819  0.84  424  0.07  833 0.08  13  0.01  2184  0.18 
DE  14,153  13001  0.71 1139 0.02  0  0  13  0.02 6853 0.75 
NL  2,395  2284  0.91 88 0.01  0  0  23 0.08  445  0.07 
FI  1,034  888 0.77 144 0.20  0  0  2  0.03 294 0.70 
SE  2,516  2429  0.71 74 0.01  0  0  13 0.28  165  0.04 
BE  1,031  275 0.38 753 0.61  0  0  3  0.02 436 0.56 
NO  751  681  0.82 67 0.13  0  0  3  0.05  111  0.08 
ES  1,255  1188  0.89 54 0.05  0  0  13 0.06  131  0.10 
DK  1,259  1115  0.88 133 0.05  0  0  11  0.03 176 0.05 
IT  5,647  4333 0.64 1295 0.22  0  0  19  0.14  601  0.16 
FR  4,980  3726 0.76 1237 0.10  0  0  17  0.15  826  0.12 
CZ  78 73  0.97 5 0.03 0  0  0 0.00 7 0.07 
PL  73 65  0.88 2 0.01 0  0  6 0.11 2 0.02 
PT  59 50  0.72 6 0.12 0  0  3 0.17 3 0.02 
GR  35 30  0.88 5 0.12 0  0  0 0.00 2 0.07 
Notes: (1) UK: United Kingdom, NL: Netherlands, SE: Sweden, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, DK: Denmark, NO: Norway, IT: Italy, FR: France, BE: Belgium, CZ: 
Czech Republic, GR: Greece, PL: Poland, BG: Bulgaria, PT-Portugal. (2) Number of applicants matched to only one entry in Amadeus (as in col (6) of Table 1). (3) The number 
of applicants matched using a standardised version of the name. (4) The percentage of all matches that matched using a standardised version of the name, weighted by 
applicant’s patents relative to matched patents. (5) The number of applicants matched using a stem version of the name. (6) The percentage of all matches that matched using a 
stem version of the name, weighted by applicant’s patents relative to matched patents. (7) The number of applicants matched using a previous version of the firms name (from 
FAME). (8) The percentage of all matches that matched using a previous version of the firm’s name, weighted by applicant’s patents relative to matched patents. (9) The number 
of applicants matched by hand. (10) The percentage of all matches that matched by hand, weighted by applicant’s patents relative to matched patents. (11) The number of 
applicants matched, by any method, to a dead or inactive firm. (12) The percentage of all matches that resulted, by any method, to an applicant matched to a dead or inactive 
firm, weighted by the applicant’s no. of patents relative to total no. of matched patents.34 
 
     
2.3.2.  Outputs 
This section describes the structure of the data produced by the matching process and will 
really only be of interest to those readers who are about to use the data.  
The core relationship in the dataset created by the matching process is a link of unique 
EPO patent application numbers to Amadeus firm BVD numbers. This and 
supplementary information on name standardisation of both EPO applicants and 
Amadeus firms constitute the key outputs of matching. Table A4 lists the data variables 
in the three entities that contain this information (see Appendix). They are described in 
turn here.    
1.  Patent BVD match – this file contains a unique list if EPO patent application numbers 
and Amadeus firm BVD numbers. It can link to the Amadeus accounts database on 
bvdidnumber and year to match patent activity to accounts information for each 
firm-year (where for the patent, the year is the year of filing the patent application). 
Extra patent information, such as inventors, citations, grant status and technology 
class can be obtained by linking to the PATSTAT database on appln_nr  (see 
European Patent Office 2006 for details on the information in PATSTAT). A basic 
measure of patent activity can be constructed by counting the number of unique 
patent applications filed each year by each unique BVD. Also included is the 
match_type variable which describes how the match was achieved (see Table A3 for 
a list of possible values).  
2.  Auxiliary Match File – this file contains all matched and unmatched applicant_name 
records, along with the match_type which defines how the match was achieved. The 
file also contains the standardised names for the applicants, number of patents and 
address information, and the applicant_type which identifies if the matching process 
identified the applicant as non-corporate (see Table A3 for a list of possible values). 
Where the applicant has matched to an Amadeus firm, the firm bvdidnumber, address 
information, activity status and ownership information is recorded. The purpose of 
this file is to give the researcher full information to judge the quality of the match. 
3.  Auxiliary Match File (Firms) – this file contains the full target population of 
Amadeus firms, i.e. all matched and unmatched firms. Also included is standardised 
name information and ownership data. This gives the researcher full information to 35 
 
explore cases where patent applicants have not matched to firms that the researcher 
may be particularly concerned about. The uo variable holds the BVD of the ultimate 
owner as created by Amadeus, the buo variable holds the BVD of the ultimate owner 
identified using CEP’s ownership algorithm (see Belenzon 2007). 
3. THE MATCHED DATASET 
This section has two purposes. The first is to further validate the data through: i) the 
description of patterns of patenting in the data, ensuring that they are intuitive; and ii) the 
comparison of our dataset with R&D expenditure. Section 3.1 will describe industry 
patterns of patenting and section 3.2 will describe country patterns of patenting and 
specialisation. The second purpose is to describe the dataset, investigating: i) how it 
relates to stylised facts concerning firm size and patenting (section 3.3); and ii) what it 
tells us about the scientific complexity of innovation in industries and how this relates to 
the concentration of patenting among firms (section 3.4).   
3.1.  Industry Patterns  
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the resulting dataset, with total patent applications 
between the years 1995 and 2002 summarised by country and two digit industry category 
for all firms. The total number of patents applied for in this period by matched 
corporations equals 236,935. Of these, 161,478 were applied for by firms operating in 
manufacturing and 73,324 by firms operating in services (see final column of Table 3.1). 
Within manufacturing the five most prolific sectors in our sample are: Machinery and 
Equipment (25,717 applications); Chemicals, excluding pharmaceuticals (23,022 
applications); Electrical Machinery and Apparatus (20,547 applications); Motor Vehicles, 
Trailers and Semi-Trailers (20,303 applications); and Radio, Television and 
Communication Equipment (19,880 applications). Pharmaceuticals (11,619 applications) 
and Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments (10,300 applications) are sixth and 
seventh highest respectively.  36 
 
Table 3.1: Country-Industry Breakdown of Matched Patent Applications 1995-2002 
Industry  Country
  BE CZ DK FI  FR  DE  GR IT NL  NO  PO  PT  ES  SE  UK  Sector 
Totals 
AGRICULTURE, HUNTING AND 
FORESTRY 
0  6   7 10  1  0 21  0    1  5 3 53 107 
FISHING      1        4       1 4 10 
MINING AND QUARRYING   1  0  15 37    81 97  335      9 1  256  832 
Agriculture and Mining sub-totals  0  1  6  0  23  47  1  81  118  339  0  1  14  5  313  949 
FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES 
AND TOBACCO 
40 1 36  39 71 221  3  113  1733  9 1  20 11  1142  3440 
TEXTILES  22 1 11  28 123 273  2  113 15 8 0  9  15 170 790 
WEARING APPAREL, DRESSING 
AND DYEING OF FUR 
1 0    1 22 65   24  0      0  4  3  14 134 
LEATHER, LEATHER PRODUCTS 
AND FOOTWEAR 
   1  4  17  32    110  2  0      3  1 9 179 
WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD 
AND CORK 
1  4  7 33  172    51 8 3    3  14  48  14 358 
PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS  75  25  86  146  305  0  37 34 4    16  394  146  1268 
PUBLISHING, PRINTING AND 
REPRODUCTION OF RECORDED 
MEDIA 
4  4  1 36  428    32 11  1    0  9  12  205  743 
COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM 
PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL 
6    4 34 71    11 5      8  50  40 229 
CHEMICALS EXCLUDING 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
1578 1  496  144 4432  10083  0 682 1248  106 4 1 169 233 3845 23022 
PHARMACEUTICALS  605 11 634 97  994 5422  7 474  104 134 6 10  221  1232  1668 11619 
RUBBER AND PLASTICS 
PRODUCTS 
282 2  58 25 702 2408  3 667  138 21 1  16  83 131 576  5113 
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL 
PRODUCTS 
119 3  17 65 297 1023   148  32  7     22  21  199 1953 
BASIC METALS  289 0  2  12 297 982  1 129  90  2  0 0 38 127 122 2091 
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, 
EXCEPT MACHINERY AND 
EQUIPMENT 
47  7  64 93 726 3699    744  197 26 0 3  108 212 1374 7300 
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, 
NEC 
497 19 544  919 1549  15551  9 2724 757 154 1 1 281 930 1781 25717 
OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND 
COMPUTING MACHINERY 
12   8 3 251  321   83 207  25    2 83  285  1280 37 
 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND 
APPARATUS, NEC 
79  2  97 77  1639  6283   1017  10123  20 2  1  147 59 1001  20547 
RADIO, TELEVISION AND 
COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT 
67  35  4572  1749  12065  1  213 61  16     23  79  999  19880 
MEDICAL, PRECISION AND 
OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS, 
WATCHES AND CLOCKS 
102 2 405  313  1803  4793  1 540  312 71 3 2 45 803 1105  10300 
MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS 
AND SEMI-TRAILERS 
21 24  4  26 2202  16064  0 516  126 13 3 6  127 489 682 20303 
OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT  76  0  9  20 521 1071    128  269 35 4 1 42 160 177  2513 
MANUFACTURING NEC  32  18  18  484  783  0  345 23  49  1    31  47  868  2699 
Manufacturing sub-totals  3,955  73  2,472 6,554 18,128 82,115 27  8,901  15,495 704  26  44 1,422 5,140 16,422 161,478 
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER 
SUPPLY 
2  2  7 6 111    22 19  4    1  14  22  105  315 
CONSTRUCTION  24 0 10  33 318  1069   114 70 7 0  9  27 449 2130 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; 
RESTAURANTS AND HOTELS 
180 5 225  102  1291  12720  1  1314 500 51 3  23  248  721 757 18141 
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE AND 
COMMUNICATION 
7   32  169  901  763    271  350  19  1    40  286  1318  4157 
FINANCE, INSURANCE, REAL 
ESTATE AND BUSINESS SERVICES 
601  16 1344  1012  11283  14182  4 1390 4100 522 14  15 306 7233 6559 48581 
Services sub-totals  814  21  1,613  1,323  13,799  28,845 5  3,111  5,039  603  18  39  617  8,289  9,188  73,324 
PUBLIC ADMIN AND DEFENCE; 
COMPULSORY SOCIAL SECURITY 
    3   4                6 13 
EDUCATION  5  1   2 60   0  0   3  1    6 12 90 
HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK  16  1 3 1  0  73   4  34 2    23  10  167 334 
OTHER COMMUNITY, SOCIAL 
AND PERSONAL SERVICES 
13 0 3 23 42 284   18  19 3   0  5 10 326 746 
PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS WITH 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 
                       0  0 
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL 
ORGANISATIONS AND BODIES 
                       1  1 
Public sector sub-totals  34  1  7  27  44  421  0  22  53  5  3  1  28  26  512  1,184 
  Country Totals  4,803  96  4,098  7,904  31,994  111,428  33  12,115 20,705 1,651  47  85  2,081 13,460 26,435 236,935 
Notes: (1) UK: United Kingdom, NL: Netherlands, SE: Sweden, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, DK: Denmark, NO: Norway, IT: Italy, FR: France, BE: Belgium, CZ: Czech 
Republic, GR: Greece, PL: Poland, PT - Portugal. Four patents are excluded as they match to firms with invalid sector codes. 
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These rankings could just reflect that some industries are larger than others. Column 1 of 
Table 3.2 shows the sectors ranked by the cross-country average of patent applications 
per US dollar of value added.  The sectors just listed, with the addition of Office, 
Accounting and Computing Machinery, constitute the eight most patent intensive 
industries. 
 
Table 3.2: Manufacturing Industries Ranked by Patent Intensity  
Industry Patents  per 
million USD 
Value Added 
R&D as 
proportion of 
Value Added 
 (1)  (2) 
RADIO, TELEVISION AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT  0.059  0.274 
PHARMACEUTICALS 0.047  0.273 
CHEMICALS EXCLUDING PHAMACEUTICALS 0.044  0.067 
MEDICAL, PRECISION AND OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS, WATCHES 
AND CLOCKS 
0.044 0.115 
OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND COMPUTING MACHINERY  0.027  0.311 
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, NEC  0.023  0.059 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND APPARATUS, NEC  0.016  0.064 
MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILERS 0.014  0.088 
RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS  0.011  0.029 
OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT  0.009  0.147 
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, EXCEPT MACHINERY AND 
EQUIPMENT 
0.007 0.011 
MANUFACTURING NEC  0.006  0.011 
TEXTILES 0.006  0.017 
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 0.004  0.015 
PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS  0.004  0.037 
FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO  0.004  0.013 
BASIC METALS  0.004  0.025 
COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL  0.003  0.038 
LEATHER, LEATHER PRODUCTS AND FOOTWEAR  0.002  0.005 
WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK  0.001  0.004 
WEARING APPAREL, DRESSING AND DYEING OF FUR  0.001  0.006 
PUBLISHING, PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION OF RECORDED 
MEDIA 
0.001 0.002 
 
     
A standard measure of innovation at the 2-digit industry level is R&D expenditure from 
the OECD’s Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development database (see 
OECD 2006, OECD 2002). This data has been widely used in economic research and it is 
important to check that our dataset broadly agrees with it. Figure 3.1 shows the 
relationship between log patents per dollar value added and log R&D expenditure as a 39 
 
proportion of value added, for country-industry-year observations for private sector 
industries.  
Figure 3.1: Patents vs. R&D, pooled country, industry, years 
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Notes: Observations are country-industry-years for 1995-2000 for private sector industries. 
 
 
This is comparable to the Figure 2.4 of Bound et al. (1984) for US firm level data. 
Clearly there is a strong positive association between the two measures of innovation, 
with some suggestion of an increasing elasticity of patents to R&D for more innovative 
sectors, as in Bound et al. (1984) for more innovative firms. Running an OLS regression 
of log patents on log R&D, for all observations for which R&D expenditure is available, 
with log patents set to zero for observations with zero patents and log R&D set to zero 
and separate dummy variables included to indicate both zero patents and zero R&D, plus 
a full set of country, industry and time dummy variables, yields an estimated elasticity of 
patents with respect to R&D (robust standard error) of 0.33 (0.03). This compares 
favourably with the Bound et al. (1984) estimate, from running the same regression at the 
firm level, of 0.38 (see Bound et al. 1984, column 1 of Table 2.8). Naturally there is quite 
a difference between running such regressions at the firm level and running at the 
industry level, however it is reassuring that the estimate from our new dataset is not 
radically different from existing estimates. When we include a squared log R&D term in 40 
 
our regression we see that it is positive and significant, suggesting that the elasticity of 
patents with respect to R&D increases with R&D, as in Bound et al. (1984). Modelling 
the observations with zero patents explicitly by running a Poisson regression of patents 
on the log of R&D, again with country, industry and year dummies, yields a higher 
estimate of the elasticity of 0.50 (0.07), which may be due to the fact that Poisson 
regressions give higher weight to large observations, where the elasticity may indeed be 
higher. Again, if we include a squared log R&D term we find it positive and significant.
21     
Returning to Table 3.2, column 2 shows the average R&D intensity for each sector. 
Figure 3.2 shows graphically that for these manufacturing sectors the two measures of 
innovation intensity are in broad agreement. Although the exact ordering might differ the 
two measures appear to consistently group the sectors into high, medium and low 
intensities. Furthermore the ordering is as we would expect, with high tech, heavy 
manufacturing sectors being more intensive and low tech, light manufacturing sectors 
being less intensive.   
Figure 3.2: Patents vs. R&D, Manufacturing Sector Averages 
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21 Figure 3.1 is based on the 931 observation with both patents and R&D greater than zero. The regressions 
referred to in the text are based on 1426 observations, with zero observations handled as described. 41 
 
3.2.  Country Patterns  
Figure 3.3 shows that calculating (weighted) country averages of the two measures of 
innovation intensity, using all private sectors, yields an ordering that is consistent across 
the two measures. Finland, Sweden and Germany are ranked as highly innovative 
countries by both measures, Spain, Norway and Italy are low innovation countries by 
both measures, with Denmark, France, Belgium and United Kingdom making up an 
intermediary group. The Netherlands is among the most innovative countries when 
measured using patents, but in the intermediary group when measured using R&D. This 
is due to the presence of Phillips, a very high patenting company which is solely 
responsible for two thirds of all Dutch manufacturing patents.    
 
Figure 3.3: Patents vs. R&D, Country Averages 
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Within countries matching error should be randomly distributed across industries for the 
time period under study. The patent measure should, therefore, give a reasonable picture 
of specialisation, one that should relate to an equivalent R&D measure. Figure 3.4 shows 
graphs for eleven of the countries in our sample of cross-industry specialisation as 
measured by patenting and as measured by R&D expenditure. The measures used are the 
total patent applications (R&D expenditure) in country i manufacturing industry j over 42 
 
the period 1995-2000 divided by the total patent applications (R&D expenditure) in 
country i over the period 1995-2000.
2223 There is some concern in comparing across 
industries in this fashion in that the propensity to patent/cost of innovation varies across 
industries, and we would therefore expect some diversion of our two measures of 
innovation. Nevertheless we would expect that if our dataset is useful in measuring 
industry innovation there should be a strong positive correlation within countries across 
industries between the patent measure and the R&D measure. By inspection we can see 
this strong correlation for the countries in our sample and the correlation coefficient is 
0.5901 for the 236 observations. The patterns observed here are consistent with some 
intuition and existing evidence we have on country innovation specialisation. For 
example, Germany’s highest innovation manufacturing sector by both measures is motor 
vehicles, consistent with the view that Germany specialises in traditional manufacturing 
sectors (see Carlin and Mayer 2003), whereas the UK’s highest innovation sector by 
patenting is chemicals and by expenditure is a pharmaceuticals. Also, we can see that 
Finland has a very strong specialisation by both measures in telecoms as we would 
expect. One discrepancy is the large spike in patenting activity in Electrical Machinery 
and Apparatus, nec, in the Netherlands. This is the result of very high patent filings by 
Phillips, which filed 1,445 of the 2,957 matched corporate patents in 2000. This 
highlights an important concern with using patent data, in that the distribution of 
patenting across firms is very highly skewed that it affects inference in applications that 
do not explicitly control for firm heterogeneity. Extreme outliers like this can lead to 
spurious results and it is common in the patent literature to control for such outliers or 
exclude the top percentile of the patent distribution, the justification being that the 
economic model under consideration cannot explain such uncommon patenting 
behaviour.     
                                                 
22 The total number of patents filed by manufacturing firms in these 11 countries in our dataset between 
1995 and 2000 equals 110,847. 
23 For presentational purposes the seven lowest manufacturing industries have been excluded from the 
graphs, although they are present in the measures. They are SIC’s 17 to 23. For similar reasons I have 
focused on manufacturing, the same comparison could be performed for service sectors.  43 
 
Figure 3.4: Industry Specialisation, Patents vs. R&D 
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Often in research applications identification is achieved through the use of within 
country, within industry variation over time to control for correlation from unobserved 
cross country and cross industry characteristics. It is therefore interesting to investigate if 
changes over time of country-industry patenting are correlated with changes in R&D 
expenditure. Figure 3.5 shows for each country the change in the proportion of country 
i’s patenting (R&D expenditure) in industry j between 1995 and 2000. There are issues of 
timing between patenting and R&D; Pakes and Griliches (1984) find that although there 
is a strong cross-sectional correlation between patents and R&D at the firm level, the 
relationship within firms over time is much weaker: patents seem to be applied for early 
on in R&D projects, but much of the R&D spend comes later, in the development phase 
(Griliches 1990). Nevertheless, we can see that there are many strong correlations 
particularly in heavy patenting industries such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
communications, machinery, motor vehicles and other transport. Over all of the 
manufacturing sectors the correlation coefficient for changes in industry innovation 
specialisation as measured by patenting and as measured by R&D expenditure is 0.3844 
for the 213 observations (this is less observations than before as the panel is unbalanced, 
some countries lack observations for certain industries in earlier years). 
This section has shown that the matched patents dataset at an aggregate industry level is 
closely related to a often used measure of innovation in the form of declared R&D 
expenditure. The relationship between patents and R&D at the industry level is similar to 
that found in existing studies at the firm level from the United States. The matched patent 
dataset successfully ranks industries in groups of high, medium and low innovation 
intensity, and successfully ranks countries in groups of high, medium and low innovation 
intensity. Within countries the dataset measures industry specialisation in a manner 
highly correlated with a R&D based measure, however changes in specialisation over 
time are much less correlated with the equivalent changes as measured by R&D.47 
 
Figure 3.5: Changes in Industry Specialisation, Patents vs. R&D 
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3.3.  Patenting and Firm Size 
This section investigates the relationship between the propensity to patent and firm size. 
Klepper and Cohen (1996) cites several stylised facts about the relationship between firm 
size and innovation. Two which we can investigate here are as follows:  
Stylised fact 1: a higher proportion of large firms than small firms innovate (Klepper and 
Cohen 1996, stylised fact 1); and,  
Stylised fact 2: conditioning on innovative firms patenting increases with firm size, 
although small firms account for a disproportionately large amount of patent applications 
(Klepper and Cohen 1996, stylised fact 4).  
Consider the first of these existing observations. Table 2.4 of Bounds et al. (1984) also 
show that among US firms, large firms are more likely to report positive R&D, and this is 
supported by similar observations by Pavitt et al. (1987) for UK firms. We can 
investigate this in our sample, defining here patenting firms as those that patent between 
the years 1995 and 2002, excluding firms that are observed to patent only before this 
period as these will disproportionately be large firms, assuming that large firms have 
higher survival rates than small firms. In Table 3.3 we can see that this is also true for 
firms in each country in our dataset in that the percentage of firms that file patents 
increases with their position in the within country distribution of sales. For example, only 
0.2 percent of UK firms (final column) in the bottom half of the size distribution apply 
for patents, whereas 3.6 percent do so between the 91
st and 99
th percentile of the 
distribution and 9.4 percent do so in the top percentile of the distribution. This pattern is 
common across all countries in the sample. There is a concern that the pattern may be an 
artefact of the matching process: in the manual stage of matching we deliberately target 
large firms for matching. The dataset enables us to exclude manual matches and resolved 
multiple matches, which also might favour large firms as they rely on supplementary data 
which may be more available for large firms. The numbers in italics in each cell in Table 
3.3 show the fraction of firms in each size class that patent using only automated unique 
standard name and stem name matches (match types 1.1 and 1.2 in Table A3, other 
match types remain in the sample but are changed to non-patenting firms). Using just 
these match types we can see that the observation that a higher proportion of large firms 51 
 
patent remains: for the UK the equivalent values to those quoted above are 0.2 percent, 
3.2 percent and 8.4 percent. 
Turning to the second stylised fact described above, a number of studies find that for 
innovative firms inventive output increases with firm sales but at a less than 
proportionate rate, so that smaller firms account for a more than proportionate amount of 
innovation (Scherer 1965, Bound et al. 1964, Pavitt et al. 1987). This is true for all 
countries in our sample. Table 3.4 shows results of a Poisson regression of total patent 
applications on the log of average sales for all private sector firms that patent at least 
once in the period 1995-2002, with industry fixed effects controlling for cross industry 
differences in size and the propensity to patent. An elasticity of less than one, which is 
found for all countries, indicates that although patenting increases with sales it does so 
less than proportionately. 
           52 
 
 
Table 3.3: Firm Size and the Propensity to Patent  
Size Classification, by 
percentile in sales distribution 
within each country 
Country 
    BE  DK  FI FR DE IT NL  NO  ES  SE UK 
1st-50
th  No. of firms  79,375 18,034  31,045  318,571 268,834  107,247 10,374  65,305 295,211  97,730 212,800 
Fraction that patent  0.000 0.003  0.003 0.001  0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.000  0.004 0.002 
  0.000 0.003  0.003 0.001  0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.000  0.004 0.002 
51st-75th  No. of firms  39,751 9,033  15,537  159,240  134,332  53,510 5,142 32,683  147,778  48,883  106,466 
Fraction that patent  0.001 0.004  0.005 0.001  0.004 0.006 0.020 0.002 0.000  0.003 0.003 
  0.001 0.004  0.005 0.001  0.004 0.005 0.019 0.002 0.000  0.003 0.003 
76th-90th  No. of firms  23,783 5,404 9,281 95,434 80,122  31,915 3,066 19,592  88,552  29,268 63,541 
Fraction that patent  0.004 0.007  0.009 0.004  0.014 0.019 0.038 0.002 0.001  0.007 0.011 
  0.003 0.007  0.009 0.003  0.014 0.016 0.036 0.002 0.001  0.007 0.010 
91st-99th  No. of firms  14,182 3,194 5,558 56,909 47,358  18,928 1,837 11,732  53,025  17,391 37,643 
Fraction that patent  0.013 0.052  0.024 0.017  0.070 0.055 0.048 0.009 0.006  0.025 0.036 
  0.005 0.051  0.023 0.016  0.027 0.050 0.045 0.009 0.006  0.025 0.032 
100th  No. of firms  1,556 352 608 6,224 5,255  2,074 203 1,289  5,837  1,912  4,085 
Fraction that patent  0.058 0.119  0.043 0.102  0.147 0.120 0.143 0.050 0.039  0.113 0.094 
  0.028 0.111  0.041 0.096  0.065 0.111 0.133 0.050 0.038  0.112 0.084 
  
Sales N/A  No. of firms  158,593 118,264 21,740  190,542  306,420 227,049 324,891  43,633 222,466  40,977 1,353,240 
Fraction that patent  0.001  0.004  0.009  0.001  0.007 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000  0.004 0.002 
  0.001 0.004  0.005 0.001  0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000  0.004 0.002 
Notes: (1) UK: United Kingdom, NL: Netherlands, SE: Sweden, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, DK: Denmark, NO: Norway, IT: Italy, FR: France, BE: Belgium, CZ: Czech 
Republic, GR: Greece, PL: Poland, PT - Portugal.(2) The fraction that patent is given calculated using all matches and using just automated unique matches (match types 1.1 and 1.2) in 
italics.  53 
 
 
Table 3.4: Patenting and Firm Size, for patenting firms 
Dependent variable:  Patent Applications 
  BE  DK FI FR DE IT NL  NO ES SE UK 
Log Sales  0.6172  0.5498  0.7377 0.6617 0.7261 0.5516 0.9253 0.2275 0.2398 0.6442 0.4388 
  [0.0617] [0.0931] [0.1134] [0.0552] [0.0389] [0.0402] [0.0785] [0.0300] [0.0346] [0.1317] [0.0359] 
Constant  -2.4205 -1.4504 -0.5114 -1.4627 -8.9506 -6.7238 -0.6503 -0.2085 -0.8235 -0.5781 -1.4924 
  [0.2418] [0.3628] [0.0786] [0.1797] [0.6640] [0.6875] [0.2071] [0.0275] [0.1189] [0.3427] [0.1222] 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs.  434  338  427  2444 6273 2516  386  428  747  1381 3032 
Notes: (1) UK: United Kingdom, NL: Netherlands, SE: Sweden, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, DK: Denmark, NO: Norway, IT: Italy, FR: France, BE: Belgium, CZ: Czech 
Republic, GR: Greece, PL: Poland, PT - Portugal.(2) Observations are private sector firms all of which have patented at least once in the sample period of 1995-2002. Patents are summed 
over the period and Log Sales is the log of the average value of turnover in USD over the same period.(3) The regression run is a Poisson regression, therefore coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 54 
 
 
3.4.  Scientific Complexity and Concentration 
One advantage of the new dataset is that the patent dataset provides further information 
on the patents applied for, in the form of citations and inventor information. One use of 
this data is that it gives an idea of the complexity of innovation. Recorded in the 
PATSTAT dataset, as well as citation to other patents, is the count of citations to non-
patent literature (NPL), predominantly scientific journals. We introduce here the 
proportion of citations made by a patent to NPL as a measure of the closeness of 
innovation to the scientific frontier.  
Table 3.5 shows manufacturing sectors ordered by the average of the proportion of 
citations to NPL, column (1). Along with the rest of the variables in this table the un-
weighted firm average is taken at the country, four digit industry level, and then the 
median of the distribution of those values is taken at the two-digit industry level, for ease 
of presentation in Table 3.5. The ordering of sectors by proportion of citations to NPL is 
as we might expect, with high tech sectors such as pharmaceuticals, communications and 
chemicals at the top of the table moving down to more traditional manufacturing sectors 
such as motor vehicles and machinery and equipment, down to lighter manufactures such 
as clothes and apparel. The average number of inventors per patent is displayed in 
column (2), as a measure of complexity. This is clearly highly correlated with the NPL 
measure of complexity (the correlation coefficient is 0.75). Product life-cycle theory 
(Klepper 1996) relates the nature of innovation to market structure, predicting that early 
life-cycle product markets experience both a large amount of new product innovation and 
entry, and that later life-cycle markets experience more process innovation and more 
innovation by incumbents rather than entrants. Breschi et al. (2000) define two main 
patterns of innovation in industries: a Schumpeter Mark I period of creative widening, 
with a disproportionate amount of innovation performed by entrants; and a Schumpeter 
Mark II period of creative deepening, with innovation concentrated in the hands of 
incumbent firms. Column 3 recreates one of the measures used by Breschi et al. (2000) to 
identify Schumpeter Mark I industries: the proportion of patents filed by firms patenting 
for the first time. By inspection this measure is clearly negatively correlated with the 
values in columns (1) and (2), the correlations coefficients of entry intensity to the 
proportion of citations to NPL and the average number of inventors per patent are 55 
 
respectively -0.53 and -0.62. Patenting in industries that are engaged in more 
scientifically complex innovation is more likely to be performed by incumbents than 
patenting in industries engaged in less scientifically complex innovation. Column 4 lists a 
Herfindahl concentration measure of patenting, which is weakly positively correlated 
with both column (1) and column (2), reinforcing the observation that highly technical 
patenting is concentrated in the hands of incumbent firms. 
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Table 3.5: Industry Patenting Characteristics in Manufacturing  
Industry  Proportion of 
citation to 
NPL 
Average no. 
of inventors 
per patent 
Entry 
Intensity 
Concentration 
(patent HHI) 
Patents/Sales
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
PHARMACEUTICALS  0.36 3.08 0.04 0.1700 12.44 
RADIO, TELEVISION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
EQUIPMENT 
0.17 1.93 0.04 0.3600 15.43 
CHEMICALS EXCLUDING 
PHAMACEUTICALS 
0.15 2.54 0.03 0.5000  9.84 
BASIC METALS  0.13 2.00 0.05 0.3900  2.39 
OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND 
COMPUTING MACHINERY 
0.13 1.89 0.14 0.2700  3.70 
OTHER TRANSPORT 
EQUIPMENT 
0.11 2.00 0.04 0.3300  4.80 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 
AND APPARATUS, NEC 
0.10 1.74 0.14 0.1500 14.64 
MEDICAL, PRECISION AND 
OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS, 
WATCHES AND CLOCKS 
0.10 2.07 0.13 0.0900 26.97 
MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS 
AND SEMI-TRAILERS 
0.10 1.82 0.04 0.3400 10.09 
COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM 
PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR 
FUEL 
0.09 3.00 0.00 0.3600  0.22 
FOOD PRODUCTS, 
BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 
0.08 2.00 0.11 0.0000  0.22 
RUBBER AND PLASTICS 
PRODUCTS 
0.07 1.73 0.19 0.1300 11.12 
MACHINERY AND 
EQUIPMENT, NEC 
0.07 1.68 0.14 0.1800 16.32 
PUBLISHING, PRINTING AND 
REPRODUCTION OF 
RECORDED MEDIA 
0.06 1.89 0.12 0.3300  3.69 
OTHER NON-METALLIC 
MINERAL PRODUCTS 
0.06 1.83 0.25 0.3100  6.46 
FABRICATED METAL 
PRODUCTS, EXCEPT 
MACHINERY AND 
EQUIPMENT 
0.06 1.54 0.26 0.1400 11.81 
MANUFACTURING NEC  0.06 1.64 0.27 0.0400 11.87 
LEATHER, LEATHER 
PRODUCTS AND FOOTWEAR 
0.05 1.43 0.36 0.1800  6.98 
TEXTILES  0.04 1.50 0.22 0.2600  6.51 
WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF 
WOOD AND CORK 
0.03 1.33 0.50 0.1900  5.54 
PAPER AND PAPER 
PRODUCTS 
0.03 1.86 0.20 0.3300  3.91 
WEARING APPAREL, 
DRESSING AND DYEING OF 
FUR 
0.00 1.00 0.11 0.4100  1.31 
Notes: (1) the proportion of citations to non-patent literature, calculated for each patent, averaged for each 
firm, averaged for each country-four digit industry, the median within each two-digit industry shown here. (2) 
calculated as in column 1 for number of inventors per patent. (3) the proportion of patent applications made 
by a first time patenter, average for each country-four digit industry, median of which taken for each two-
digit industry show here. (4) Herfindahl index based on share of patents in country-four digit industry sector 
held by each firm, median of which taken for each two digit industry shown here. (5) Patents per sales (in 
thousands of USD), average at the country-four digit industry sector, median of which taken for each two 
digit industry shown here.  
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4. CONCLUSION 
This paper has described the creation of a valuable new dataset of firm level measures of 
innovation by way of patent applications for a very large population of firms from 15 
European countries. The authors contribution to the creation of this dataset was the 
matching of patent applicants at the EPO to company names in the accounting database 
Amadeus. This non-trivial task was carried out through the development of reusable 
corporate name standardization software and high success rates were achieved for the 
countries in the sample. Much remains to be done and it is envisaged that, as with other 
similar datasets, matching and data checking will be developed over time by the 
researchers who use the data. The current paper shows that the resulting dataset compares 
favourably to a widely used source of information on R&D expenditure at the industry 
level. The paper also shows that the dataset exhibits some of the relationships between 
patenting and firms size evident in existing datasets and research papers. The paper 
describes a measure of scientific complexity based on patent citations and how it varies 
across industries and how it is related to patenting concentration.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Name Standardisation, additional to Derwent 2000 standard 
Country  String  Changed to  Country  String  Changed to 
UK   PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY   PLC  FR  SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE  SC 
UK   PUBLIC LIMITED CO   PLC  FR  SOCIETE EN NOM COLLECTIF  SNC 
UK   PUBLIC LIMITED   PLC  FR  SOCIETE EN PARTICIPATION  SP 
UK   PUBLIC LIABILITY COMPANY   PLC  FR  SOCIETE EN COMMANDITE SIMPLE  SCS 
UK   COMPANY   CO  FR  SOCIETE PRIVEE A RESPONSABILITE LIMITEE  SPRL 
UK   LIMITED   LTD  BE  SOCIETE ANONYME SIMPLIFIEE  SAS 
UK   HOLDINGS   HLDGS BE  SOCIETE  ANONYME  SA 
UK   HOLDING   HLDGS  BE  SOC ANONYME  SA 
UK   CORPORATION   CORP  BE  STE ANONYME  SA 
UK   INCORPORATED   INC  BE  SOCIETE A RESPONSABILITE LIMITEE  SARL 
UK   INTERNATIONAL   INTL  BE  SOCIETE A RESPONSIBILITE LIMITEE  SARL 
UK   UNITED KINGDOM   GB  BE  SARL UNIPERSONNELLE  SARLU 
UK   UNITED KINGDOM   UK  BE  SOCIETE PAR ACTIONS SIMPLIFIEES  SAS 
UK   LTD CO   CO LTD  BE  SAS UNIPERSONNELLE  SASU 
ES SOCIEDAD  LIMITADA  SL  BE  ENTREPRISE UNIPERSONNELLE A RESPONSABILITE 
LIMITEE 
EURL 
ES  SOCIEDAD ANONIMA  SA  BE  ET COMPAGNIE  ETCIE 
ES  SOCIEDAD EN COMMANDITA  SC  BE  COMPAGNIE  CIE 
ES  SOCIEDAD REGULAR COLECTIVA  SRL  BE  SOCIETE CIVILE IMMOBILIERE  SCI 
ES SCOOP  SC  BE  GROUPEMENT  D'INTERET  ECONOMIQUE  GIE 
IT  SOCIETÁ IN ACCOMANDITA PER AZIONI  SA  BE  SOCIETE CIVILE  SC 
IT  SOCIETA IN ACCOMANDITA PER AZIONI  SA  BE  SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE  SC 
IT   SAPA   SA  BE  SOCIETE EN NOM COLLECTIF  SNC 60 
 
IT  SOCIETÁ IN ACCOMANDITA SEMPLICE  SAS  BE  SOCIETE EN PARTICIPATION  SP 
IT  SOCIETA IN ACCOMANDITA SEMPLICE  SAS  BE  SOCIETE EN COMMANDITE SIMPLE  SCS 
IT  SOCIETÀ IN NOME COLLETTIVO  SNC BE  BESLOTEN  VENNOOTSCHAP  BV 
IT  SOCIETA IN NOME COLLETTIVO  SNC  BE  BESLOTEN VENNOOTSCHAP MET BEPERKTE 
AANSPRAKELIJKHEID 
BVBA 
IT SOCIETÀ  PER  AZIONI  SPA  BE  COMMANDITAIRE VENNOOTSCHAP OP AANDELEN  CVA 
IT SOCIETA  PER  AZIONI  SPA  BE  GEWONE COMMANDITAIRE VENNOOTSCHAP  GCV 
IT  SOCIETÀ A RESPONSABILITÀ LIMITATA SRL  BE  NAAMLOZE  VENNOOTSCHAP  NV 
IT  SOCIETA A RESPONSABILITA LIMITATA  SRL  BE  SOCIETE EN COMMANDITE PAR ACTIONS  SCA 
SE  AKTIEBOLAG   AB   BE  SOCIETE PRIVEE A RESPONSABILITE LIMITEE  SPRL 
SE   AKTIEBOLAG   AB  BE  GCV  SCS 
SE   AKTIEBOLAGET   AB  BE  NV  SA 
SE  HANDELSBOLAG   HB   BE  BVBA  SPRL 
SE   HANDELSBOLAG   HB  DK  ANDELSSELSKAB  AMBA 
SE HANDELSBOLAGET    HB    DK  ANPARTSSELSKAB  APS 
SE   HANDELSBOLAGET   HB  DK  AKTIESELSKAP  AS 
SE  KOMMANDITBOLAG   KB   DK INTERESSENTSKAB  IS 
SE   KOMMANDITBOLAG   KB  DK  KOMMANDITAKTIESELSKAB  KAS 
SE KOMMANDITBOLAGET    KB    DK  KOMMANDITSELSKAB  KS 
SE   KOMMANDITBOLAGET   KB  NO  ANDELSLAG  AL 
DE  GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG GMBH  NO  ANSVARLIG SELSKAP  ANS 
DE AKTIEN  GESELLSCHAFT  AG  NO  AKSJESELSKAP  AS 
DE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT  AG  NO ALLMENNAKSJESELSKAP  ASA 
DE  KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFT AUF AKTIEN  KGAA  NO  SELSKAP MED DELT ANSAR  DA 
DE KOMANDIT  GESELLSCHAFT  KG NO  KOMMANDITTSELSKAP  KS 
DE KOMANDITGESELLSCHAFT  KG  NL  BESLOTEN VENNOOTSCHAP  BV  
DE KOMMANDIT  GESELLSCHAFT  KG  NL COMMANDITAIRE  VENNOOTSCHAP  CV 
DE KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFT  KG NL  COMMANDITAIRE  VENNOOTSCHAP OP ANDELEN  CVOA 
DE EINGETRAGENE  GENOSSENSCHAFT  EG NL  NAAMLOZE  VENNOOTSCHAP  NV 
DE GENOSSENSCHAFT  EG  NL VENNOOTSCHAP ONDER FIRMA  VOF 61 
 
DE  GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG GMBH  FI AKTIEBOLAG  AB 
DE  GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG GMBH  FI  PUBLIKT AKTIEBOLAG  APB 
DE GESELLSCHAFT  MBH  GMBH FI  KOMMANDITBOLAG  KB 
DE  GESELLSCHAFT M B H  GMBH FI  KOMMANDIITTIYHTIO  KY 
DE  OFFENE HANDELS GESELLSCHAFT OHG  FI  OSAKEYHTIO  OY 
DE GESMBH  GMBH FI  JULKINEN  OSAKEYHTIO  OYJ 
DE  GESELLSCHAFT BURGERLICHEN RECHTS  GBR  PL  SPOLKA AKCYJNA  SA  
DE  OFFENE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT  OHG  PL  SPOLKA PRAWA CYWILNEGO  SC 
DE  GMBHCOKG  GMBH & CO 
KG 
PL SPOLKA  KOMANDYTOWA  SK 
DE GESELLSCHAFT  GMBH PL SPOLKA  Z  OGRANICZONA ODPOWIEDZIALNOSCIA SPZOO 
FR  SOCIETE ANONYME SIMPLIFIEE  SAS  PL  SP Z OO  SPZOO 
FR SOCIETE  ANONYME  SA  PL SPZ  OO  SPZOO 
FR  SOC ANONYME  SA  PL  SP ZOO  SPZOO 
FR  STE ANONYME  SA  GR  ANONYMOS ETAIRIA  AE 
FR  SOCIETE A RESPONSABILITE LIMITEE  SARL  GR  ETERRORRYTHMOS  EE 
FR  SOCIETE A RESPONSIBILITE LIMITEE  SARL  GR  ETAIRIA PERIORISMENIS EVTHINIS  EPE 
FR SARL  UNIPERSONNELLE  SARLU  GR  OMORRYTHMOS  OE 
FR  SOCIETE PAR ACTIONS SIMPLIFIEES  SAS  GR  SOCIETE ANONYME  SA 
FR  SAS UNIPERSONNELLE  SASU  CZ  AKCIOVA SPOLECNOST  AS 
FR  ENTREPRISE UNIPERSONNELLE A 
RESPONSABILITE LIMITEE 
EURL CZ  KOMANDITNI  SPOLECNOST  KS 
FR  ET COMPAGNIE  ETCIE  CZ  SPOLECNOST S RUCENIM OMEZENYM  SRO 
FR  COMPAGNIE  CIE  CZ  VEREJNA OBCHODNI SPOLECNOST  VOS  
FR  SOCIETE CIVILE IMMOBILIERE  SCI  BG  AKTIONIERNO DRUSHESTWO  AD 
FR  GROUPEMENT D'INTERET ECONOMIQUE  GIE  BG  KOMANDITNO DRUSHESTWO  KD 
FR  SOCIETE CIVILE  SC  BG  KOMANDITNO DRUSHESTWO S AKZII  KDA 
      BG  DRUSHESTWO S ORGRANITSCHENA OTGOWORNOST  OCD 
Notes: (1) UK: United Kingdom, NL: Netherlands, SE: Sweden, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, DK: Denmark, NO: Norway, IT: Italy, FR: France, BE: Belgium,  
CZ: Czech Republic, GR: Greece, PL: Poland, PT-Portugal. 
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Table A2: Identification of Non-Corporate Institutions 
Country String  Country  String 
All  UK SEC FOR  DE  Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft 
All US  ADMIN  FR  UNIV 
All US  DEPT  FR  FONDATION 
All  US SEC  FR  CENT NAT 
GB UNIV  FR HOPITAL 
GB RES  COUNCIL  FR RECHE 
GB HOSPITAL  FR INST 
GB  NHS TRUST  FR  INST MERIEUX 
GB  BONE MARROW TRUST  FR  FOND CENT NAT DE TRANSFUSION 
GB  HEALTH SERVICE TRUST  FR  INST NAT DE LA SANTE&DE LA RECH 
GB  BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION  FR DEUTFRANZOESISCHES  FORSCHUNGSINST
GB  United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority  FR  ISL INST FRANCOALLEMAND DE RECH 
GB  NATIONAL RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION 
FR  ANVAR Agence Nationale de Valorisation 
ES UNIV  BE  UNIV 
ES CONSEJO  DK  UNIV 
ES INVESTIGACION  NO UNIV 
IT UNIV  NL UNIV 
IT CONSIGLIO  NAZIONALE  NL  NEDERLANDSE ORGANISATIE VOOR
TOEGEPAST 
IT ISTSUP  FI  UNIV 
SE UNIV  PO  UNIV 
SE FORSKNINGSINSTITUT  GR  UNIV 
SE STIFTELSE  CZ  UNIV 
DE UNIV  BG  UNIV 
DE EINGETRAGENER  VEREIN  PT UNIV 
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Table A3: Match Codes and Applicant Codes 
Match Type  Description  Applicant Type   
0 No  match  0 Corporate 
1.1  Unique standard match  1.1  Automatically identified institution 
1.2  Unique stem match  1.2  Automatically identified individual 
1.3  Unique previous name match  2.1  Manually identified institution 
2.1.0  Multiple standard match, unresolved  2.2  Manually identified individual 
2.1.1  Multiple standard match, resolved by original name     
2.1.2  Multiple standard match, record change     
2.1.3  Multiple standard match, resolved by zip code     
2.1.4  Multiple standard match, allocated to Belenzon ultimate owner     
2.1.5  Multiple standard match, allocated to BVD ultimate owner     
2.2.0  Multiple stem match, unresolved     
2.2.1  Multiple stem match, resolved by original name     
2.2.2  Multiple stem match, record change     
2.2.3  Multiple stem match, resolved by zip code     
2.2.4  Multiple stem match, allocated to Belenzon ultimate owner     
2.2.5  Multiple stem match, allocated to BVD ultimate owner     
2.3.0  Multiple previous name match, unresolved     
2.3.1  Multiple previous name match, resolved by original name     
2.3.2  Multiple previous name match, record change     
2.3.3  Multiple previous name match, resolved by zip code     
2.3.4  Multiple previous name match, allocated to Belenzon ultimate owner     
2.3.5  Multiple previous name match, allocated to BVD ultimate owner     
3.1  Manual match, definite     
3.2  Manual match, probable     
3.3  Manual match to ultimate owner     
3.4  Manual multiple matches, unresolved     
3.5  Manual match failed     
3.6  Multiple match, manually resolved     
Notes: Match types that appear in italics are considered as failed and are not used in the final output. 
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Table A4: Output 
Entity Name  Variable  Variable Description 
Patent BVD Match  Bvdidnumber  Amadeus BVD no. 
appln_nr  ‘Real’ Patent Application no. 
Country Applicant country. 
applicant_name  Original applicant name from EPO. 
Year  Year patent application filed at EPO. 
match_type Coded description of how match achieved, see table X. 
Uo  Amadeus ultimate owner 
Buo  Belenzon ultimate owner 
Muo Manually assigned ultimate owner 
Auxiliary Match File – Patents  applicant_name  Original PATSTAT applicant's name 
applicant_address  PATSTAT Applicant's address 
no_of_patents  Number of patents held by this applicant 
last_pat_year 
Most recent year in which this applicant filed a patent 
application 
standard_name Standardised applicant's name 
stem_name  Standardised applicant's name stripped of corporate extensions 
amadeus_name  Amadeus firm's name, null if not matched 
Bvdidnumber Amadeus  firm's  BVD  number, null if not matched 
Zipcode  Amadeus firm's zipcode, null if not matched 
Address Amadeus  firm's  address, null if not matched 
Activeinactive 
Amadeus firm has filed account in last four years, null if not 
matched 
Uo  Amadeus ultimate owner BVD number 
Dropped 
Equals 1 if Amadeus firm has been dropped from Amadeus, 
null if not matched 
previous_name1/2/3/4  For UK firms - previous names from FAME 
standard_previous_name1/2/3/4 Standardised previous names 65 
 
Buo  Belenzon ultimate owner BVD number 
amadeus_file_no  Number of Amadeus file that this firm name came from 
match_type  Code describing how match was acheived. 0 if not matched 
Applicant_type Identifies  institutions and individuals. 0 if corporate 
manual_matcher Researcher  who assigned manual match. 
Comments  Description of manual match 
change_match  Set to 1 if manual match overwrites automatic match 
manual_uo Manually  assigned ultimate owner 
multiple_this_one 
Multiple match resolved by address, record change, indicates 
correct match 
Auxiliary Match File – Firms  amadeus_name  Amadeus firm’s name 
standard_name Standardised Amadeus name 
Uo  Amadeus ultimate owner BVD number 
Buo  Belenzon ultimate owner BVD number 
Stem_name  Standardised Amadeus name stripped of corporate extensions 66 
    
 
CHAPTER 2 | PRODUCT MARKET REFORMS, LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
Rachel Griffith, Rupert Harrison and Gareth Macartney 
 
 
Abstract24 
We analyze the impact of product market competition on unemployment, and how this depends on 
labour market institutions. Theoretically, both firms with market power and unions with bargaining 
power are constrained in their behaviour by the elasticity of demand in the product market. We use 
differential changes in regulations across OECD countries over the 1980s and 1990s to identify the 
effects of competition. We find that increased competition reduces unemployment, more so in 
countries with labour market institutions that increase worker bargaining power. We also find that 
competition increases real wages, but less so when bargaining power is high.  
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Macartney, G. (2007). ‘Product Market Reforms, Labour Market Institutions and Unemployment’, The Economic 
Journal, vol. 117, no. 519, pp. C142-C166. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
High rates of unemployment remain a key policy concern in many European countries. Following 
the OECD Jobs Study (1994) a large literature has investigated the role of unions, taxes, and other 
labour market institutions in explaining cross-country variation in unemployment rates.
25 Theory 
suggests that competition in the product market is also an important determinant of employment – 
in imperfectly competitive markets firms restrict output and thus employment. A number of recent 
theoretical papers have emphasized the role of product market competition, as well as potentially 
important interactions between competition and labour market institutions.
26 A recognition of the 
role of competition also lies behind many of the current attempts to reform product markets in 
Europe, including those laid out in the Lisbon Agenda and the Services Directive. 
In this paper we investigate the impact of increased product market competition on employment 
using data across OECD countries over the 1980s and 1990s. Our contribution to the literature is 
twofold. First, we use time-varying policy reforms as a source of exogenous variation in product 
market conditions, enabling us to provide stronger evidence that competition increases employment 
than exists so far. We show that this effect has been quantitatively important in explaining 
movements in unemployment in OECD countries over the past twenty years.  
Secondly, we provide evidence that the size of these effects varies with labour market institutions. 
Theory suggests that the positive impact of competition on employment is greater where workers’ 
bargaining power is high. The reason for this is that unions which care about employment as well as 
wages are constrained from demanding high wages by the level of competition in the product 
market. Therefore an increase in competition in an economy with both monopolistic firms and 
unions will lead to greater reductions in prices and greater increases in output than in an economy 
without unions. We also investigate the parallel predictions of theory for the impact of product 
market competition on real wages (using real labour costs as a proxy measure). In contrast to the 
case with employment, under some conditions the positive impact of competition on real wages 
may be smaller when workers have more bargaining power, since the negative impact of 
competition on the general price level may be partially offset by a reduction in the level of rents 
                                                 
25 See, amongst others, Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), Nickell and Layard (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000), Belot and van Ours (2001). In a recent contribution to this literature, Nickell et al. (2005) find that changes in 
these factors can explain about 55% of the rise in European unemployment from the 1960s to the first half of the 1990s. 
Blanchard (2005) argues that a complex interaction between institutions and other shocks provides an important part of 
the explanation. 
26 See for example Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Spector (2004) and Ebell and Haefke (2004). 
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captured by workers. Finally, we also test whether these effects of competition on employment and 
labour costs depend on the degree of bargaining coordination. 
We use the substantial market liberalisations that have occurred across countries over the past two 
decades to provide exogenous variation in competitive conditions. These include reforms that 
reduce barriers to entry, tariff rates, regulatory barriers to trade and reduce public involvement in 
production. We find strong evidence that reforms such as these decrease the average level of profits 
in the economy, which in turn increases employment and real wages. The positive effect on 
employment is found to be greater, and the positive effect on real wages lower, in economies with 
greater worker bargaining power (those with higher collective bargaining coverage and/or higher 
union membership).  
Our work is related to three key literatures. First, as discussed above, there is a substantial empirical 
literature investigating the labour market determinants of unemployment. In general this work finds 
that labour market institutions, taxes and benefits have important effects on the level of 
employment, although the nature and size of the effects vary somewhat across studies.  
Secondly, there is a body of theoretical work suggesting that increasing product market competition 
increases employment and real wages.
27 Several recent contributions to this literature emphasise 
that the employment increase is greater when workers bargain collectively, even when the workers’ 
choice of bargaining regime is endogenised as in Ebell and Haefke (2004).  
Thirdly, there is a recent and smaller empirical literature on the impact of product market 
regulations on employment and wages.
28 Most similar to this paper, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) 
estimate the impact of product market reforms on employment rates across OECD countries. 
Consistent with the discussion above, they find that restrictive product market regulations have 
reduced employment rates in some OECD countries, particularly those where labour market 
institutions provide strong bargaining power to insiders. Our approach differs from Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2005) in a number of important ways: we use indicators of product market reforms that 
affect both traded and non-traded sectors of the economy, rather than a selection of seven regulated 
network industries as in their case; we allow the impact of product market reforms to vary across 
different types of reform, rather than imposing strong a priori restrictions by calculating a single 
                                                 
27 The basic framework of several recent papers draws on elements of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki (1987), combining monopolistic competition in the goods market and bargaining over employment and wages 
in the labour market. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) is a recent model without capital. Spector (2004) introduces 
capital and finds that real wages may actually decrease following an increase in competition. 
28 Studies at the micro level include Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) and Kugler and Pica (2003). At the country level, 
Pissarides (2001) finds a negative correlation between a measure of business start-up costs and employment rates across 
a sample of OECD countries. 69 
    
index of regulation;
29 we investigate the parallel predictions of theory for real wages as well as 
employment; and, drawing on the underlying theoretical motivation, we explicitly model the impact 
of product market reforms on competition, as proxied by the average level of profits in the 
economy. Without this last step the channel for the impact of product market regulations on 
employment and wages is not clear. 
In summary, there is strong empirical evidence that labour market institutions matter in determining 
labour market outcomes, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that product market 
regulations are also important, but there is little empirical evidence to support this. In addition, 
some theory suggests that the impact of product market competition on labour market outcomes 
varies with labour market institutions. There is, however, even less empirical evidence to support 
this latter prediction. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out a theoretical framework. In section 3 we 
explain our empirical methodology and discuss the data. Section 4 presents the results, and a final 
section concludes. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The main contribution of the paper is empirical, however, it is useful to briefly explain the 
theoretical framework we use. It is based on a standard closed economy model with monopolistic 
competition in the goods market and bargaining over wages in the labour market. Models of this 
type have been widely used in the literature, and form the basis of several recent papers 
investigating the impact of product market reforms, including Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and 
Spector (2004) amongst others.
30 The exact predictions for the impact of product market reforms on 
employment depend on a number of factors, including the precise nature of the bargaining process. 
However, the main theoretical intuition that we investigate empirically is best explained as the 
result of double marginalisation by firms and unions. 
Consider a closed economy with N sectors, each consisting of one firm and one consumer-worker, 
and each represented by one union. Firms use labour to produce a single good, and the goods are 
imperfect substitutes. Worker-consumers have constant elasticity of substitution preferences and an 
increasing aversion to work.
31 Firms monopolise their sectors and unions monopolise firms, as they 
                                                 
29 Previous work has suggested that this is an important consideration. See Griffith and Harrison (2004). 
30 Our exposition is based closely on the simple model in Chapter 15 of Carlin and Soskice (2006), consisting of 
elements from the classic models of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Very similar results 
arise in the model of Jackman, Layard and Nickell (1991). 
31 The increasing marginal disutility of work is necessary for a unique equilibrium in the presence of constant returns to 
scale production. It captures the idea that workers have a higher reservation wage in times of high employment, due for 
example to increased personal wealth, household income or more opportunities for employment.   70 
    
control all of the labour in their sector. The expression for equilibrium employment under this 
double monopoly case takes the following form: 
⎥
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where E is equilibrium employment, the constant A contains the employment elasticity of the 
disutility of employment, B is a scaling parameter, and μ  is the mark-up of price over marginal 
cost. Compare this, first, to a situation with imperfect product market competition but no unions 
(equation 2), and, second, to the perfectly competitive outcome with no unions (equation 3): 
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As we would expect 
poly DoubleMono ly FirmMonopo Competive log log log E E E > > . A single margin, due to 
imperfect competition in the product market, reduces equilibrium employment below the perfectly 
competitive level, while a second margin, due to the presence of monopoly unions, reduces it still 
further. From expressions (1) and (2) it is also clear that an increase in product market competition 
that reduces the mark-up will increase employment, and will increase it more in the presence of a 
monopoly union. This is the key idea that we investigate empirically. 
In our empirical application we use country level measures of collective bargaining coverage and 
trade union membership to capture variation in the nature of wage and employment setting.
32 One 
way to interpret this is that countries with a higher proportion of workers covered by collective 
bargaining agreements, or belonging to unions, correspond more closely to the double-monopoly 
case, while countries with lower levels of bargaining coverage or union membership correspond 
more closely to the single firm-monopoly case. For example, we could think of countries with 
higher levels of bargaining coverage or union membership as having a higher proportion of sectors 
characterized by the double-monopoly case. 
An alternative interpretation is that collective bargaining coverage or union membership are 
summary measures of workers’ bargaining power in a setting where there is bargaining between 
firms and unions. Union power may be constrained by a number of factors such as regulations on 
the right to strike, the extent of control over the workforce or the presence of other unions. At one 
extreme of workers’ bargaining power lies the monopoly union and at the other extreme is the 
single firm monopoly, with a range of bargaining power in between. The intuition described above 
                                                 
32 We also consider the role of bargaining coordination – see below for a discussion of this. 71 
    
then has an equivalent as follows: an increase in product market competition that decreases the 
mark-up will increase employment more when workers’ bargaining power is higher.
33 
From this discussion we take the following empirical predictions to the data.  
PREDICTION 1 Increased product market competition reduces unemployment. 
PREDICTION 2 The reduction in unemployment is larger when workers’ bargaining power 
is higher. 
1.1. Wages 
Our main interest in this paper is in the impact of product market competition on employment. 
However, it is also interesting to consider the parallel implications for wages. These are less clear 
than the impact on employment. In the simple model described above, the effect of increased 
competition on real wages is independent of union bargaining power. The equilibrium real wage, 
e w , is entirely determined by product market conditions and it increases with competition as 
follows:  
μ +
=
1
1 e w .                                                                   (4) 
The result that the real wage is independent of union bargaining power is a direct consequence of 
the assumption that firms can set prices and employment conditional on the bargained wage. In this 
right to manage framework firms set prices as a mark-up over the bargained wage and the impact 
on the general price level offsets any increase in the bargained wage. If, on the other hand, we 
assume efficient bargaining, where firms and unions bargain over employment and the real wage 
simultaneously, then the real wage becomes a positive function of union bargaining power – 
workers are able to capture a proportion of the available rents, and it is increasing in their 
bargaining power. In this case an increase in competition that reduces the available rents will 
increase the real wage by a smaller amount when workers have higher levels of bargaining power. 
Competition hurts individuals as workers but, through its effect on the price level, benefits them as 
consumers.  
As discussed in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), while efficient bargaining may not be a complete 
description of the actual bargaining processes, it does capture the possibility that, when there are 
rents, stronger workers may be able to obtain a higher wage without suffering a decrease in 
                                                 
33 This result also comes directly out of recent theoretical models of product and labour market regulation. For example, 
in the case where firms have the right to manage it is implicit in equation (14) of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and 
equation (6) of Spector (2004). The equivalent results for the case of efficient bargaining are equation (6) in Blanchard 
and Giavazzi (2003) and equation (7) in Spector (2004). In a dynamic framework, Ebell and Haefke (2004) find that the 
positive effect of competition on employment is greater when workers bargain collectively than when they bargain 
individually, even when the choice of bargaining institution is endogenous. 72 
    
employment, at least in the short run. To the extent that this is the case, we would expect to see that 
the positive impact of competition on wages is smaller when workers have more bargaining power. 
Another consideration with regard to wages concerns the role of fixed capital. In the presence of 
fixed capital in the production function, workers and firms will bargain over the resulting quasi-
rents. Spector (2004) shows that in this case the overall impact of product market competition on 
wages may be negative, as the reduction in workers’ rents and quasi-rents more than offsets the 
reduction in the price level. 
From this discussion we take the following empirical predictions to the data.  
PREDICTION 3 Increased product market competition increases the real wage. 
PREDICTION 4 The increase in the real wage may be smaller when workers’ bargaining 
power is higher, to the extent that bargaining deviates from the right to manage framework. 
1.2. A Note on Coordination 
Finally, an important characteristic of union bargaining is the degree to which unions coordinate 
their activities. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argue that there should be a U-shaped relationship 
between employment and the degree of coordination.
34 The reason for this is that unions have an 
incentive to coordinate in sectors that are close substitutes in order to decrease the elasticity of 
demand for their (combined) product. However, as the combined union becomes larger the effect of 
its wage demands on aggregate prices increases. Its members suffer from this and worker-
consumers therefore moderate their demands, and employment increases. In this way an 
intermediate level of coordination, at the industry level for example, results in the lowest 
employment, since union bargaining power is high, but worker-consumers have little incentive to 
take into account the impact of their wage demands on the aggregate price level. 
To the extent that true economy-wide coordination that leads to more moderate wage demands does 
exist, we should expect to see that the interaction between product market competition and 
measures of union density or bargaining coverage is less strong in coordinated countries. However, 
to the extent that the main effect of coordination is to increase workers’ bargaining power we 
should expect to find that the impact of competition on employment is larger (and the impact on 
wages smaller) in more coordinated economies. We look for these effects in the results section. 
                                                 
34 The original paper made predictions concerning bargaining centralisation, although subsequent work focussed on 
coordination as a fuller measure of at which level bargaining occurs. Robust empirical evidence for the hump-shaped 
relationship has proved elusive and the debate on the impact of centralisation/coordination continues. See Flanagan 
(1999) for a discussion. 73 
    
2. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION AND DATA 
The discussion above suggests that competition will affect the unemployment rate, and will do so 
differently in economies with different labour market institutions. We are therefore interested in 
empirically exploring the following relationship: 
  
U
it t i it it i it it it t f X R LM BP UR ε α α μ α μ α + + + + ′ + + = 4
'
3 2 1 * ,                     (5) 
where i indexes countries and t years, UR is the unemployment rate, μ is a measure of the average 
level of profits firms earn, BPi captures labour market regulations that indicate the bargaining 
power of workers in the economy (at the start of the sample period – see below), LMRit is a vector 
of other labour market regulations and institutions, and  it X  contains a set of cyclical and other 
controls, including a measure of the deviation of output from trend growth, the real exchange rate, 
the change in the inflation rate and the public sector employment rate to control for any potential 
impact of public sector employment in crowding out private sector employment. We check that our 
results are robust to this set of control variables, and also check that the results are robust to using 
employment rather than unemployment as the dependent variable. Country fixed effects are 
captured by country dummies, fi, and common macro shocks by year dummies, tt.   
We capture the extent of product market competition by the average level of firm profitability in the 
economy, μ. Therefore, a key issue in estimating (5) and (6) is the potential for endogeneity of μ, as 
well as measurement error. For example, a positive demand shock might increase both output and 
firm profitability. We pay careful attention to instrumenting μ using policy reforms to product 
markets. We show that the reforms affect average profitability in the economy in a way that accords 
with theory, and we confirm the power of our instruments. Our approach assumes that such reforms 
affect labour market outcomes only through their impact on competition and not directly. We test 
the statistical validity of these exclusion restrictions. It is crucial that we have indicators of product 
market regulations and reforms that vary differentially over time across countries or industries as 
this allows us to identify the key parameters of interest separately from other cross country 
differences.  
In examining how the effect of competition depends on labour market institutions we focus on 
labour market characteristics that affect workers’ bargaining power. We capture this using 
indicators of collective bargaining coverage and trade union membership, which in themselves may 
be endogenous: for example, an adverse shock on employment or wages may trigger an increase in 
union membership. Therefore, we use initial values of coverage and union density to capture 
variation in workers’ bargaining power across countries. The implicit assumption is that bargaining 74 
    
power does not change significantly over time, and the data suggests that this is not an 
unreasonable assumption, particularly for bargaining coverage.  
We also explore two auxiliary results. First we estimate an exactly equivalent specification for real 
labour costs as follows: 
W
it t i it it i it it it t f X R LM BP w ε β β μ β μ β + + + + ′ + + = 4
'
3 2 1 * ,                         (6) 
where  w is the log of real labour costs per hour and all other notation is as above. As with 
unemployment, we pay careful attention to instrumenting μ using policy reforms to product 
markets. Secondly, we investigate whether the relationships described in equations (5) and (6) 
depend on the degree of bargaining coordination. The exact specification we use to do this is 
described later on. 
In order to investigate these issues empirically we need data on (i) unemployment, (ii) wages or 
labour costs, (iii) the extent of product market competition and indicators of exogenous product 
market reforms, (iv) labour market regulations, and (v) other country characteristics. We discuss 
each of these in turn below. For precise definitions, means and standard deviations see tables A1-
A.3 in the Appendix. We provide further description of the key variables over time for each country 
in a web appendix available at www.ifs.org.uk/ghm07.  
2.1. Unemployment  
We use the OECD’s standardised unemployment rate, which is the number of unemployed persons 
as a percentage of the civilian labour force. This is important because, in general, decreases in the 
unemployment rate are associated with increases in participation (e.g. see Blanchard, 2005). Our 
story is one of bargaining power and the medium run equilibrium in the labour market, so we are 
keen to isolate these from participation effects. However, we also check that our results are robust 
to using employment rather than unemployment as a dependent variable. 
2.2. Wages and Labour Costs  
Unfortunately, comparable wage data is not available for all countries in our sample at the total 
economy level. We therefore use total economy labour costs, which includes payroll taxes. We 
control for the tax wedge for our main results. We show that our results are robust to the use of a 
real wage index for manufacturing, which is available for a sub-sample of country-year 
observations. 75 
    
2.3. Product Market Competition and Reforms 
We capture changes in the extent of competition using a measure of the average level of firm 
profitability (excluding the public sector, agriculture and the real estate sector).
3536In a simple 
model of bargaining, such as that set out in Section 2, this corresponds closely to the equilibrium 
mark-up over costs. We calculate the average level of profits as value added over costs: 
it it
it
it ts CapitalCos s LabourCost
ValueAdded
+
= μ ,                                            (7) 
where all variables are in nominal prices.
37 We use the US long term interest rate to proxy the time 
variation in the cost of capital, under the assumption that this proxies the world interest rate.
38 The 
average level of profitability in our sample is 1.31. The measure is pro-cyclical and varies both 
within and between countries (see Table A.2 and Figure A.1, www.ifs.org.uk/ghm07).
39 We 
therefore include a measure of deviation from trend output growth and the change in the rate of 
inflation to control for country specific business cycles, as well as the real exchange rate to control 
for trade shocks. In addition, country dummies control for any differences in measurement that are 
constant over time. 
A drawback of our measure is that it contains the implicit assumption of constant returns to scale. 
This measure of profitability is biased downwards (upwards) in the presence of increasing 
(decreasing) returns to scale. However, any bias that might arise due to different levels of 
increasing returns to scale across countries should be captured by the country fixed effects in our 
econometric analysis, since the industrial mix does not change very quickly over time. Similarly, 
any trends that are common across countries will be captured by year effects. 
Key to our identification strategy is the use of time-varying indicators of product market reforms 
for each country. We use information on four types of reform - the implementation of the EU 
Single Market Programme (SMP), changes in tariff and non-tariff barriers and the burden of 
government bureaucracy. 
                                                 
35 We can think of this as an estimate of the mark-up or price cost margin (similar to a Lerner Index) if average costs 
are close to marginal costs. This is shown by Boone (2000) to be theoretically preferable to most other commonly used 
measures of competition, especially those based on market concentration or the number of firms, and it most closely 
corresponds to the parameter specified in theoretical models. 
36 Real Estate suffers from inflated values due to rising property prices. In Portugal we cannot make these exclusions 
due to lack of data so we use the total economy. We can remove the real estate sector in Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
France, the Netherlands, Norway and the US. 
37 This can be shown to be equivalent to that proposed by Roeger (1995).  See also Klette (1999) for a discussion. 
38 We repeat the analysis using time-varying country specific interest rates (see the robustness section for discussion). 
39 Overall, our measures are similar to other examples in the literature, for example those calculated for manufacturing 
industries by Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996). 76 
    
The SMP was concerned with eradicating cross-country differences in product and service 
standards, administrative and regulatory barriers, VAT and capital controls which inhibited the free 
flow of goods, services and factors of production between EU countries. Of the 14 countries in our 
sample, seven were involved in the programme (Belgium, Denmark, France, UK, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal) and seven were not (Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, US). We also exploit the fact that, among participants, the SMP both had a differential 
impact across countries and was implemented at different rates.  
To capture variation in the impact across countries we use a survey carried out before the 
programme was implemented. Cecchini et al. (1988) surveyed 11,000 firms in different industries 
asking respondents to rate the current level of various barriers to trade. Based on this survey Buiges 
et al. (1990) identified 40 out of 120 industrial sectors that were deemed to be most sensitive to the 
programme. They consulted individual country experts to confirm their findings and to add or 
remove sectors from the list according to country-specific circumstances. Table 1 lists the 
percentage of industry employment in each country that Buiges et al. (1990) identified as sensitive 
to the programme, showing that the Netherlands was deemed the least sensitive and Portugal the 
most sensitive. As well as different ex ante sensitivity to the SMP, different countries passed the 
necessary reforms into law at different rates. The European Commission recorded this from 1997 
onwards in its Internal Market Scoreboard and we modify our SMP variable accordingly using 
differences across countries in the average rate of implementation.
40  
Table 1: Measures of Product Market Reform and Bargaining Power 
 Country 
 
 
 
Industry Sensitive to 
Single Market 
Program 
(%)
Collective Bargaining 
Coverage in 1986 
 
(%)
Union Density in 
1986 
 
(%) 
Australia 0  85  45.1 
Austria 0  99  50.6 
Belgium 50.2 90 51.5 
Canada 0  39  33 
Denmark  49.4 74 77.4 
Finland 0  95  88.2 
France  50.8 90 12.5 
UK  50.0 64 44.8 
Italy  52.2 85 40.4 
Netherlands  44.9 80 27.3 
Norway 0  70  57.1 
Portugal 68.1 70 51.4 
Sweden 0  86  82.5 
US 0  21  17 
Notes: The size of industries that were deemed sensitive to the SMP is measured as % of  
employment. 
                                                 
40 The scoreboard is available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/score/index_en.htm. 77 
    
  
We combine these sources of variation to construct a variable that indicates the percentage of 
industry liberalized over time, the exact form of which can be seen in www.ifs.org.uk/ghm07.  
We use three other indicators of product market reform. The first is an indicator of the 
administrative burden on business due to government bureaucracy, which may constitute a barrier 
to firm entry. The second is a measure of the extent of hidden import barriers and costs to importing 
equipment, which may inhibit competition. Both of these indicators are based on survey responses 
from 10,000 business leaders carried out in the Executive Opinion Survey and published in the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. These indicators are available for the 
1990s. The third is an index of average tariff rates, reported in Fraser Institute (2002) based on data 
from a number of sources, including the World Bank, the OECD, UNCTAD and GATT. 
In the results reported below we pay careful attention to showing that these reforms provide 
powerful instruments for the degree of profitability (in that they enter significantly in the first stage 
regression) and that they are valid instruments (in that statistical tests suggest that they can be 
excluded from the second stage). 
2.4. Labour Market Regulations 
To measure worker bargaining power we use two variables - the proportion of workers who are 
paid wages determined by firm/union bargaining, whether or not they belong to a union (referred to 
as bargaining coverage), and the proportion of workers who are actual members of a union (referred 
to as union density). We find bargaining coverage a more convincing and accurate measure of 
bargaining power, and use it in the first instance, and consider union density for robustness.
41 The 
start of sample values of bargaining coverage and union density are listed for each country in Table 
1. As controls we use a set of labour market variables that have been found to be important in the 
unemployment literature. They are: an index of employment protection legislation; the benefit 
replacement ratio; the tax wedge between the production wage and the consumption wage; and a 
measure of the degree of coordination of bargaining in the economy.
42 
3. RESULTS   
We now turn to an empirical investigation of the predictions set out in section 1. We start by 
considering the first stage, or reduced form, regression of average profitability on the indicators of 
product market reforms, before moving on to the main results examining the effects of changes in 
                                                 
41 The classic example is that of France, which has the lowest union density in our sample (12.5%), but a very high 
level of bargaining coverage (90%). 
42 See Nickell at al (2005) for a discussion of these variables and their impact on unemployment outcomes. 78 
    
competition on unemployment. We follow with an investigation of the further predictions on wages 
and the effect of bargaining coordination.  
3.1. The Effect of Product Market Reforms on Average Profitability 
The first stage regression of average profitability on indicators of product market reforms and all 
other controls takes the following form: 
μ ε γ γ γ μ it t i it it it it t f X R LM R PM + + + + ′ + ′ = 3
'
2 1 ,                                   (8) 
where i indexes country, t year,  it PMR  represents a vector of time and country varying indicators 
of product market regulation,  it LMR  represents a vector of time and country varying indicators of 
labour market regulation (which are also included in the employment and wage regressions later 
on), and X includes the output gap, changes in inflation, the real exchange rate, and the share of 
employment accounted for by the public sector, as discussed in Section 3. 
 
Table 2: The Impact of Product Market Reforms on Competition 
Dependent variable:  Profitability ( it μ ) Profitability  ( it μ ) * 
Bargaining Coverage in 
1986 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Single Market Programme  -0.00066 -0.00048  -0.00060  -0.01364 
  [0.00026] [0.00031]  [0.00032]  [0.02778] 
Average Tariff Rate   -0.02813  -0.02064 -10.50267 
   [0.01601]  [0.05146]  [4.10911] 
Government Bureaucracy   -0.00387  -0.09118  -5.23088 
   [0.00822]  [0.06655]  [5.29911] 
Non-Tariff Barriers   0.02075  0.01997  1.28659 
   [0.01435]  [0.01516]  [1.31458] 
Average Tariff Rate *  
Bargaining Coverage 1986 
   -0.00017  0.09813 
   [0.00058]  [0.04713] 
Government Bureaucracy * 
Bargaining Coverage 1986 
   0.00103  0.05005 
   [0.00079]  [0.06331] 
Tax Wedge *  
Bargaining Coverage 1986 
   0.00010  0.00935 
   [0.00007]  [0.00651] 
Labour market controls: Tax wedge, 
employment protection, benefits, 
coordination 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other controls: output gap, change in 
inflation, real exchange rate, public 
sector employment rate, country and 
year dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: The regressions include 206 observations on 14 countries over the period 1986-2000. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. See Table 3 for tests of the joint significance and partial R
2 of the four product market reform variables. 
 
All of the product market variables are increasing with liberalisation, so a negative coefficient 
suggests that reforms which liberalise product markets are associated with lower average 79 
    
profitability. Column (1) in Table 2 shows the first stage using the SMP variable alone. We can see 
that it is statistically significant and negative, meaning that entering the SMP was associated with a 
reduction in average profitability, which we interpret as a positive impact on competition.  The 
magnitude of the SMP effect is such that, if the SMP affected 50% of industry, as it did in the case 
of the UK for example, then we estimate that economy-wide average profitability decreases by 3 
percentage points (0.00066*50).
43 In Column (2) we include three other product market reforms, 
and the four variables together are jointly significant at the 1% level. This is the first stage 
regression used to identify the linear competition effect in column (3) of Table 3.  
We estimate equations (4) and (5) both for the linear case (restricting α2 and β2 to be zero) and 
including the interaction terms with bargaining power (α2 and β2 non-zero). Therefore we need 
reduced forms for both the linear variable and the interaction. In column (3) we interact the product 
market reforms with bargaining coverage. In the long run, when the number of firms in the 
economy is endogenous, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) show that the equilibrium level of rents in 
the economy depends on both entry costs and workers’ bargaining power, which justifies including 
these interactions in the first stage.
44 We show at the bottom of column (5) of Table 3 that the 
excluded instruments have strong explanatory power, in the sense that they are jointly significant at 
the 1% level and have a partial R-squared of about 9%. In column (4) we show the reduced form 
for the interaction term, which has similar properties. 
3.2. Unemployment 
We now turn to the estimation of the determinants of unemployment, as expressed in equation (4). 
In Table 3 we start in column (1) by looking at the relationship between labour market regulations 
and the unemployment rate. The results are consistent with those in Nickell et al. (2005), and 
several other studies, in that taxes and the benefit replacement rate have a significantly positive 
effect on unemployment and coordination has a negative effect, whereas employment protection 
legislation has no significant effect on its own.
45 The output gap has a significant negative 
coefficient as expected, the change in the inflation rate is not significant, and the real exchange rate 
has a significant negative coefficient, indicating that a more appreciated exchange rate is associated 
with a lower equilibrium level of unemployment. The coefficient on the public sector employment 
                                                 
43 That is, for example, from 0.13 to 0.10, or from 13% to 10%. 
44 See equation (8) of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). We also tried including the SMP interacted with bargaining 
coverage but found that the data rejected this specification in the sense that the Hansen test in the second stage rejected 
the over-identifying restrictions. 
45 Nickell et al. (2005) find that interactions between different labour market institutions can be important in explaining 
unemployment. We do not investigate this possibility as our main focus is on the impact of product market competition. 80 
    
rate is significantly higher than minus one, suggesting that unemployment decreases less than one-
for-one with an increase in public sector employment. In the robustness section we show that the 
results are robust to dropping some of these controls. 
Table 3: The Impact of Competition on the Unemployment Rate 
Dependent variable: 
Unemployment Rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  OLS  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Competition Variables         
Profitability   6.857  17.102 -17.858 -0.272 -13.361 1.700 
   [2.402] [8.612] [5.705]  [12.975]  [3.855] [7.538] 
Profitability * Bargaining 
Coverage in 1986 
    0.300 0.375    
    [0.062] [0.134]    
Profitability * Union Density 
in 1986 
      0.297 0.157 
      [0.049] [0.078] 
Labour Market Controls         
Tax Wedge  0.109 0.118 0.131 0.079 0.099 0.039 0.083 
  [0.047] [0.047] [0.048] [0.047] [0.060] [0.044] [0.046] 
Employment Protection 
Legislation  -0.271 -0.225 -0.157 -0.035 0.172  0.193  0.033 
  [0.289] [0.279] [0.268] [0.266] [0.328] [0.270] [0.281] 
Benefits Replacement Ratio  10.72 9.591 7.905 6.943 2.360 8.810 8.268 
  [2.984] [3.055] [3.149] [2.948] [3.844] [2.455] [2.525] 
Coordination Index  -1.328 -1.446 -1.622 -1.172 -1.513 -0.885 -1.245 
  [0.364] [0.367] [0.384] [0.391] [0.485] [0.327] [0.363] 
Other Controls         
Output Gap  -0.515 -0.563 -0.635 -0.566 -0.733 -0.545 -0.592 
  [0.044] [0.047] [0.075] [0.046] [0.074] [0.046] [0.058] 
Change in Inflation  -1.454 0.246 2.786 -0.231 5.549 -1.259 0.822 
  [5.830] [5.740] [6.325] [5.555] [8.278] [4.999] [5.007] 
Real Exchange Rate  -0.070 -0.057 -0.037 -0.062 -0.018 -0.063 -0.049 
  [0.012] [0.013] [0.022] [0.012] [0.023] [0.012] [0.016] 
Public Sector Employment Rate  -0.546 -0.537 -0.523 -0.396 -0.329 -0.491 -0.505 
  [0.122] [-.0109] [0.093] [0.107] [0.119] [0.102] [0.091] 
Constant  4.783  -4.778 -19.061 35.951 -29.396 35.451  -8.651 
  [2.829]  [4.248] [12.780] [8.513] [12.346] [7.079]  [8.436] 
         
1
st Stage P-value:     linear 
                                 interaction  
   0.0053 
-
 0.0016 
0.0003 
 0.0001 
0.0000
1
st Stage Partial R
2: linear 
                                 interaction 
   0.06 
- 
 0.09 
0.11 
 0.15 
0.26 
P-value for Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions 
   0.20  0.27  0.08 
Notes: The regressions include 206 observations on 14 countries over the period 1986-2000. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. All specifications include country and year dummies. The 1
st Stage P-value is for a test of the joint 
significance of the excluded product market reforms, and the 1
st Stage Partial R
2 is for the excluded product market 
reforms. In column (3) they are based on the estimates in column (2) of Table 2, in column (5) they are based on the 
estimates in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, and in column (7) they are based on the equivalent specification to columns 
(3) and (4) in Table 2 but with bargaining coverage replaced by union density. 
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In column (2) we include the linear effect of average profitability on unemployment. The 
significant positive coefficient suggests that increasing competition (a decrease in profitability) 
decreases the unemployment rate. Controlling for the endogeneity of competition by using our IV 
estimator in column (3) indicates that the OLS estimates are negatively biased, as the coefficient 
becomes more positive when we instrument. This is as expected: for example unobserved shocks 
that increase profitability are likely to decrease unemployment. Instrumenting will also help to 
reduce any attenuation bias that may be present due to classical measurement error in profitability. 
At the bottom of column (3) we present diagnostics showing the strength and validity of the 
excluded instruments. The p-value and partial R2 of the excluded instruments suggest that they 
have power, and the Hansen test suggests that we cannot reject the over-identifying restrictions that 
the policy reform variables can be excluded from this regression. 
In columns (4) and (5) we look at how the impact of increased competition varies with collective 
bargaining coverage, measured at the beginning of the sample period to mitigate potential problems 
of endogeneity.
46,47 In columns (6) and (7) we consider the equivalent interaction with union 
density. The results provide evidence of interaction effects with both bargaining coverage and 
union density, and in both cases they are as theory predicts: an increase in competition decreases 
the unemployment rate more so in the presence of strong worker bargaining power. In the case of 
bargaining coverage the interaction effect becomes slightly larger once we instrument, whereas 
with union density the interaction becomes smaller, but the linear effect larger. We have no strong a 
priori reason to believe that the direction of the bias in the interaction term should be positive or 
negative. However, the mean effect in both cases increases, which is consistent with the hypothesis 
that any bias in profitability dampens the estimated effect of competition. At the bottom of columns 
(5) and (7) the p-values for the test of significance of the excluded instruments and the partial R2 
suggest that the instruments have power. In column (5) we cannot reject the validity of the 
overidentifying exclusion restrictions, while in column (7) we cannot reject at the 5% level, but can 
at the 10% level.  
                                                 
46 The results are robust to letting bargaining coverage vary over time in the interaction, and including it as a control. In 
this case the coefficients (standard errors) on profitability and the interaction between profitability and bargaining 
coverage are –4.533 (9.856) and 0.376 (0.104) respectively. The result also holds with time-varying union density. 
 
47 We exclude Germany as we expect the effects of re-unification to swamp any impact of product market reforms 
around that time period. When we do include data for Germany, controlling for re-unification with a dummy variable, 
the coefficients (standard errors) on profitability and the interaction between profitability and bargaining coverage are –
4.293 (12.371) and 0.404 (0.129). 82 
    
3.3. Economic Significance 
What are the economic magnitudes of these effects? The magnitude of the results in column (3) 
suggest that the 3 percentage point drop in profitability predicted for the UK’s entry into the SMP 
would, all else equal, result in a decrease in the unemployment rate of 0.51 of a percentage point 
(17.10*-0.03). To assess the magnitude of the interaction in column (5) we can compare the effect 
of a 3 percentage point drop in profitability on economies that have a bargaining coverage one 
standard deviation either side of the mean (which is 75%). An economy with an initial coverage of 
53%, somewhere between that of Canada (39%) and the UK (64%), will experience a decrease in 
the unemployment rate of 0.60 percentage points (-0.03*(-0.27+0.38*53)), whereas an economy 
with an initial coverage of 97%, similar to that of Austria (99%), will experience a decrease of 1.10 
percentage points (-0.03*(-0.27+0.38*97)), a difference of half a percentage point. The coefficient 
when we use union density is smaller and the comparable difference in the unemployment effect 
between a low density economy and a high density economy is 0.21 percentage points, again 
corresponding to one standard deviation either side of the cross-country mean. The smaller 
interaction effect with union density is consistent with our view that, perhaps, it does not measure 
bargaining power as well as coverage. 
Table 4 further quantifies the economic significance of our estimates by comparing the actual 
changes in unemployment for each country between 1988 and 1998 (the years between which we 
have a balanced panel of countries) to the predicted changes from product market reforms based on 
our estimates. We first examine the predicted impact of the SMP for participant countries, and then 
the predicted impact of changes in all the product market reform variables. In all cases we control 
for common year effects, country-specific business cycles and macroeconomic shocks, so changes 
are relative to the cross-country average. We also control for the share of employment in the public 
sector. The predicted changes use estimates from column (5) of Table 3.  
The table shows that the predicted effects of product market reforms in reducing unemployment are 
substantial. For some of the countries the SMP variable accounts for a large part of the impact, but 
the other product market variables also explain a significant amount of variation. For example, our 
estimates suggest that the SMP was associated with a 1.1 percentage point reduction in the 
unemployment rate in Portugal, while all the product market reforms that we measure were together 
associated with a 2.6 percentage point reduction. This compares with an actual reduction in the 
unemployment rate relative to the cross-country average trend of 1.1 percentage points. Thus, 
factors other than product market reforms appear to have been responsible for an increase in the 
unemployment rate relative to the cross-country average trend of 1.5 percentage points. Overall the 83 
    
predicted changes due to all the product market reforms are positively correlated with the actual 
changes across countries, with a correlation coefficient of 0.35. 
Table 4: Predicted Effects of Product Market Reforms, 1988 to 1998 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Country  ΔUnemployment  Explained by  
SMP 
Explained by all 
product market 
reforms 
Explained by 
labour market 
reforms 
Australia 0.2  0.0  -0.2  0.3 
Austria 2.9  0.0  -0.2  0.9 
Belgium -1.6  -1.0  -0.4  0.1 
Canada -3.5  0.0  0.2  0.3 
Denmark -0.4  -0.8  -2.2  0.1 
Finland 4.8  0.0  1.6  0.4 
France 1.3  -1.0  -1.3  0.7 
UK -5.9  -0.7  -1.3  -0.3 
Italy 0.2  -1.0  -1.1  -0.9 
The Netherlands  -1.2 -0.8  -2.9  -0.7 
Norway 2.7  0.0  -1.4  0.8 
Portugal -1.1  -1.1  -2.6  -0.5 
Sweden 2.5  0.0  -0.3  -0.4 
US -1.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.2 
Notes: All columns are calculated using de-trended values, controlling for the business cycle, the real exchange rate, 
changes in the inflation rate, and the public sector employment rate. Predictions are based on coefficient estimates reported 
in column (5) of Table 3. 
 
The predicted effect of the SMP, on the seven countries that participated, was an average decrease 
in the unemployment rate of 0.9 of a percentage point. This is sizeable when compared to the 
average change in the unemployment rate for the same seven countries between 1988 and 1998, 
which was, with controls, a decrease of 1.2 percentage points (0.5 percentage points without any 
controls).   
These effects vary substantially with different levels of bargaining coverage. Still using the values 
from column (2) of Table 4 we can compare the impact of the SMP on unemployment in the UK to 
that in Belgium (the estimated impact of the SMP on average profitability for these two countries is 
the same – a reduction of 3.0 percentage points). We estimate that the SMP reduced unemployment 
in the UK (where bargaining coverage was 64%) by 0.7 percentage points, whereas in Belgium 
(where bargaining coverage was 90%) the SMP reduced unemployment by 1.0 percentage points. 
There is, however, a lot of variation in unemployment that we do not explain. Continuing to 
consider the seven SMP countries, the predicted effect of all product market reforms (including the 
SMP) is an average decrease of 1.7 percentage points and the predicted net effect of labour market 
reforms is a decrease of 0.2 percentage points. This leaves an increase in unemployment of 0.7 
percentage points unexplained. It is possible that our results underestimate the overall impact of 
reforms to labour market institutions. In particular, Nickell et al. (2005) find that interactions 84 
    
between labour institutions are significant determinants of unemployment; for the sake of 
parsimony, we have not explored this here.   
3.4. Labour Costs 
Table 5 presents the results for the wage regression as written in equation (6). As mentioned 
previously, comparable total economy wage data is unavailable for these countries. Therefore, we 
present results for real labour costs per hour for the total economy. This includes payroll taxes and 
other non-wage labour costs.  
We start in column (1) by ensuring that the simple labour cost regression is consistent with existing 
literature. The coefficients on the labour market institutional variables are consistent with Nunziata 
(2005) in that the tax wedge and benefit replacement ratio increase labour costs, and the 
coordination index decreases labour costs (although it is only significant at 10% here). However, 
whereas in our sample the employment protection index has a negative coefficient, Nunziata (2005) 
finds a positive coefficient. The theoretical predictions for the impact of protection legislation are 
ambiguous (see Blanchard (2005) for a discussion) and the results may differ due to the difference 
in samples: Nunziata (2005) uses 20 OECD countries over the period 1960-1994. 
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Table 5: The Impact of Competition on Labour Costs 
Dependent variable: 
Log Real Labour Costs per Hour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS  OLS IV OLS IV 
Competition Variables       
Profitability     -21.025  -114.644 -124.116 -176.422 
    [10.336] [56.607] [28.126] [61.486] 
Profitability * Bargaining         1.245  1.803 
Coverage in 1986 
 
    [0.313]  [0.569] 
Labour Market Controls       
Tax  Wedge  0.593 0.568 0.459 0.368 0.272 
  [0.163] [0.160] [0.197] [0.161] [0.167] 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
-2.028 -2.189 -2.909 -0.945 -0.436 
[1.072] [1.037] [1.359] [1.040] [1.055] 
Benefit  Replacement  Ratio  24.208 27.759 43.571 14.893 10.175 
  [8.814] [8.750]  [13.152]  [8.350] [9.550] 
Coordination  Index  -3.225 -2.847 -1.163 -2.035 -1.561 
  [1.894] [1.850] [1.946] [1.899] [1.824] 
Other Controls       
Output  Gap  0.109 0.255 0.908 0.261 0.307 
  [0.150] [0.146] [0.421] [0.148] [0.314] 
Change in Inflation  14.657  9.349  -14.284  9.295  7.714 
  [32.625] [29.936] [32.477] [31.640] [32.918] 
Real  Exchange  Rate  0.218 0.177 -0.004 0.160 0.141 
  [0.051] [0.054] [0.128] [0.052] [0.087] 
Constant  136.958 166.248 296.666 416.462 217.467 
  [11.394] [17.923] [80.801] [33.395] [56.449] 
       
1st Stage p-value: linear     0.0227  0.0329 
                              interaction       0.0013 
1st Stage Partial R
2: linear     0.05  0.06 
                              interaction       0.10 
P-value for Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions 
   0.61  0.08 
Notes: The regressions include 206 observations on 14 countries over the period 1986-2000. Robust standard errors appear 
in parentheses. Country and year dummies are included throughout. The 1
st Stage P-value is for a test of the joint 
significance of the excluded product market reforms, and the 1
st Stage Partial R
2 is for the excluded product market 
reforms. In column (3) they are based on estimates similar to those shown in column (2) of Table 2 but with non-tariff 
barriers excluded, in column (5) they are based on equivalent specifications to columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 but with non-
tariff barriers excluded. The dependent variable has been multiplied by 100, to aid presentation. 
 
In column (2) we include profitability in an OLS regression on real labour costs for the total 
economy and find that increased rents reduce real labour costs, as expected. In column (3) we use 
an instrumental variables estimator to control for the potential endogeneity of profitability. At the 
bottom of the table we show that the instruments are both powerful and valid for profitability in this 
specification. The significant negative coefficient on profitability suggests that competition has a 
positive effect on wages. The difference between the OLS and IV estimates suggests that the OLS 86 
    
coefficient is biased upwards, as would be expected if there was a positive correlation between 
profitability and wages due to unobserved shocks or other factors.  
To assess the economic significance of these results consider as before the impact of joining the 
SMP on a country such as the UK where 50% of industry was expected to be affected. The 
coefficient on profitability in column (3) of Table 5 implies that the predicted impact of the SMP in 
the UK was an increase in real labour costs of about 3.4% (-0.03*-114.64). Thus, if we interpret 
labour costs as a proxy for wages, workers were on average made better off by this amount. 
In column (4) we include the interaction with bargaining coverage in an OLS regression, and in 
column (5) we use our IV estimator. Recall from Section 1 that, to the extent that bargaining 
deviates from right-to-manage, we expect the positive impact of competition on real wages to be 
smaller in countries where workers have high levels of bargaining power. The results in column (5) 
are consistent with this prediction. Consider the same 3 percentage point reduction in average 
profitability as a result of the SMP. The size of the effect in column (5) is such that a low 
bargaining coverage country (53% as before) would experience an increase of about 2.4% in real 
labour costs (-0.03*(-176.42+1.80*53)), whereas a high coverage country (97% as before) would 
experience an increase of only 0.1% (-0.03*(-176.42+1.80*97)). Theory suggests that workers 
should be better off on average in all countries and our results are largely consistent with this: with 
bargaining coverage up to 98% the interaction effect does not outweigh the linear effect. In our 
sample only Austria has coverage higher than this. 
As a robustness check we estimated an equivalent specification to that in column (5) but for an 
index of real wages in manufacturing.
48 The results are similar, with coefficients (standard errors) 
on the linear profitability variable and the interaction of –79.082 (23.550) and 0.546 (0.306) 
respectively. Combining these with the coefficient on the SMP variable from the first stage (from 
which we estimate that the SMP reduced average profitability in UK manufacturing by about 9 
percentage points) implies that a low bargaining coverage country would experience a 4.5% 
increase in real manufacturing wages as a result of joining the SMP, while a high coverage country 
would experience an increase of only 2.3%. In this case the average effect on real wages is positive 
even with 100% coverage. 
3.5. Bargaining Coordination  
As described in Section 1.2 we may expect that our results will vary with the degree of bargaining 
coordination in the economy. If the degree of coordination is high enough that it successfully 
                                                 
48 We lose observations for Portugal and some years for other countries, leaving 176 observations. 87 
    
moderates wage demands we expect our interaction result to be less strong in highly coordinated 
countries, however to the extent that it increases workers’ bargaining power then we expect the 
impact of competition on employment to be larger (and the impact on wages to be smaller) in more 
coordinated economies. To investigate this we split the countries in our sample into three groups 
according to the average value of their coordination index. The highly coordinated countries are 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands and Norway; the intermediate ones are Belgium, 
France, Italy, Portugal and Sweden; and the low coordination countries are Australia, Canada, the 
UK and the US.
49 We then estimate a modified version of equation (5) for the unemployment rate 
as follows: 
i it i it i it it it HIGH INT BP UR * * * 4 3 2 1 μ α μ α μ α μ α + + + =                                 (9) 
i i it i i it BP HIGH BP INT * * * * 6 5 μ α μ α + +  
U
it t i it it t f X R LM ε α α + + + ′ + ′ + 8 7 , 
where INT and HIGH are dummies for intermediate and high coordination respectively and all 
other notation is as before. If the effect of competition on unemployment is higher in intermediate 
or highly coordinated countries we expect  3 α  or  4 α  to be positive. This would be the case if the 
main effect of coordination was to increase workers’ bargaining power by lowering the elasticity of 
demand for their (combined) product. If coordination also leads to moderated wage demands 
through the internalization of negative externalities then we expect the interaction between 
competition and bargaining coverage to be weaker in more highly coordinated countries, in which 
case we expect  5 α  or  6 α  to be negative. 
The first column of Table 6 shows the results of estimating equation (9). While the estimated 
coefficients on the three way interactions between profitability, bargaining coverage and the 
coordination dummies are indeed negative, they are both insignificant, and the same is true for the 
two-way interactions between profitability and the coordination dummies. In the second column we 
set   5 α  and  6 α  to zero and include only the interactions between the coordination dummies and 
profitability. As well as a significant positive coefficient on our main interaction of interest - 
between profitability and bargaining coverage - we also find significant positive coefficients on 
both of these additional interactions. Thus the largest effect of increased competition on 
unemployment appears to be in countries where bargaining coverage is high and coordination is 
also intermediate or high.  
                                                 
49 The results are robust to changing the categorisation so that only Finland, The Netherlands and Norway are 
considered as highly coordinated.    88 
    
Table 6: Coordinated Bargaining 
Dependent variable: 
Unemployment Rate  Log of Real Labour Costs Per 
Hour, Total Economy 
 
(1) 
 
OLS 
(2) 
 
OLS 
(3) 
 
OLS 
(4) 
 
OLS 
Profitability -22.012  -20.089  -125.531  -121.213 
 [6.489]  [5.595]  [33.393]  [27.465] 
Profitability * Bargaining Coverage in 1986  0.230  0.201  0.989  0.923 
[0.083] [0.079] [0.547] [0.430] 
Profitability * Intermediate Coordination Dummy  36.675  12.735  -9.509  0.809 
[37.627] [4.465]  [421.416]  [23.411] 
Profitability * High Coordination Dummy  17.706  10.918  53.641  35.417 
[17.954] [4.169] [58.575]  [20.570] 
Profitability * Intermediate Coordination Dummy 
* Bargaining Coverage in 1986 
-0.289 - 0.104 - 
[0.442]  [4.883]  
Profitability * High Coordination Dummy 
* Bargaining Coverage in 1986 
-0.088 - -0.233 - 
[0.204]  [0.782]  
Labour market controls: Tax wedge, employment 
protection, benefits, coordination 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cyclical controls: output gap, change in inflation, 
real exchange rate, public sector employment rate 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  206 206 206 206 
Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. All specifications include country and year dummies. The highly 
coordinated countries are Austria, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands and Norway; the intermediates are Belgium, France, 
Italy, Portugal and Sweden; and the low coordination countries are Australia, Canada, UK and US. The results are robust 
to changing the categorisation so that only Finland, The Netherlands and Norway are considered as highly coordinated. 
 
In columns (3) and (4) we repeat the same exercise for the log of real labour costs per hour in the 
total economy and the results are qualitatively similar.
50 As before, our previous results are robust 
and the three-way interactions between profitability, the coordination dummies and bargaining 
coverage are insignificant in column (3). In column (4) the interaction between profitability and the 
high coordination dummy is positive and significant, but only at the 10% level. Overall these 
results are consistent with the idea that the main effect of the degree of bargaining coordination 
actually observed in our sample is to increase workers’ bargaining power, rather than to internalize 
the negative externalities of excessive wage demands. At the very least they suggest that the impact 
of competition on unemployment is larger in more coordinated countries. 
3.6. Robustness 
Finally, we turn to a number of potential robustness concerns, not previously discussed. We 
consider whether our main results are robust to the following: a different measure of the cost of 
                                                 
50 The results using the manufacturing real wage index are also similar. 89 
    
capital used in calculating profitability; changing the control variables used; and using employment 
instead of unemployment as the dependent variable. These are discussed in turn. 
In our main results we use the US long term interest rate to proxy variation over time in the cost of 
capital for all countries. This assumes that capital markets are fully open throughout the sample 
period, which we find to be the most plausible assumption. If capital markets were liberalized by 
some countries during the sample period in a way that was correlated with reforms to product 
markets this could potentially affect our results. To check the robustness of our results we re-ran all 
results making the extreme assumption that capital markets are fully closed, and hence used 
domestic interest rates to proxy for changes in the cost of capital. Our main results are robust to this 
change.
51 
We also check that our main results are robust to the set of control variables included. For example, 
if we drop the change in the inflation rate, the real exchange rate and the public sector employment 
rate from the specification in column (5) of Table 3 the main results are not significantly affected. 
For example, the coefficients (standard errors) on profitability and the interaction between 
profitability and bargaining coverage are 5.826 (10.980) and 0.345 (0.137) respectively. 
Another potential measurement concern is with our use of the unemployment rate as the dependent 
variable. To investigate this we instead use the log of employment as the dependent variable, and 
include the size of the labour force as a control, as well as the log of public sector employment. The 
key difference between this and the unemployment regressions is that we no longer restrict the 
coefficient on the labour force to equal one. The key coefficients on profitability, and the 
interaction between profitability and bargaining coverage, are robust to this change of specification. 
For example the equivalent coefficients (standard errors) on profitability and its interaction with 
bargaining coverage to those in column (5) of Table 3 are –0.042 (0.150) and –0.004 (0.001). The 
magnitude of these estimated effects are very similar to those using the unemployment rate. For 
example, consider again the impact of joining the SMP for a country with high bargaining coverage 
(97% as before). Using the coefficients above this is associated with a 1.30% increase in 
employment (-0.03*100*(-0.042-0.004*97)), which is comparable with a predicted reduction in the 
unemployment rate of 1.10 percentage points calculated from column (5) of Table 3. The 
equivalent changes for a low bargaining coverage country (53% as before) are a 0.76% increase in 
                                                 
51 For example, for the instrumented unemployment regression (Table 3 column 3) the coefficient (standard error) on 
profitability, for the 185 observations for which the domestic interest rate is available, is 12.792 (4.777). In Table 3 
column (5) the coefficients (standard errors) on profitability and the profitability*bargaining coverage terms are       -
1.093 (9.100) and 0.168 (0.103) respectively. For the instrumented wage regression, using real labour costs per hour for 
the total economy (Table 5 column 5) the equivalent coefficients (standard errors) are -115.751 (28.206) and 1.556 
(0.310). 90 
    
employment (-0.03*100*(-0.042-0.004*53)) and a 0.60 percentage point reduction in the 
unemployment rate predicted by column (5) of Table 3. 
4. CONCLUSION 
High rates of unemployment remain a key policy concern across many European countries. 
Attention has focused on labour market institutions as the main determinant of unemployment, but 
recent work suggests that they cannot fully explain the variation across countries and over time. We 
have shown here that conditions in the product market are important determinants of 
unemployment, as well as interactions between product markets and labour markets. Having said 
that, there remains significant variation in unemployment to be explained. 
Empirically we have shown that the significant product market de-regulation experienced in the 
1990s by some OECD countries was associated with an increase in competition as measured by 
average firm profitability. Such exogenous increases in competition are further associated with 
increases in aggregate employment and the real wage. We estimate that in countries with higher 
levels of collective bargaining coverage and/or union density the increase in employment is more 
pronounced, and the increase in real wages (labour costs) less so. Although some of the key reforms 
that we have used specifically targeted manufacturing, we find that even manufacturing workers 
with very high bargaining coverage were, in real wage terms, better off on average as a result of the 
product market reforms. 
Our results have interesting implications for policy. First, widespread product market reforms will 
tend to benefit workers and the economy as a whole through increased employment and higher real 
wages. Second, the presence of strong unions is not a reason to shy away from product market 
reform – if anything there is more incentive to reform as the employment benefits may be larger. 
However, given that we find a positive average impact of product market reforms on wages, our 
results raise the question of why workers and unions are often hostile to reforming product markets. 
One answer suggested by our results is that existing workers with more bargaining power have less 
to gain on average from product market reforms. However, our results have focused solely on 
average effects across the whole economy. We have not considered the possibility of piecemeal 
reforms that only affect the sector in which an individual works and not the goods they consume. In 
this case workers with bargaining power may lose out overall. This suggests that widespread 
reforms are less likely to be resisted by workers than reforms that only affect a small number of 
sectors. 91 
    
DATA APPENDIX 
Our data consist of an unbalanced panel on 14 countries over the period 1986-2000. Table A.1 
shows the structure of the panel. Spain and Greece are excluded from the analysis due to a lack of 
data availability, and Germany is excluded due to re-unification, which is likely to have swamped 
any effects from product market reform. The second panel of Table A.1 shows the mean and 
standard deviation of our measure of profitability. It is important to note that the inclusion of 
country dummies in all specifications controls for average differences across countries in the level 
of measured profitability due to differences in measurement or other differences that are constant 
over time. Thus the main results are identified from differential within-country changes over time. 
Table A.1: Sample Composition and Average Profitability by Country 
Country  Total economy  Manufacturing  Mean of Average 
Profitability 
Standard Deviation 
 Unemployment,  Labour 
Costs 
Wages  
Australia 1986-2000  1986-2000 1.2944  0.0596 
Austria 1986-2000  1986-1999  1.2716  0.0505 
Belgium 1986-2000  1986-1998 1.2995  0.0349 
Canada 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.3972  0.0534 
Denmark 1986-2000  1986-2000 1.4980  0.0456 
Finland 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.2120  0.1011 
France 1986-2000  1986-1997  1.2828 0.0259 
UK 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.3679  0.0527 
Italy 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.4889  0.0832 
The Netherlands  1986-2000  1986-1999  1.2419  0.0560 
Norway 1986-1999  1997-1999  1.2297  0.1283 
Portugal 1988-1999  -  1.2222  0.0275 
Sweden 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.2029  0.0664 
US 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.3698  0.0376 
Total 206  176  1.3127  0.1123 92 
    
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions – Profitability, Labour Market Outcomes and Control Variables 
Variable  Description and source  Mean 
(s.d.) 
Profitability  
(priv. sec.) 
it it
it
it ck Capitalsto tal CostofCapi s LabourCost
ValueAdded
* +
= μ  
1.3127 
(0.1123) 
Profitability 
(manuf.) 
  1.2128 
(0.0986) 
Value added  Value added at basic prices plus taxes, less subsidies on production, excluding imports and VAT. 
At factor costs for Canada and producer’s prices for USA; OECD STAN database.  
669345 
(1136497) 
Labour costs  Wages and salaries plus supplements, such as contributions to social security, private pensions, 
health insurance, life insurance. OECD STAN database 
390341 
(671321) 
Cost  of  capital    Yield on USA Government composite bond (10 Years), minus inflation rate, plus assumed 
depreciation of 7%. OECD Main Economic Indicators for bond yields and consumer price index.  
0.1118 
(0.0075) 
Capital stock  Calculated using the perpetual inventory method. Depreciation rates are calibrated so that the 
stocks are similar to the OECD estimates when both are available. OECD STAN database. 
1094195 
(1431343) 
Unemployment 
rate 
Standardised unemployment rate for all countries except Austria, for which we use the 
“commonly used definition”. OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
7.3650 
(2.7414) 
Employment  All persons engaged in domestic production including the self-employed. Countries are advised to 
report the number of jobs, rather than headcounts, subject to availability. OECD STAN database. 
18698 
(33187) 
Real labour costs 
per hour 
Wages and salaries plus supplements, such as contributions to social security, private pensions, 
health insurance, life insurance per hour worked. Deflated by the CPI, expressed here in US 
dollars (2000 exchange rate). OECD STAN database.  
13.4592 
(3.4204) 
Real wages 
(manufacturing) 
Real wage index for manufacturing; ILO, Key International Labour Market statistics.  102.7 
(6.6) 
Output gap  Percentage deviation of output from trend; OECD Economic Outlook.  -0.3488 
(2.4411) 
Change in 
inflation 
Change in growth of consumer price index for all goods, from previous year; OECD Main 
Economic Indicators. 
-0.0020 
(0.0140) 
Real exchange rate  Ratio of home country’s prices to a weighted average of competitor country’s prices, relative to a 
base year (2000) and measured in US dollars. Therefore an increase is an appreciation of the home 
country’s real exchange rate. OECD Main Economic Indicators.   
106.2 
(12.2) 
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions - Product and Labour Market Regulations 
Variable  Description and source  Mean 
(s.d.) 
    
Single  Market  Programme  We use the percentage of employment (value added in the case of Belgium due to lack of data 
availability) in industry “liberalized” by the SMP. The variable from 1997 onwards is calculated as % 
of industry identified ex-ante to be sensitive to SMP times the EU’s transposition index measuring % of 
reforms actually implemented. The variable is linearly extrapolated back to the programme start date, 
and is everywhere zero for those countries not in the programme 
10.660 
(18.450)
Average Tariff Rate  This is an index of the average tariff rate constructed by Fraser Institute from a number of sources, 
including the World Bank, the OECD, UNCTAD and GATT. It varies between 1 and 10, where 1 
indicates very high tariffs and 10 indicates none at all. 
8.670 
(0.437) 
Government Bureaucracy  This is and index constructed from responses to the question: “How much time does your firm's senior 
management spend dealing/negotiating with government officials?”. This is available for the years 1995 
and 2000. The World Economic Forum 
7.418 
(0.552) 
Non-Tariff Barriers  This is based on survey questions on hidden import barriers and the cost of importing equipment to 
measure changes in the trade environment that are not captured in the SMP variable. Fraser Institute 
8.326 
(0.830) 
    
Union density   Actual union members as percentage of employees. OECD Labour Force Statistics.  45.25 
(25.16) 
Union coverage  Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining, whether they are union members or not. 
Nickell (2003), originally obtained from Wolfgang Ochel. 
73.78 
(23.20) 
Employment protection 
legislation 
An average of an indicator of legislation for regular contracts (covering procedural inconveniences, 
direct cost of dismissal, notice and trial period) and an indicator for legislation for temporary contracts 
(covering types of work admissible under temporary contracts and maximum cumulative duration 
allowed). Nicoletti et al (2000). 
2.129 
(1.193) 
Benefits replacement ratio  Based on replacement ratio of the first year of unemployment. Nickell (2003), originally obtained from 
OECD Jobs Study 1994. 
0.482 
(0.181) 
Tax wedge  Average of the tax wedge for one-earner family with two children and single persons without children. 
OECD, Taxing Wages, 2003. 
36.20 
(8.85) 
Coordination index  The degree of coordination of bargaining: 1- firm level, 2- industry level, 3- economy level. We use 
coordination index 2 from Nickell(2003), originally obtained from Wolfgang Ochel. 
1.926 
(0.607) 
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FURTHER DATA APPENDIX 
 
Figure A.1 shows the evolution of the output gap and profitability over time for each country. It 
is clear that our measure of profitability is pro-cyclical, and it is thus important to control for the 
cycle using the output gap. 
Fig. A.1: Output Gap and Profitability 
 
Notes: Data is from the OECD STAN database. The right hand side axis shows profitability, the left hand side shows 
the output gap. The output gap is defined by the OECD as percentage deviation of output from trend.  Profitability is 
value-added over labour and capital costs. 
 
 
At first the fact that average profitability trends upwards over time may seem to conflict with 
most preconceptions about changes to the degree of competition associated with product market 
reforms, globalisation and opening to trade. One explanation, discussed in Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2003) and Boulhol (2004), is that upwards trending measured firm profits could be a 
short term response to reductions in the bargaining power of workers. The intuition is that 
declining bargaining power reduces the share of rents captured by workers in higher wages, and 95 
    
increases the share that is measured in firms’ profits.
52 In the long term, the increase in 
profitability associated with declining workers’ bargaining power would be expected to lead to 
entry and a reduction of rents to their previous level, but to the extent that these effects occur 
with lags it is possible for the rent transfer effect to dominate the entry effect during the 
transition period. We control for these types of changes by including time-varying measures of 
labour market institutions in all specifications. In addition, any trends that are common across 
countries will be captured by year effects.  
 
                                                 
52 This is in a context of efficient bargaining. The intuition remains valid to the extent that bargaining deviates from 
the right-to-manage framework. 
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Figure A.2 shows that, without any control variables profitability and unemployment, although 
weakly positively correlated, often move in opposite directions, as expected.  
 
Fig. A.2: The Unemployment Rate and Profitability 
 
Notes: Data is from the OECD STAN database. The right hand side axis shows profitability, the left hand side shows 
the unemployment rate.  
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Figure A.3 shows that, with the full set of labour market controls and time dummies (see paper), 
unemployment and profitability move together more closely. 
 
Fig. A.3: The Unemployment Rate and Profitability with Controls 
 
Notes: Data is from the OECD STAN database. The right hand side axis shows profitability, the left hand side shows 
the unemployment rate. Both variables have controls for the business cycle, exchange rate shocks,  a time trend  and 
changes in labour market regulations.  98 
    
Figure A.4 shows the Single Market Programme (SMP) variable and the profitability measure 
(with full controls for labour market institutions and year dummies). 
 
Fig. A.4: The Single Market Programme and Profitability 
 
Notes: Data is from the OECD STAN database. The right-hand side axis shows profitability, the left-hand side shows 
expected impact of the Single Market Programme. Profitability has controls for the business cycle, exchange rate 
shocks, a time trend and changes in labour market regulations.  
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CHAPTER 3 | PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION, FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATION 
Gareth Macartney 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper finds evidence of complementarities between product market competition and 
financial institutions, as determinants of innovation. Recent research has found that product 
market competition increases innovation, particularly in sectors that are technologically 
advanced, i.e. have high initial innovation rates. Financial institutions that reduce monitoring 
costs faced by investors are theoretically associated with higher innovation rates. We find that 
increased competition has a bigger effect on innovation in the presence of such financial 
institutions. We use exogenous variation in competitive conditions across manufacturing 
industries and European countries that arose due to the adoption of the Single Market 
Programme. The positive effect of competition on innovation is found to be bigger in countries 
with more numerous credit institutions and lower deposit insurance. The results are robust to 
controlling for other institutions that may affect the competition-innovation relationship.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For some time economists have postulated both positive and negative effects of product market 
competition on innovation. Recent empirical studies have found considerable evidence that on 
average increased product market competition (PMC) leads to increased innovation (Nickell 
1996, Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen 1999). However, the effect seems to depend on initial 
conditions, in that PMC increases innovation more in initially technologically advanced sectors 
(Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt 2005, Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and 
Prantl 2006). The theory is that incumbent firms in technologically advanced sectors can escape 
their competitors through radical innovation, and increased competitive pressure will increase 
their incentive to do so. As noted in the conclusion to Aghion and Griffith (2005), understanding 
the interplay between PMC and institutions in labour and capital markets is one of many 
challenges in coming up with practical policy advice for innovative sectors. Indeed, there is 
evidence that labour market institutions have an effect (Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti 
2003). The current paper investigates how financial institutions affect the relationship between 
PMC and innovation, which to the author’s knowledge has not been empirically investigated to 
date.   
This paper uses product market reforms to identify the effect of increased PMC on innovation 
rates in manufacturing sectors and how this effect varies across countries with different financial 
institutions. We find evidence of complementarities between PMC and financial institutions as 
determinants of innovation, in that the effect of PMC on innovation is more positive in the 
presence of good financial institutions. The intuition is that good financial institutions reduce 
monitoring costs faced by investors and therefore promote investment in innovation. This 
increases the proportion of sectors that are technologically advanced and over which PMC 
increases innovation effort. The result is robust to controlling for labour and legal institutions 
that may be correlated with financial institutions.       
There has been a long debate in economics as to whether the availability of external finance has 
a causal impact on economic outcomes such as investment, innovation and growth. There is now 
reasonable support from the finance and growth literature that it does (see Levine 2005 for a 
comprehensive survey). Country level empirical studies suggest that countries with a greater 
abundance of private credit (financial deepening) grow faster (see King and Levine 1993a and 103 
    
Beck, Levine and Loayza 2000). Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) find that countries 
with greater financial deepening converge to a common growth rate more quickly. At the 
industry level Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that sectors that are more dependent on external 
finance grow faster in countries with high financial deepening. However, it is not just an 
abundance of finance that matters, as Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2003) note “…whereas 
financial development can contribute to growth, the choice of institutional mechanism to induce 
financial development matters.” The Dehejia and Lleras-Muney paper shows that manufacturing 
growth rates in US states before World War II were positively associated with bank branching 
(the existence of small local bank branches rather than large centralized banks), but negatively 
associated with state deposit insurance schemes. Most importantly here, the literature 
distinguishes institutions that are associated with better monitoring with those that are not: small 
local banks easily gather information on investment projects, whereas deposit insurance schemes 
lesson the incentive for investors to ensure their money is being invested wisely. In support, 
Claessens and Laeven (2005) find that sectors grow faster with higher levels of competition in 
the banking sector. Galindo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (2005) find that financial liberalisation 
improves the allocation of capital, in that it is more targeted at firms where the estimated 
marginal productivity of capital is higher. Laeven (2003) estimates that firms are less financially 
constrained in the presence of liberal financial markets.  
The finance literature emphasizes the monitoring role played by financial institutions in 
distinguishing between good and bad investment projects (Diamond 1984, King and Levine 
1993b). The specialist nature of innovation suggests that informational problems are particularly 
pronounced and, indeed, the financing behaviour of innovative firms seems to support this (see 
Hall 2002 for a survey).
53  
The main idea in this paper comes from the combination of two literatures. The literature on 
competition and innovation suggests that initial conditions matter: competition has a more 
positive effect on innovation when initial steady state innovation rates are high. The finance 
                                                 
53 Aghion et al. (2004b) find that when firms use external finance for innovation it is more often in the form of 
equity rather than debt, as equity instruments are more suitable for long term, risky projects with high information 
asymmetries. Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen (1999) find that cash flow is a determinant of the R&D participation 
decision for firms in the United Kingdom (although not for firms in Germany), suggesting that external finance 
comes at a high premium for innovation. There is considerable evidence that even large firms are financially 
constrained by external finance costs in that their investment displays high cash flow sensitivity, see for example 
Fazzarri et al. (1998), Bond and Meghir (1994), although there is some debate as to whether cash flow sensitivity 
indicates financial constraints: see Kaplan and Zingales (1997) in opposition and Bond and Soderbom (2006) in 
support.  104 
    
literature suggests that good financial institutions that reduce monitoring costs for investors 
increase steady state innovation rates. The idea explored in this paper is whether the impact of 
competition is stronger in the presence of financial institutions associated with lower monitoring 
costs, i.e. whether these two policies are complementary.   
We use two indicators of financial institutions: the number of credit institutions
54 per capita and 
the ratio of deposit insurance to GDP. The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that these 
measures will be related to steady state innovation rates. A large number of credit institutions per 
capita may reduce monitoring costs for investors for at least two reasons. Firstly, small lenders 
have a comparative advantage in lending based on ‘soft’ information (Berger et al. 2005), which 
may be particularly important for investment in innovation which is by its nature investment in 
intangibles. Secondly, the presence of many small lenders enforces hard budget constraints 
which starves bad quality projects of capital, alleviating adverse selection problems as banks 
know they are less likely to lend to bad projects (Dewatripont and Maskin 1995).
55 There are 
agency costs in delegating monitoring to financial intermediaries (Diamond 1984) and investors 
must exert pressure on financial intermediaries to ensure good lending. One institution that 
reduces investors’ incentives to exert this pressure is deposit insurance. This has been found to 
be associated with indiscriminate credit expansions, poor productivity growth and bank failures 
(Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2003, Wheelock and Wilson 1995).  
We can see statistically significant correlations between innovation in manufacturing and the 
number of credit institutions (see Figure 1) and deposit insurance (see Figure 2). These 
descriptive pictures suggest that numerous credit institutions are associated with high steady state 
innovation rates and deposit insurance schemes are associated with low steady state innovation 
rates. We explore the robustness of these results, and use the fact that these countries 
experienced large product market reforms in the 1990s as part of the Single Market Programme 
(differential across industries) to investigate whether the effect of PMC on innovation is more 
positive in economies with numerous credit institutions and less positive in economies with high 
deposit insurance. 
 
 
                                                 
54 Deposit and savings banks. 
55 Carlin and Mayer (2003) provide empirical evidence that high tech sectors grow faster in countries with fractured 
banking systems. 105 
    
Figure 1: Manufacturing Patents and the No. of Credit Institutions (all firms)
56 
 
  
Figure 2: Manufacturing Patents and Deposit Insurance (all firms) 
 
                                                 
56 Notes: The y-axis shows the residuals from a regression of the log of the total number of patents filed by 
manufacturing firms between 1997 and 2002 on log of the working population in 1997. The x-axis shows the 
residuals from a regression of the log of the number of credit institutions in 1997 (deposit insurance in Figure 2) on 
log of the working population in 1997. Confidence intervals are calculated using robust standard errors.   106 
    
The policy relevance of this work is clear. There are ongoing attempts in the European Union to 
increase product market competition, with promises of more jobs and greater productivity. The 
Single Market Program in the 1990s reduced non-tariff trade barriers in manufacturing sectors 
between EU countries and the Lisbon Agenda in the current decade is an attempt to complete 
that process and extend it to service sectors. Also, European Commission anti-trust activity has 
increased greatly in the late 1990s with record fines for anti-competitive behaviour. Given that 
recent theory and evidence suggest that there can be both positive and negative effects on 
innovation from increased PMC, and given that external financial systems seem to be very 
important for innovation, it is desirable to know how increases in PMC interact with financial 
institutions. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and shows how a 
complementarity between PMC and good financial intermediation can be derived theoretically; 
Section 3 describes the empirical specification, the product market reforms and the choice of 
financial institutional variables in more detail; Section 4 provides the main results and robustness 
checks; and a final section concludes. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND             
Recent models of step-by-step innovation incorporate the decreasing effect competition has on 
pre-innovation rents and predict a positive “escape competition” effect of PMC on innovation 
(Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers 2001, Aghion, Howitt 2005).
 57 This effect is prevalent in 
technologically advanced “frontier” sectors, where incumbent firms can achieve unconstrained 
monopoly status through innovating. In technologically “laggard” sectors firms cannot escape 
their competitors and PMC decreases post-innovation rents as well as pre-innovation rents, such 
that it discourages innovation (referred to as the “discouragement” or “Schumpeterian” effect). 
The average economy wide effect of increased PMC on innovation will depend on the proportion 
of frontier and laggard sectors and therefore on initial conditions (in the inverted-U of Aghion, 
Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt 2005 the effect of PMC on innovation depends on the 
initial levels of competition, for example).     
                                                 
57 Early models emphasised the negative effects of competition on innovation (Salop 1977, Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, 
Aghion-Howitt 1992). Also “Deep pocket” (Schumpeter 1943) arguments predicted that increased PMC destroyed 
the funds available for research and development when firms faced external financing premiums. 107 
    
The finance literature emphasizes the monitoring function of financial intermediaries in 
economies with information asymmetries between investors and firms. Monitoring by financial 
intermediaries is optimal over individual monitoring by investors as it avoids the duplication of 
monitoring costs and reduces problems of investors free-riding on other investors’ monitoring 
effort. Efficient monitoring reduces agency costs by ensuring firms declare the returns from 
innovation (Diamond 1984, Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes 2005), or by evaluating the 
abilities of entrepreneurs to innovate (King and Levine 1993b). The research arbitrage condition 
in King and Levine (1993b) that is a building block of the Aghion-Howitt model predicts that 
where increased financial market efficiency lowers agency costs, innovation is increased: the 
more efficiently financial systems evaluate entrepreneurs/researchers the lower the cost of 
innovation.
58  
The intuition in this paper is that financial institutions associated with good monitoring increase 
innovation and thus the proportion of technological “frontier” sectors in the economy. This 
increases the extent to which PMC increases innovation in the economy. This prediction can be 
obtained by incorporating financial intermediation into a model of step-by-step innovation and 
product market competition. The following section demonstrates this.  
2.1.  Complementarity Between Competition and Financial 
Intermediation 
This section describes a simple version of the multi-sector model of step-by-step innovation with 
entry (Aghion et al. 2004a).
59 Agency costs are incorporated following King and Levine (1993b), 
where individuals are able to perform research with ex-ante probability φ . The realization of this 
ability is private information that can be revealed by a financial intermediary for cost f. Better 
financial intermediation is modeled as a lower f and higher competition as a higher probability of 
entry p. What follows is as brief as possible, but for clarity it is necessary to repeat the key 
features of the Aghion-Howitt model. 
                                                 
58 As they note, the King and Levine 1993b model, although written with developing countries in mind, is applicable 
to developed countries with market or bank based systems, where monitoring and firm valuation is carried out by 
large financial conglomerates.  
59 The model presented here is the “escape-entry” version of the Aghion-Howitt framework. The same result is 
possible using the “escape-competition” version where PMC is modelled as a decrease in the cost structure of a 
competitive fringe that constrains each incumbent firm. This is presented in the Appendix. 108 
    
As in Aghion-Howitt, a continuum of sectors, denoted by i, each containing one incumbent firm 
provide at time t an intermediate product of quality (productivity)  it A  to be used in the 
production technology  ∫
− =
1
0
1 di x A y it it t
α α  . Each firm supplies a quantity of the intermediate good, 
using a one-for-one production technology and pricing as an unconstrained monopolist, making 
profits equal to  it A .
60 Product market competition is modeled as a threat of entry by a foreign 
firm with exogenous probability, p. Each sector has an endowment of individuals that can be 
employed in either production or innovation. An innovation is an increase in the productivity of 
the intermediate good by a factor  1 > γ , so that on innovating  1 − = it it A A γ . Following King and 
Levine (1993b), innovation requires two activities, the selection of researchers and the execution 
of research.
61 A financial intermediary will require a payment from the firm of  φ f  labour units 
per successful researcher to break even.
62 The total cost (in labour units) of devoting  it n  units of 
labour to research is therefore given by: 
                                                                (1)
 
where the factor  1 − it A γ captures the notion that the cost of innovation is increasing in the target 
quality level. 
As in Aghion-Howitt (2005) the amount of labour devoted to research, n, increases the 
probability of successful innovation via a concave research production function:  ( ) n g = μ , 
() () () 0 0 , 0 , 0 = < ′ ′ > ′ g n g n g . The incumbent firm in each sector will choose the amount of labour 
to devote to research, or equivalently, will choose the optimal innovation probability to 
maximize expected profits subject to the cost of research:
63 
 
                                                 
60 Strictly the profits equal  it A δ , but the δ  factor has no bearing on our result and is dropped from the analysis. See 
Aghion and Griffith (2005); by simple profit maximisation of  ( ) it it it x p 1 − = π  the price charged for the good is 
equal to  α 1  the quantity supplied is such that  it it t p x y = ∂ ∂ , so that 
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61 Also described in Chapter 2 of Aghion and Howitt (1998), and similar to the costly state verification form in 
Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).  
62 Break even evaluation price, q, for a financial intermediary when an individual incapable of research has no value 
(as a researcher) is given by:  () wf q = − + 0 1 φ φ , where w is the wage rate.  
63 As in Aghion and Howitt (2005),  n n g 2 ) ( = . 
( ) it it n f A φ γ + − 1 1109 
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it
μ φ γ μ π
μ ,                                             (2) 
where expected profits  () . π E  are a function of  it μ . 
A technological frontier for intermediary goods increases the productivity of intermediary goods 
by the innovation factor γ  each period, so that it moves each period from  1 − t A  to  1 − = t t A A γ . 
Three types of sectors, denoted by  { } 2 , 1 , 0 ∈ j  exist. Sector type-j starts each period able to 
produce a good of quality  j t A − −1 . Types 0 and 1 innovate with probabilities  0 μ , 1 μ  respectively 
attaining a quality level of  j t A − , type 2 sectors innovate automatically. As such, sector types 0 
and 1 retain their type through innovation and type 2 sectors remain type 2 sectors. Each sector 
faces the same probability, p, that entry by a technologically advanced foreign firm occurs. In 
type-0 sectors the incumbents are advanced enough that if they innovate they retain the 
monopoly position even if entry does occur. In type-1 sectors the incumbents cannot compete 
with entrants even if they do innovate and earn zero profits when entry does occur.  
The problem can be summarized by the following objective functions and first order conditions, 
for sector type-0 and type-1 respectively:  
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An increase in PMC from an increase in the entry threat increases innovation effort in type-0 
sectors (“the Escape-entry effect”) and decreases innovation effort in type-1 sectors (“the 
discouragement or Schumpeter effect”): 
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Higher agency costs, f, decreases effort in both types of sector and dampens the effect of PMC 
on effort in both sectors.  
We see by inspection that:  
1 0 μ μ >  and therefore  1
1
1
0
1 >
−
−
μ
μ
, 
f f ∂
∂
>
∂
∂ 1 0 μ μ
 and both are negative.                                             (5) 
These properties follow from the fact that in this model there are greater incentives to innovate in 
frontier sectors than in laggard sectors, and will be useful in what follows. 
Following Aghion et al. (2006), the short term aggregate effect of an increase in competition (an 
increase in the probability of entry) on aggregate innovation I is given by: 
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Where  0 q  and  1 q  are the proportion of frontier and laggard sectors respectively. This short term 
effect is exactly what we are interested in: it is the effect of an increase in competition, for a 
given initial condition, i.e. a given composition of frontier and laggard sectors ( 0 q and  1 q ). This 
composition of sectors and the value of γ  will determine whether (6) is positive or negative. 
Agency costs f will affect the composition of sectors and hence the value and sign of (6). In 
addition f will have a dampening effect on how innovation responds to competition through the 
() φ f + 1 1  factor. We can investigate how (6) is affected by agency costs by taking the second 
derivative with respect to f. We assume that each country depends on their own financial 
intermediaries for the evaluation of researchers, and so carry out comparative statics across 
countries (this strong assumption is based on empirical observation and is discussed in section 
3.1).    
The second derivative is: 111 
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The first term of this expression is the dampening effect agency costs have on how each sector 
type reacts to changes in PMC. The second term is the composition effect agency costs have in 
shifting the proportion of frontier and laggard sectors and therefore the proportion of sectors 
where PMC has a positive or negative effect. We will show that this derivative is negative, 
meaning that high agency costs make the effect of PMC on innovation overall less positive.  
Noting that foreign entry turns any sector into a type-0 sector, the steady state flow conditions 
for sector types 0, 1 and 2 respectively are: 
 
( ) ( )( ) 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 q p q p pq pq μ − − = − = +
  () ( ) ( )( ) 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 q p pq q p μ μ − − + = − −
  ( )( ) 2 1 1 1 1 pq q p = − − μ
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Solving these expressions yields: 
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We can make three observations that will tell us the sign of (7).  
(i)  The first term in (7) is negative. As  1 < p  and, from (5),  1 0 μ μ > , it follows from (10) 
that  1 0 q q > . Also, for any reasonable value of γ  (that is, less than 2), 
γ γ
1 1
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⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
− . 
(ii)  Agency costs reduce innovation effort 0 μ , which from (9), and assuming 1 < p , means 
0
0 <
∂
∂
f
q
. Intuitively, high agency cost cause more sectors to fall out of type-0, a 112 
    
proportion given by  1 < p  of which return to type-0 through foreign entry, therefore in 
the steady state there are less type-0 sectors. 
(iii)  From (10) the ratio  0 1 q q  varies with agency costs as: 
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As  0
0 <
∂
∂
f
μ
 the first term in the square bracket makes a positive contribution to the 
derivative of  0 1 q q . We can evaluate the second term as: 
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That this expression is less than zero follows from (5). Therefore (11) is positive: 
0
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f
, increased agency costs increase the relative proportion of laggard sectors to 
frontier sectors (this is not sufficient on its own to give the sign of the second term in 7).  
 
Point (iii) along with (ii) will give us the sign of the second term in (7) as follows. From (ii) we 
know that  0
0 <
∂
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q
 which means that, along with (iii) which states that  0
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agency costs decrease the number of type-0 sectors and at a greater rate than they (may) decrease 
the number of type-1 sectors. The number of type-1 sectors may increase or decrease, but this 
does not matter: the fact that 
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less than 
γ
1
 for reasonable values of γ  means that the second term in (7) is negative. Along with 
point (i) this means that 0
2
<
∂ ∂
∂
q p f
I
 .
 
Therefore, higher agency costs decrease innovation effort and decrease the extent to which PMC 
increases aggregate innovation. This comes from two effects: one, agency costs decrease the 
proportion of frontier sectors relative to laggard sectors; and, two, agency costs dampen the 
elasticity of effort with respect to PMC in both types of sector, but more so in frontier sectors. 
Appendix 1 shows that we can reach the same prediction from other variants of the Aghion-
Howitt model. 
This is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition: Increased agency costs, f, (from poor financial intermediation) decrease the short 
term positive effect of product market competition, from increased entry threat p, on aggregate 
innovation I: 
0
2
<
∂ ∂
∂
p f
I
. 
 
3. IDENTIFICATION, ESTIMATION AND MEASUREMENT                  
3.1.  Identification 
We are interested in the determinants of innovation in country, c, industry i, and year t, and 
particularly the role of both product market competition (PMC) and financial institutions and 
their interaction. We therefore consider a model of the form,   
() cit c c cit cit cit v s nstitution FinancialI s nstitution FinancialI PMC PMC f I , , * , =     (12) 
Financial institutions are measured at the start of the sample period
64 and are assumed exogenous 
(i.e. they are not determined in response to immediate or anticipated changes in innovation and 
productivity in manufacturing).
65 It is also assumed that firms rely heavily on their domestic 
                                                 
64 In the case of the number of credit institutions the variable is measured in 1997. 
65 It is important to note that innovative activity in the financial sector is not featured in this study. If it were it could 
be of concern that our financial institutions might react quite quickly to activity in that sector. They key assumption 114 
    
financial systems for external finance (i.e. capital markets are closed). This is backed up by 
empirical observations. The reality about capital market openness, as noted in Carlin and Mayer 
(2003), is that there is actually very little cross-border, non-interbank lending in a sample of nine 
European countries, from as little as 1.6% of total non-bank loans in Spain to 9.9% in the UK. 
Raising equity finance has a similar domestic bias; it is a stylized fact in finance that domestic 
investors’ equity portfolios are disproportionately weighted towards domestic stocks (Lewis 
1999).
66  
Measures of PMC will be endogenous in their relationship with innovation in that innovations 
drive changes in competition and profitability. We use exogenous variation in PMC that arises 
due to product market reforms that were designed to increase competition: 
( ) cit cit cit REFORMS g PMC ε , = .                                             (13) 
It is assumed that these reforms affect innovation only through their impact on PMC, i.e. 
[] 0 = ′ cit citv S REFORM E , and we will test this empirically.
67 This assumption also implies that 
country-sectors have not been targeted for product market reform because of anticipated changes 
in future productivity, but rather because they are in need of reform in that their initial levels of 
competition are low. The reforms used will be differential changes across country-industries, 
allowing us to control for unobservable differences across countries, across industries and across 
years using fixed effects. These reforms affect firms’ behavior if there is a home bias in 
production, in that firms are located in the country where they wish to satisfy demand, at least to 
some extent. This is observed empirically in that the reforms have explanatory power in equation 
(13).   
3.2.  Empirical Specification 
To investigate the relationship in 12 we will run the following Poisson regression:  
( ) cit t i c c cit cit cit v FIN PMC PMC Firm PatentsPer + + + + + = τ η η γ γ * exp 2 1 ,      (14) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
here is that financial institutions are at least slow moving in their response to what occurs in other parts of the 
economy. 
66 Bovenberg and Gordon (1996) develop a model of imperfect information that describes why capital is immobile 
between countries.  
67 In practice we will use the reforms to instrument both PMC and its interaction with financial institutions. 115 
    
where  c FIN  denotes financial institutions. The argument of (14) is the rate at which innovations 
occur.
68 The proposition in section 2 suggests that the cross-industry average effect of increases 
in PMC on the rate at which innovations occur should be more positive in countries with good 
financial institutions. This will be captured by the sign and statistical significance of  2 ˆ γ . Where 
c FIN  is increasing to indicate better institutions, a positive and significant  2 ˆ γ  coefficient 
indicates that the positive effect of competition is bigger with good financial institutions. The  1 ˆ γ  
coefficient may be positive or negative, although we expect based on previous literature an 
positive average effect of PMC on innovation. 
The dependent variable is the patents per firm in each country-industry-year. To control for time-
invariant cross-sectional differences and measurement error in innovation and competition  c η  
contains country fixed effects and  i η  contains industry fixed effects.  t τ  contains time dummies 
to control for common shocks, and  cit v  is a disturbance term. Patents are those filed at the 
European Patent Office (EPO) with the firm cited as applicant. Using patents per firm, rather 
than the sum of patents, controls in part for country-industry specialization. Any country or 
industry specific differences in firm size, and therefore patents per firm, will be controlled for by 
the country and industry fixed effects. Although the underlying dataset is at the firm level, 
variation in PMC occurs at the country-industry-year level and, therefore, regressions are run at 
that level. 
The measure of PMC is one minus the ratio of value added minus labour costs over value added 
for country i and industry j (labour costs and value added are taken from national accounts data 
via the OECD’s STAN database). As such it is one minus a weighted average of profitability for 
the entire country-industry, for each year. This gives an increasing measure of competition where 
one indicates perfect competition (zero profits). Similar profitability based measures have been 
used in Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al. (2005a).
69 Profitability based measures have the 
advantage over concentration based measures in that knowledge of the exact dimensions of the 
                                                 
68 Given the non-negativity of the dependent variable and the skewness of the distribution of patents Poisson 
regressions are very widely used on the patent literature. See Aghion et al. (2005a) and others.  
69 We can think of this as an estimate of the mark-up or price cost margin (similar to a Lerner Index) if average costs 
are close to marginal costs. This is shown by Boone (2000) to be theoretically preferable to most other commonly 
used measures of competition, especially those based on market concentration or the number of firms, and it most 
closely corresponds to the parameter specified in theoretical models. 
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product market are not required. They have the disadvantage in that they are biased in the 
presence of non-constant returns to scale. To the extent that such bias is industry or country 
specific it will be captured by the industry and country fixed effects in our specification. 
Instrumentation of PMC will also mitigate for non-classical measurement error that may be 
caused by changes in technology and returns to scale. Capital costs are available for a sub-
sample and are included as a robustness check. In theory, profitability measures could be 
calculated for each firm using the accounts data in Amadeus. However, the availability of this 
data is highly variable across firms and across time and therefore the OECD STAN database was 
considered a more reliable source of information.
70         
As mentioned, key to estimating the effect of competition on innovation in equation (14) is the 
use of product market reforms as exogenous variation in competition. The PMC variable is 
endogenous in that, among other reasons, patents grant monopoly rights and are therefore 
associated with higher average profitability. We use product market reforms such as the Single 
Market Program and antitrust action to instrument PMC and its interaction with  c FIN , following 
a control function approach that is common in the literature. This, in conjunction with the 
country and industry fixed effects, means that identification of the effect of PMC on innovation 
comes from differential changes in product market regulations across time, within countries, 
within industries. The reforms used are described in Section 3.4.  
3.3.  Firms and Patents 
This paper uses patent applications as a measure of innovative activity. Although not a perfect 
measure of innovation in that many new techniques and tools that increase productivity do not 
require patents, patenting has been found to be associated with productivity growth and in our 
sample of countries is very closely related with measure of R&D expenditure at the industry 
level (see Chapter 1). Its advantage in this study is that we can observe it at the firm level across 
several countries for many firms, which is not true of declared research and development 
expenditure the accounting treatment of which differs largely across countries. The firm-patent 
dataset was constructed by the author by matching firms’ accounts to patents filed at the 
European Patent Office (EPO). Firm names are obtained from the Amadeus accounts database 
and matched to patent applicants at the EPO, see Chapter 1 for a full description of the matching 
                                                 
70 These variables, along with the others used in this study are summarized in Table A.1. 117 
    
process. Amadeus gives us the industry sector of the firm and accounts information, the latter 
used in this study to identify incumbents by conditioning on listed firms.  
The matching uses a target population of firms from several versions of the Amadeus dataset so 
that firms that may be filing accounts in early years but subsequently go out of business are not 
missed. The sample period in the current paper, 1995-2002, is within the time span for which we 
expect to have all firms active and eligible to be registered on Amadeus. To be registered on 
Amadeus usually requires the firm to be a registered legal entity, for example in the United 
Kingdom it means the firm is registered at Companies House. Any biases in estimation from 
differences in such rules across countries will be captured by fixed effects in our specification. 
The matching process was performed by standardizing firm names and applicant names and 
comparing them. The ability to do this is greatly improved by country specific knowledge 
leading to a ‘researcher bias’, the countries that we matched most successfully were those that 
we were most familiar with. Again, this will be controlled for by country fixed effects.   
Our matching success rate in this sample period is extremely high. The total number of patents 
filed at the EPO by all corporate applicants in all sectors in the countries in our sample between 
1995 and 2002 equals 291,723. Of these we successfully match at least one applicant to a unique 
company account for 242,593 patents; 161,308 of which match to manufacturing firms; 46,023 
of which are filed by listed firms or their subsidiaries in the same sector and country and for 
which we have industry-wide profitability data. Therefore our final sample constitutes 
approximately one quarter of patenting activity we know to be carried out by manufacturing 
firms in these countries in this period. 
I have selected only listed manufacturing firms that file patents, either directly or via a subsidiary 
(ownership information was constructed by Belenzon 2007). Listed manufacturing firms were 
the focus of ABBGH (2006). The theory is concerned with the effect of PMC on innovation by 
incumbent firms, the effect of PMC on entrants being likely rather different, and this seems an 
appropriate sample to focus on here. Table 1 column (1) lists the distribution of the 618 firms 
across the countries in the sample.
71 Column (2) shows the distribution of patent applications 
filed by these firms and their subsidiaries, where the subsidiary is in the same country and 
                                                 
71 Each firm’s country is its country of registration. For the vast majority of these firms their main listing is on a 
stock exchange in their country of registration. This is true in all cases except for one Finnish firm (London Stock 
Exchange) and one Italian firm (Berlin Stock Exchange). (The location of listing is not available from Amadeus for 
Spanish firms, British firms, one Italian firm, five Norwegian firms or two Swedish firms).   118 
    
industry sector, and column (3) shows the distribution of the average patent per firm. There is 
considerable cross-country variation in this measure, with the value for Germany being much 
higher than in other countries for example. In the case of Germany this is likely due to a 
specialization in certain high patenting traditional manufacturing industries, as has been observed 
in the literature. This cross-country variation may be due to other differences in the enforcement 
of intellectual property rights. The country fixed effects and industry fixed effects should control 
for these differences. The variable summarized in column (3) is the key dependent variable used 
in this study. Conditioning on subsidiaries of listed firms in the same country gives a reasonable 
picture of firm innovative activity, however it is likely that with low technology transfer costs 
firms locate research and development overseas to take advantage of comparative advantages in 
skills (see Ekholm and Hakkala 2007 for a model of the location of production and research and 
development by multinationals). Therefore for robustness, I re-run my results using the number 
of patents filed by subsidiaries in the same industry as the parent, but located abroad, as the 
dependent variable. From column (4) we can see that this adds relatively few patents to the 
sample. One further concern may be firm birth and attrition, which may be correlated with 
changes in competition. Of the 618 firms in the sample, 529 are present for all 8 years, and the 
results of this paper are robust to conditioning on just these firms.
72 
Table 1: Listed Manufacturing Firms 
Country Number  of 
firms 
Patents filed, 
including by 
subsids in same 
sector, same 
country 
Average of patents 
per firm (based on 
col. 2) 
Patents filed, 
including by 
subsids in same 
sector, in any 
country 
Average of patents 
per firm (based on 
col. 4) 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Belgium 16  927  5.78  1,024  6.18 
Denmark  15 1,118 6.85 1,118 6.85 
Finland  27 587 1.93 633 2.09 
France  70 3,664 3.65 3,667 3.65 
Germany  112 30,226 37.48 30,407 37.65 
Italy  34 472 1.02 486 1.05 
Netherlands 32  3,458  9.34  3,636  10.22 
Norway  20 112 0.73 112 0.73 
Spain  17 50 0.34 50 0.34 
Sweden  25 469 2.05 470 2.06 
United  Kingdom  250  4,940 1.57 4,987 1.59 
Total  618  46,023  46,590  
Notes: 86% of firms there for all 8 years (529 out of 618), 98% for 7 or more (606 out of 618). 
 
                                                 
72 Average sizes of the firms in the sample and their distribution across countries are given in Table A.2.  119 
    
3.4.  Product Market Reforms 
As discussed, measures of competition based on average profitability are endogenous in patent 
regressions. Finding exogenous variation in PMC is very difficult, especially at the industry 
level. I use European Commission anti-trust action and the European Union’s Single Market 
Programme (SMP), the latter being an attempt to lower non-tariff barriers to trade within the EU. 
The remainder of this section describes each of these instruments in turn and the variables are 
summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2: Product Market Reforms 
Country  No. of country-sectors with 
high trade barriers affected by 
SMP (high tech.) 
No. of country-sectors with 
high trade barriers affected by 
SMP (traditional) 
No. of EC Anti-trust cases 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Belgium  3 1 4 
Denmark  1 2 0 
Finland  0 0 0 
France  3 4  11 
Germany  3 3 9 
Italy  3 3 6 
Netherlands  2 3 5 
Norway  0 0 0 
Spain  1 1 3 
Sweden  0 0 4 
United Kingdom  1 4  12 
Total  17 21 54 
Notes: In total there are 149 country-sectors in the sample. Non-SMP countries are Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
 
The Single Market Programme (SMP) eradicated cross-country differences in product and 
service standards, administrative and regulatory barriers, VAT and capital controls which 
inhibited the free flow of goods, services and factors of production between EU countries. For 
our purposes we are most interested in the effect on trade barriers, i.e. the effect on product 
markets. To capture this impact and how it varies across country-industries we use a survey 
carried out before the program was implemented. Cecchini et al. (1988) surveyed 11,000 firms in 
different industries asking respondents to rate the current level of various barriers to trade. Based 
on this survey Buiges et al. (1990) identified 40 out of 120 industrial sectors that were deemed to 
be most sensitive to the program. They consulted individual country experts to confirm their 
findings and to add or remove sectors from the list according to country-specific circumstances. 
This resulted in a list of country-industries split into those with high trade barriers and those with 
medium trade barriers. I use country-industries that were deemed to have high trade barriers 120 
    
prior to the program, split by Buiges et al. (1990) into those that were high tech and those that 
were traditional sectors. From Table 2, column (1) and column (2) we can see that 38 out of the 
149 country-industries in my sample were categorized as such. The SMP has been used as an 
instrument for competition at the country level in Griffith, Harrison and Macartney (2007) and at 
the industry level in Griffith, Harrison and Simpson (2006). Although the program started in 
1992 most countries took some time to implement the reforms and did so at different rates, as 
recorded by The European Commission in its Internal Market Scoreboard
73. Therefore I consider 
that country-sectors that were deemed to be affected by the reform were experiencing an ongoing 
period of reform in the late 1990s relative to those that were not affected. The variable I use is a 
vector of dummy variables that are interacted with the percentage of reforms actually 
implemented by each country, as recorded by the Internal Market Scoreboard from 1997 
onwards, linearly interpolated between 1992 and 1997.  
The European Commission (EC) has been increasingly active in anti-trust actions in the late 
1990s. The variable I use I have constructed from cases described on the EC website.
74 Cases that 
involve actual fines implemented or action by alleged violators of anti-trust legislation to avoid 
further proceedings are included. There were 54 such cases in our sample and their distribution 
across countries is given in Table 2, column (3). The EC website gives the firms involved and 
their industrial sector of activity. I construct the variable so that for each case it is one in the 
country-industry sector after the date action is taken and zero before hand, indicating a 
permanent increase in competition after EC action. The variable is cumulative in that the number 
of cases are added up if there are several in a country-industry. It is assumed that anti-trust action 
is exogenous in that the EC does not target sectors because it believes there will be future 
changes in productivity or innovation.  
Table 3, column (1) shows the results of the first stage regression of our measure of competition 
on the three product market reform variables. Column (1) shows that the excluded instruments 
have explanatory power in that they are statistically significant and have a partial R-squared of 2 
percent. The signs on the SMP High Barriers high tech sectors variable and the EC anti-trust 
variable are positive indicating that these reforms were associated with increases in competition, 
whereas the sign on the SMP High Barriers traditional sectors variable is negative. As mentioned 
                                                 
73 The scoreboard is available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/score/index_en.htm. 
74 Cases are described at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/index.html. 121 
    
we aim to instrument both the linear PMC variable and its interaction with  c FIN  in equation 
(14). To aid this we use interactions of the reform variables with the assumed exogenous  c FIN  
variables. Columns (2) and (3) show the two first stage regression that will be run when using 
= c FIN Credit Institutions per Capita and columns (4) and (5) show the two first stage 
regressions that will be run when using  = c FIN Deposit Insurance. We can see in both cases the 
use of interacted variables in this way increases the amount of variation in PMC that we can 
explain, indicated by higher R-squared measures.     
Table 3: Product Market Reforms and Competition 
Dependent variable:  1-Profitability 1-Profitability 1-Profitability  * 
No. of Credit 
Institutions per 
Capita 
1-Profitability 1-Profitability  * 
Deposit 
Insurance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SMP High Barriers (high tech)  0.072 0.074 0.002 0.016 -0.257 
[0.027]*** [0.043]*  [0.002]  [0.031]  [0.106]** 
SMP High Barriers 
(traditional) 
-0.034 -0.023 0.001 -0.046 0.048 
[0.019]* [0.022]  [0.001]  [0.022]**  [0.043] 
EC  Anti-Trust  Action  0.026 0.039 0.001 0.064 0.082 
  [0.013]*  [0.016]** [0.001]** [0.025]** [0.042]** 
SMP High Barriers (high tech) 
* No. Of Credit Institutions 
per Capita 
 -0.067  0.036    
 [0.760]  [0.031]    
SMP High Barriers 
(traditional) * No. Of Credit 
Institutions per Capita 
 -0.312  -0.080    
 [0.380]  [0.022]***     
EC Anti-Trust Action * No. 
Of Credit Institutions per 
Capita 
 -0.425  -0.019    
 [0.499]  [0.021]    
SMP High Barriers (high tech) 
* Deposit Insurance 
    0.029  0.154 
    [0.012]**  [0.044]*** 
SMP High Barriers 
(traditional) * Deposit 
Insurance 
    0.007  -0.073 
    [0.006]  [0.016]*** 
EC Anti-Trust Action * 
Deposit Insurance 
    -0.018  -0.012 
    [0.009]**  [0.021] 
Output  Gap  -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.009 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.000] [0.003] [0.008] 
Constant 0.616  0.616  0.02  0.617  1.718 
  [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.001]*** [0.019]*** [0.062]*** 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Digit Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value for F-test of excluded 
instruments 
0.0020 0.0036 0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 
Partial R-squared of excluded 
instruments 
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 
Observations  1177 1177 1177 1177 1177 
Notes: OLS regression. The time period is 1995 to 2002 inclusive. Observations are country-industry-years. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets. 122 
    
 
3.5.  Financial Institutions 
This section motivates the choice of the number of credit institutions per capita and the 
maximum amount of a bank deposit covered by insurance as a ratio to GDP per capita as 
measures of the effectiveness of financial systems to reduce agency costs. It is difficult to 
measure the extent to which financial systems provide good monitoring of investments, and the 
motivation of these measures draws heavily on evidence from existing literature.  
There is much debate as to which financial systems may promote effective monitoring and an 
efficient allocation of capital. Firstly, do bank-based or market-based systems provide better 
information for investors? Traditionally the theoretical finance literature has asserted that bank-
based systems have a comparative advantage in monitoring over market systems. Securities 
markets suffer from investors free-riding on other investors’ information gathering (Stiglitz 
1985) and adverse selection driving up the cost of finance for all firms (Akerloff 1970). On the 
other hand securities provide liquidity enabling investors to manage risk and crystallize gains 
and losses sooner rather than later. In developing countries it appears that whether finance is 
bank-based or market-based does not matter for growth (see Levine 2005). Furthermore, there 
appears to be complementarities between the two and evidence suggests that greater stock 
market development promotes greater bank lending (as discussed in Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
1996).
75 Institutional measures of stock market efficiency are not readily available and therefore 
the current study uses measures that are more bank based than market based.
76 The results are not 
intended to imply that bank based systems are more important, but rather the measures used are 
proxies for a financial environment that promotes good monitoring. It is fair to say that there is 
theoretical and empirical evidence of a bias in financing innovation towards equity rather than 
debt (Hall 2002, Aghion et al 2004b). The assumption in the current paper is that financial 
systems that promote good monitoring mitigate problems of adverse selection and reduce the 
cost of finance faced by firms regardless of the exact financial instrument used.
77    
                                                 
75 This true in our sample of ten countries in that the correlation coefficient of stock market capitalization as a ratio 
of GDP and total bank credit as a ratio of GDP measured in 1995 is 0.64. 
76 Measures of the size of stock market and bank credit markets are available from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2000). These measures are not really institutional in nature and are likely endogenous in that specific types of 
finance, or the total amount of credit in the economy may precede future increases in growth.  
77 Indeed there is some view that stock market investors free-ride on information gathered by banks, see page 26 of 
Levine 2005 for a discussion. 123 
    
Given that we are restricted to using bank based institutional measures the second question is: 
which financial institutions or organizational characteristics promote good monitoring by banks? 
There is a reasonable consensus that fragmented banking systems are associated with better 
monitoring and a more efficient allocation of capital. Firstly, small banks have a comparative 
advantage in lending based on ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ information. The idea being that in large 
organizations the justification for lending has to be passed through the hierarchical structure and 
this communication is much easier if the information is based on hard verifiable data such as 
financial ratios. There is evidence that small banks are more likely to lend to informationally 
difficult clients, such as small firms lacking full financial accounts (Berger et al. 2005). It is 
likely that such issues are also important in the case of innovative firms, where investment is by 
definition in intangibles. Secondly, an economy dominated by small lenders may be better at 
enforcing hard budget constraints. For large banks it is ex-post efficient to re-finance bad 
projects that the banks have already sunk capital into. Small banks have insufficient capital for 
this to be a problem, lenders are forced to re-finance with a new lender at each stage of the 
project. This capital starvation of bad quality projects, alleviates adverse selection problems and 
reduces monitoring costs for investors as they are less likely to lend to bad projects (Dewatripont 
and Maskin 1995, Akerloff 1970). There is empirical evidence that fragmented banking systems 
promote industry growth in developed countries (Cetorelli and Gambera 2001), particularly in 
industries with inherent informational asymmetries (Carlin and Mayer 2003). Concentration 
measures are highly correlated with country size (small countries have less banks) and therefore, 
to avoid picking up market size effects, I use for my first measure of institutional structure: the 
number of credit institutions per capita.
78 This measure is related positively to cross-country 
measures of patenting in our sample, as we have already seen in Figure 1, and the relationship is 
robust to controlling for industry specialization by way of three-digit industry fixed effects, as 
presented in column (1) of Table 4. Although this cross-country association could be driven by 
other country specific factors it is at least consistent with the idea that these institutions have an 
association with innovation rates in a way that we might expect.  
 
 
 
                                                 
78 Cetorelli and Gambera 2001 use concentration measures instrumented by market size measures such as GDP and 
population, and by legal institutions. Carlin and Mayer 2003 use the same measure un-instrumented. My results are 
robust to using such measures, available from the author on request. 124 
    
Table 4: Financial Institutions and Innovation in Manufacturing (all firms) 
Dependent variable:  Patent Applications 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Log of  no. of Credit Institutions 
per Capita 
1.347  1.011 
[0.307]***  [0.385]*** 
Log of Deposit insurance    -1.043  -0.421 
   [0.167]***  [0.188]** 
Log of Working Population at 1997 
-0.284 1.074 0.027 
[0.307] [0.151]*** [0.375] 
Constant  -27.03 -8.636  -22.565 
  [15,302.821] [1.232]*** [285.488] 
3 Digit Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 947  947  947 
Notes: Poisson regression. Observations are country-3 digit industries. The time period is 1997 to 2003 inclusive. The 
dependent variable is the sum of patent applications in each country-manufacturing industry across the time period 
divided by the population. Robust standard errors are in brackets clustered at the country level. 
 
Although institutional in nature and likely to be slower moving than market outcome measures 
such as the amount of credit in the economy, the number of credit institutions itself may be 
endogenous in that it changes with anticipated changes in industrial productivity. As discussed 
by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) there are reasons why regulators may control banking structure 
that are nothing to do with industry growth, however concerns remain. The Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001) approach is to instrument banking concentration with legal institutional 
variables, but this is problematic for us as we use patents as our dependent variable and the value 
of a patent is likely to vary with the cost of suing for patent infringement and therefore with legal 
institutions (we later ensure that our result is robust to controlling for this). The approach taken 
here is to ensure the result is robust to using another measure of financial institutions that is 
likely to be even slower to respond to changes in manufacturing productivity. This measure is: 
the maximum amount of a bank deposit covered by insurance as a ratio to GDP per capita. The 
purpose of deposit insurance is to prevent runs on banks, but there is much debate as to its 
desirability. As emphasized by Diamond (1984) there is a delegation cost incurred by investors 
in entrusting monitoring to financial intermediaries: investors are required to monitor the 
intermediary and to promote efficient lending it is desirable that they do so. Knowing that their 
deposits are insured reduces their incentive to do so. Indeed there is microeconomic evidence 
from US states that deposit insurance schemes are associated with indiscriminate credit 
expansions, poor productivity growth and bank failures (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2003, 
Wheelock and Wilson 1995). Of course a country with a deposit insurance scheme could set such 125 
    
policy in response to a poorly performing financial sector, either way it is assumed here that 
deposit insurance schemes are indicative of a financial system that does not monitor investments 
effectively. In our sample, as we have seen in Figure 2, deposit insurance is negatively related to 
cross-country measures of patenting, and this is robust to controlling for three digit industry 
fixed effects as in column (2) of Table 4.  
Both measures are obtained from the DICE database available at the CESifo website.
79 They are 
listed in Table 5 for each country and we can see that they vary considerably across the ten 
countries in our sample.
80 In fact there is enough variation in the variables to separately identify 
their effects on country-industry innovation by including both in a cross-country regression as in 
column (3) of Table 4. Deposit insurance does not vary for the countries in the sample over the 
time period. The number of credit institutions does vary during the period, for most countries it 
decreases due to consolidation in the banking sector, as discussed in Walkner and Raes (2005). 
We may be concerned that this variation is caused by unobservable factors that also affect 
innovation and, therefore, I use the value at 1997, which is as close to the start of the sample 
period (1995) for which I have data. The results are robust to dropping the first two years of the 
sample, available from the author on request.
81  
Our interpretation of the variables is consistent with Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen (1999) 
which finds that firms in the United Kingdom are more financially constrained than those in 
Germany, in that cash flow is a predictor of the R&D participation decision (although not the 
level of spending thereafter). Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen (1999) states that the exact source 
of these constraints is unclear. The idea that United Kingdom firms are more financially 
constrained than those in Germany is consistent with the measures in Table 5 in that the United 
Kingdom has less credit institutions than Germany and a higher level of deposit insurance. 
                                                 
79 See http://www.cesifo.de/pls/diceguest/search.create_simple_search_page 
80 The number of credit institutions, concentration measures and the number of local banking units come originally 
from the European Commission study by Walkner and Raes (2005). Credit institutions are defined by the European 
Central Bank as any institution covered by the definition contained in Article 1(1) of Directive 2000/12/EC, as 
amended. Accordingly, a credit institution is "(i) an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other 
repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account; or (ii) an undertaking or any other legal 
person, other than those under (i), which issues means of payment in the form of electronic money." The most 
common types of credit institutions are banks and savings banks. Deposit insurance information comes originally 
from the World Bank. 
81 Similar results are also found if we let the number of credit institutions per capita vary over time, while 
controlling for its direct effect by including it as a linear term. Also, consistent results are obtained if we simply split 
the sample into two: high credit institutions and low credit institutions. These results are available from the author 
on request. 126 
    
Table 5: Financial Institutions 
Country  No of Credit Institutions (per 
thousand people) 
Deposit Insurance 
 (1)  (2) 
Belgium 0.02  0.77 
Denmark 0.06  1.15 
Finland 0.10  0.91 
France 0.03  2.70 
Germany 0.06  0.78 
Italy 0.02  4.58 
Netherlands 0.06  0.72 
Norway 0.05  5.81 
Spain 0.02  1.11 
Sweden 0.04  0.92 
United Kingdom  0.01  1.89 
Notes: Values at 1997 for column (1). Deposit insurance is time-invariant in this period. 
Deposit insurance is the maximum balance amount insurable divided by GDP per capita.  
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1.  Main Results  
The results for the regression described in equation (14) are reported in Table 6, for an 
unbalanced panel of 149 country-2 digit industries over 8 years. The dependent variable is the 
average number of patents filed by listed firms and their subsidiaries in each country-industry-
year. Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the country level because the measures 
of financial institutions vary only across countries. Our measure of competition is 1-Profitability 
for country c, industry i and year t, and is increasing with greater competition. Country and 
industry fixed effects control for cross-sectional differences, and year dummies for common 
macroeconomic shocks. The difference of output from trend is included as a control variable 
although it is never significant, perhaps as the sample does not quite cover one business cycle.   
Column (1) shows the results of the regression with the restriction  0 2 = γ , that is the average 
linear effect of PMC on innovation. Column (2) control for the endogeneity of the 1-Profitability 
variable by including the residuals from the first stage regression listed in column (1) of Table 3 
as a control function.
82 The control function is statistically significant indicating that the 1-
Profitability is indeed endogenous. Its sign is negative which is as expected as patents grant 
                                                 
82 The results are robust to using two control functions together, one from a linear PMC first stage and one from a 
PMC interacted with financial institutions first stage, as in Aghion et al. (2006).  127 
    
monopoly rights to firms and are associated with greater profitability, therefore instrumentation 
removes a negative bias from the patenting, competition relationship. We can see that the  1 ˆ γ  is 
both positive and statistically significant, consistent with the Nickell (1996) and Blundell et al. 
(1999) results that on average increased PMC increases innovation. As a test of the validity of 
the exclusion restrictions for the product market reform variables the P-value for the Hansen 
overidentified test is 0.6172, meaning that the exclusion restrictions cannot be rejected.
83 Column 
(3) now investigates how the effect of PMC on manufacturing innovation rates depends on 
financial institutions.  2 ˆ γ  is positive and significant, meaning that the effect of PMC on 
innovation is greater in countries with a large number of credit institutions per capita. Column 
(4) controls for the endogeneity of our measure of PMC by instrumenting both the linear PMC 
term and its interaction. This is performed by running the two first stage regressions listed in 
columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 and including the residuals from each as two separate control 
functions. The result is robust to this instrumentation. The median effect in column (4) is positive 
with a value of 7.685.
84 Column (5) investigates the effect of our alternative measure of financial 
institutions: deposit insurance. As discussed deposit insurance may reduce the incentives for 
good monitoring of investment projects, reducing steady state innovation rates and therefore the 
positive effect of PMC on innovation. Column (5) shows that the interaction is negative as 
expected and column (6) indicates that this is robust to instrumentation using the residuals from 
the two first stage regressions in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3 as control functions. The median 
effect from column (6) is 0.122.
85         
What is the economic significance of these results? Using the estimates in column (4) the effect 
of a one percentage point increase in competition in the United Kingdom, which has a low 0.01 
credit institutions per thousand people, is a 3.58 percent decrease in patenting per firm.
86 For 
                                                 
83 This was carried for the OLS regression of the log of patents per firm on the explanatory variables, as opposed to 
the Poisson specification for the which the test is more difficult to perform. 
84 Coefficients are semi-elasticities. The median effect for column (4) equals -7.333+(375.464*0.04), where 0.04 is 
the median of the number of credit institutions per capita in our sample. The mean is also equal to 0.04, but I chose 
to quote median effects as the distribution of deposit insurance is very highly skewed, with only three values greater 
than the mean. 
85 The median effect for column (6) equals =5.466+(-4.814*1.11), where 1.11 is the median of deposit insurance 
measure for our sample. 
86 This is calculated from [-7.333+375.464*0.01]*0.01*100,  noting that the coefficients in a Poisson regression are 
semi-elasticities. 128 
    
Germany, which has a high 0.06 credit institutions per thousand people, the same increase in 
competition would increase average patenting per firm by 15.19 percent.
87 
Table 6: Competition, Financial Institutions and Innovation 
Dependent variable:  Patents per firm 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1-Profitability 0.823  9.058  -6.88  -7.333  3.576  5.466 
  [0.989]  [4.303]** [3.069]** [3.406]** [1.776]**  [4.858] 
1-Profitability *No of Credit Institutions per Capita
   139.324  375.464    
   [46.637]*** [68.329]***    
1-Profitability *Deposit Insurance 
     -2.235  -4.814 
     [1.686]  [2.091]** 
Control Function 
 
 -8.153  1.957  -2.715 
 [3.830]**   [4.427]    [5.134] 
Credit Institutions Interaction Control Function 
    -262.958    
    [92.176]***    
Deposit Insurance Interaction Control Function 
      3.294 
      [2.515] 
Output Gap 
 
0.049 0.079 0.017 0.000 0.037 0.011 
[0.044]  [0.044]*  [0.047] [0.048] [0.047] [0.055] 
Constant  -0.525 -6.065 1.482 -3.797 1.634  4.59 
  [1.094]  [3.104]*  [1.091] [2.373] [1.914]  [2.127]** 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Digit Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test of exclusion restrictions (P-value)   0.6172  0.0058  0.0559 
Observations  1177 1177 1177 1177 1177 1177 
Notes: The time period is 1995 to 2002 inclusive. Observations are country-industry-years. Robust standard errors are 
in brackets. They are clustered at the country level as the financial institutions are invariant across industries and years. 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
One concern with the results is that firm birth or death that affects average patenting in each 
country-industry and is correlated with changes in product market competition may be driving 
the results. Such firm attrition, although perhaps a consequence of competition, would reflect a 
different dynamic than that of the effect of competition on innovation incentives by incumbents 
that motivates this work. Therefore we now repeat the results for a balanced panel of firms. The 
results for the 1080 observations for which we observe at least one firm in each country-industry 
for the entire sample period are presented in Table 7 and are consistent with those for the 
unbalanced panel. The interaction between PMC and the number of credit institutions per capita 
                                                 
87 The United Kingdom and Germany have credit institutions per capita approximately one standard deviation either 
side of the mean; the United Kingdom’s value is the lowest in the sample and the only value to have an estimated 
negative effect of PMC on innovation.  129 
    
is positive and significant (column 4) and the interaction between PMC and deposit insurance is 
negative and significant (column 6).       
Table 7: Competition, Financial Institutions and Innovation (balanced panel) 
Dependent variable:  Patents per firm 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1-Profitability 1.092  7.287  -8.873 -27.914 3.683  4.537 
 [1.092]  [5.821]  [4.425]**  [8.306]***  [1.711]**  [5.632] 
1-Profitability *No of Credit Institutions per Capita
   165.773  421.057    
   [63.556]*** [152.731]***    
1-Profitability *Deposit Insurance 
     -2.185  -5.162 
     [1.522]  [2.245]** 
Control Function 
 
 -6.233  18.618  -1.751 
 [5.282]   [9.320]**   [5.228] 
Credit Institutions Interaction Control Function 
    -255.054    
    [169.049]    
Deposit Insurance Interaction Control Function 
      3.690 
      [2.432] 
Output Gap 
 
-0.002 0.036 -0.027 -0.088 -0.018 -0.06 
[0.049] [0.060] [0.058] [0.088] [0.052] [0.074] 
Constant -1.324  -5.463  1.693  8.444  0.936  5.296 
  [1.219] [3.994] [1.618]  [2.645]***  [1.935]  [2.097]** 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Digit Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 
Notes: The time period is 1995 to 2002 inclusive. Observations are country-industry-years. Robust standard errors are 
in brackets. They are clustered at the country level as the financial institutions are invariant across industries and years. 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
4.2.  Robustness and institutions 
It is clear from the specification in Section 3 that any country specific factor that increases the 
cost of innovation and/or patenting may affect the PMC-innovation relationship. Where such a 
factor is institutional in nature we may be concerned that it is correlated with financial 
institutions and thus driving our results. One obvious contender is labour market institutions, 
which have considerable variation across the countries in our sample. Although the theoretical 
impact of labour market institutions on innovation is equivocal in that rigid labour markets may 
increase workers’ commitment to invest in firm specific innovation but at the same time may 
increase the adjustment costs for firms (see Chapter 4 for a discussion and evidence of both of 
these effects from employment protection legislation), there is considerable evidence that labour 
market institutions affect the impact of changes in product market competition on outcomes such 130 
    
as employment (see Griffith, Harrison and Macartney 2007, Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005 and the 
references therein) and productivity (see Aghion, Burgess, Redding, Zilibotti 2003). To ensure 
my results are not driven by employment protection legislation (EPL), I take the regressions 
from columns 4 and 6 of Table 6 and include an interaction of PMC with a widely used measure 
of EPL. We instrument each of the PMC term, the PMC*No. of Credit Institutions per Capita 
term and the PMC*Employment Protection Legislation term, using a control function for each 
with interactions of product market reforms with EPL as additional instruments. The results are 
presented in columns 1 and 5 of Table 8. The EPL variable is time-invariant and the country 
fixed effects control for its direct effect on innovation. We can see that the results are robust to 
this control. Similar results are found using collective bargaining coverage as an alternative 
measure of the labour market environment, as presented in columns (2) and (6). 
Another concern specifically connected with our use of patents as a measure of innovation is the 
extent to which intellectual property protection varies across countries. All patents used in this 
study are filed at the European Patent Office, providing patent holders with Europe wide 
protection. One advantage of using only EPO patents is that all patents at the EPO carry the same 
legal protection. However, patent holding firms are required to make claims on patent 
infringement through the courts in the country where the defendant is domiciled. To the extent 
that this is the same country as that of the patent holder this leads to a potential source of 
heterogeneity in patent value across countries in our sample. The cost of suing for patent 
infringement will be higher in countries with slow legal systems and therefore the value of 
holding patents lower, and this characteristic of legal institutions may be related to financial 
institutions. Using a methodology developed in Djankov et al. (2003) the Doing Business report 
constructs a cross-country measure based on a hypothetical breach of contract case and survey 
responses from local litigators.
88 The measure is the cost of suing as a percentage of the claim 
amount and is listed for the countries in our sample in Table 9 along with a similar measure 
based on the average number of days in court for the hypothetical case. Vaver (1999) notes that 
the Italian and Belgian courts are notoriously slow and this is reflected in the measure in Table 9 
in that Italian courts are most expensive and the slowest in our sample, and Belgium courts are 
fifth slowest, but are actually quite cheap.
89 This measure is time-invariant and we can interact it 
                                                 
88 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/EnforcingContracts/ for data and exact methodology. 
89 Vaver also notes that patent infringers pursue various strategies to force litigation to occur in a slow court, often 
referred to as “deploying the Belgian or Italian torpedo”. Such factors cannot be controlled for here. Again some 131 
    
with our PMC variable and let country fixed effects control for its direct effect on patenting per 
firm.  
Table 8: Robustness, Other Institutions 
Dependent variable:  Patents per firm 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1-Profitability -12.239 -6.323  -6.639 -0.587 10.784 9.906 14.425 18.289 
  [7.677] [10.774] [4.602]  [5.653]  [6.814]  [8.689]  [4.192]***  [9.775]* 
1-Profitability * No of 
Credit Institutions per 
Capita 
302.088 283.405 314.229 354.171         
[73.517]*** [78.944]*** [106.273]** [59.261]***         
1-Profitability * Deposit 
Insurance 
     -7.545  -8.993  -5.671  -4.697 
       [1.550]***  [1.582]***  [2.328]**  [1.848]** 
1-Profitability * 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
2.178    3.056  2.759    4.262 
[2.311]     [1.839]*  [1.821]    [5.438] 
1-Profitability * 
Collective Bargaining 
Coverage 
 -0.008  -0.127  0.074  -0.207 
   [0.123]  [0.079]  [0.087]  [0.261] 
1-Profitability * Average 
Proportional Legal Costs 
   -0.141  -0.107    -0.187  -0.271 
     [0.123]  [0.106]      [0.094]**  [0.138]** 
Control  Function  1.536 1.18 4.512  -0.158 5.48 7.446  -8.526  -3.115 
 [3.784]  [104.942]  [4.437]  [4.899]  [4.584]***  [3.756]***  [4.367]*  [4.710] 
Credit Institutions 
Interaction Control 
Function 
-183.253 -158.701 -216.248 -234.206         
[83.919]**  [4.704]  [106.446]**  [93.005]**      
Deposit Insurance 
Interaction Control 
Function 
     -14.49  -13.578  4.037  2.776 
     [2.186]**  [1.987]***  [1.639]**  [2.674] 
Output  Gap  0.01  0.013 -0.011 -0.005 0.015 -0.013  0.02  -0.027 
  [0.044] [0.048] [0.069] [0.052] [0.047] [0.055] [0.056] [0.070] 
Constant  -2.844  -1.768  -1.123 -4.35 0.396 3.903 2.225 3.908 
  [2.366] [3.143] [2.974]  [2.501]*  [1.976] [2.899] [3.360]  [2.027]* 
Control functions for 
“other institutions” 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Digit Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1177 1177 1177 1177 1177 1177 1177 1177 
Notes: The time period is 1995 to 2002 inclusive. Observations are country-industry-years. Robust standard errors are 
in brackets. They are clustered at the country level as the financial institutions are invariant across industries and years. 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
appeal is made to home bias, in that when seeking intellectual property protection, incumbent firms expect 
infringement and litigation more likely to occur in their domestic countries (or rather if this were not the case, then 
there would be no concern that this may drive our results).   132 
    
Columns (3) and (7) of Table 8 show that the reaction of patenting to increased PMC is 
dampened in countries with expensive courts and this interaction is statistically significant in 
column (7), although not in column (6). Columns (3) and (7) show that the key results of our 
paper are robust to including this interaction. Similar results hold using the average number of 
days in court. 
Finally, columns (4) and (8) of Table 8 show that our key results are robust to the inclusion of 
interactions of PMC with employment protection, collective bargaining and legal costs together, 
although there is not enough variation in the data to instrument all of the control interactions 
simultaneously.             
Table 9: Legal Institutions 
Country  % Cost of Claim  No. of days in court 
Belgium 16.6 505 
Denmark 23.3 380 
Finland 10.4  235 
France 17.4  331 
Germany 11.8 394 
Italy 29.9  1210 
Netherlands 24.4  514 
Norway 9.9  310 
Spain 17.2  515 
Sweden 31.3  508 
United Kingdom  23.4  404 
          
4.3.  Robustness, other 
This section takes the results from column (3) and (4) of Table 6 and exposes them to some 
further robustness checks, the results of which are presented in Table 10. One concern is the use 
of the average number of patents per firm as the dependent variable. This may capture 
differences in average firm size rather than actual patenting intensity, differences which may be 
related to financial institutions. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Maksimovic (2003) describes how 
average firm size might be related to financial institutions, although the theoretical relationship is 
ambiguous: with poor financial institutions average firm size is large as firms need to rely on 
internal capital markets; on the other hand large firms are difficult to monitor and this requires 
good financial institutions. They find more evidence for the latter effect: with good financial 
institutions, firms tend to be larger. It is difficult to see exactly how such a bias could drive our 133 
    
results, given that identification comes from differential changes in product market competition 
interacted with time-invariant financial institutions, nevertheless I ensure that the key result is 
robust to using the sum of patents in each country-industry-year and this is presented in columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Further Robustness 
Dependent variable:  Sum of patents Sum of patents Citation 
weighted 
patents per firm
Citation 
weighted 
patents per firm
Patents per 
firm 
Patents per 
firm 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1-Profitability  -6.877 -7.005 -8.927  -6.95     
 [3.104]**  [3.752]*  [5.051]*  [7.013]     
1-Profitability *No of Credit 
Institutions per Capita 
146.724 284.351 191.479 308.555     
[42.631]*** [93.021]***  [80.057]**  [89.015]***     
1-Profitability(including capital 
costs)       -2.691  -10.568 
       [0.835]***  [2.803]*** 
1-Profitability(including capital 
costs)*No of Credit Institutions 
per Capita 
     67.347  221.661 
     [17.698]***  [53.390]*** 
Control  Function   0.730  -1.325  8.414 
   [5.255]  [7.441]   [3.211]*** 
Credit Institutions Interaction 
Control Function 
 -150.276  -126.862  -168.045 
 [118.587]  [128.297]   [61.004]*** 
Output Gap  -0.041  -0.047  0.028  0.032  -0.06  -0.049 
  [0.045] [0.047] [0.067] [0.060] [0.048] [0.052] 
Constant  3.347 0.186 1.507 -2.554  -0.937 0.66 
  [1.132]***  [2.921] [1.397] [3.937] [0.648] [1.246] 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Digit Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1177 1177 1177 1177  824  824 
Notes: The time period is 1995 to 2002 inclusive. Observations are country-industry-years. Robust standard errors are 
in brackets. They are clustered at the country level as the financial institutions are invariant across industries and years. 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
A second concern is that the measure of patents filed does not capture the fact that some patents 
are much more important or valuable than others and therefore constitute a much greater 
investment by the firm. The common way in the literature to control for this is to weight patents 
by the number of citations they have received. The reason I have not done this in the main results 
is that, given our sample period, patents in later years are relatively new and have many less 
citations than those in earlier years. This trend should be adequately controlled for by the year 
dummies and I present the key regressions in columns (3) and (4), using citations weighted 134 
    
patents per firm as the dependent variable. The results are robust to this in that the positive effect 
of competition on innovation is higher in countries with a large number of credit institutions per 
capita.  
Another concern addressed here is that the measure of product market competition used so far 
uses a mark-up over labour costs alone, as the capital stock can only be estimated for a much 
smaller sample. As discussed, the measure of competition will be biased in non-constant returns 
to scale and we may be concerned that this bias may be correlated with changes in technology as 
observed through patenting. This will be controlled for to some extent by instrumentation, but 
concerns remain and such biases may be larger when capital costs are ignored. Therefore I re-run 
the key regression using a measure of competition that includes capital costs from an estimated 
capital stock and the US interest rate as a proxy for the cost of capital. The results for the sub-
sample for which this is possible are reported in columns (5) and (6). The key result that 
competition has a more positive effect on innovation in countries with plentiful credit institutions 
still holds. 
Table 11: Reduced form 
Dependent variable:  Patents per firm 
 (1)  (2) 
Single Market Program Dummy 
(all high barriers) 
0.497 -2.35 
[0.250]** [1.115]** 
Single Market Program Dummy 
(all high barriers) * No of Credit 
Institutions per Capita 
 49.74 
[17.226]*** 
Constant  -0.332 0.157 
  [0.526] [0.448] 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
2 Digit Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes 
Observations 270  270 
Notes: The sample contains only two years: 1995 and 2002. Observations are country-industry-years.  
Robust standard errors are in brackets. They are clustered at the country level.  ***, **, * indicates  
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
There are concerns with difference-in-difference estimation of this nature where the dependent 
variable is likely highly persistent that standard errors are underestimated due to serial 
correlation, as described in Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004). Although the time series 
variation in our sample is small, concerns remain. One technique to ensure that this problem is 
not responsible for the statistical significance of our results is to throw out the time series 135 
    
variation and estimate a further “reduced form” specification, the results of which are displayed 
in Table 11. These results take just observations from 1995 and 2002 and use the stronger of our 
two instruments, the SMP variable.
90 We reduce this variable to a simple step function so that it 
is equal to one in 2002 in sectors that were most affected by the SMP and equal to zero 
everywhere else. This step function is interacted with the number of credit institutions per capita. 
Column (1) shows that country-industries most affected by the SMP increased in patents per firm 
more so than those country-industries less affected. Column (2) shows our key result, that this 
positive effect of competition on innovation was greater in countries with numerous credit 
institutions per capita. This specification also addresses, at least in part, concerns that the main 
results may have been driven by measurement error in the profitability measure of PMC. 
Table 12: Firm level estimation 
Dependent variable:  Patent Count 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1-Profitability  -0.338 0.747 -9.972 -8.111 3.036 5.595 
  [0.886] [3.791]  [4.530]**  [3.377]**  [1.825]*  [2.622]** 
1-Profitability * No of 
Credit Institutions per 
Capita 
171.787 169.424 
[85.357]** [83.877]** 
1-Profitability * Deposit 
Insurance 
-3.501 -3.563 
[1.488]** [1.447]** 
Pre-Sample Mean of 
Patents 
0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Control Function  -1.069 -1.797 -2.447 
  [3.174] [3.318] [2.683] 
Output Gap  -0.011 -0.001 -0.063 -0.044 -0.036 -0.016 
  [0.048] [0.042] [0.055] [0.046] [0.044] [0.049] 
Constant  1.176 0.478 3.462 2.282 4.753 3.236 
  [1.169]  [2.916] [1.312]*** [1.995] [1.653]*** [3.062] 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Digit Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  3449 3449 3449 3449 3449 3449 
Notes: The time period is 1995 to 2002 inclusive. Observations are firm-years. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
They are clustered at the industry level. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. The sample is the number of firm that have at least one observation between 1990 and 1994, 
for calculation of the pre-sample mean. 
 
                                                 
90 We take our two SMP measures here and combine them into one variable so that it represents all sectors with high 
non-tariff barriers before the program started. 136 
    
Finally, Table 12 shows that our main results hold when we control for time-invariant firm 
heterogeneity in patenting. The concern being that firms are inherently different in countries with 
different financial arrangements and this difference determines how they patent in reaction to 
changes in market conditions. Where these difference are time-invariant and where they 
determine previous patenting behavior, they can be controlled for using a pre-sample mean of 
patents for each firm, as suggested in Blundell, Griffith, and Windmeijer (2002). Pre-sample 
information is not available for all of the firms in our sample, only 435 out of the 618 in the 
baseline sample. Nevertheless the results on this smaller sample are consistent with the main 
results.      
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper finds evidence of complementarities between product market competition and 
financial institutions. It uses product market reforms and anti-trust action as exogenous variation 
in product market competition in manufacturing sectors, in conjunction with proxies for good 
financial institutions across countries. We found that countries with a larger number of credit 
institutions per capita and low deposit insurance benefit more through higher innovation rates, 
from increases in competition. We have also shown that this result is consistent with an 
application of a model of step-by-step innovation to the case where good financial intermediation 
alleviates agency costs. 
The policy relevance of this work is clear. Many policy reforms in Europe and elsewhere have 
aimed at increasing product market competition, in an effort to improve economic performance 
along several dimensions, including productivity. A large body of research has focused on the 
effects of competition on firms’ incentives to increase productivity through innovation and recent 
work finds strong support of a positive relationship. However, the relationship depends on initial 
conditions in that the effect is more positive in sectors that are initially technologically advanced 
and indeed may be negative in sectors that are initially technologically backward. This suggests 
that other institutions that affect steady state innovation rates may be important determinants of 
which sectors or economic regions will most likely experience the positive effect of PMC. The 
results in the current paper suggest that policies that encourage good financial intermediation 
may increase the positive effect of PMC on innovation.      137 
    
Much further work is required in this area. It would support these findings greatly if it were 
observed that a correlation existed between industry measures of distance from technological 
frontier and the financial institutional variables used herein. Furthermore, any microeconomic 
evidence that firms in those countries with low numbers of credit institutions or high deposit 
insurance actually are more financially constrained would greatly support the result.  
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APPENDIX 
Theory 
This section shows that the key results can be obtained from both the simple single-sector and 
the “escape competition” version of the Aghion-Howitt model.    
Single sector Aghion­Howitt model, with Financial Intermediation 
This section describes the simplest version of the model in Aghion and Howitt (2005). Each 
discrete time period a final good is produced using a quantity x of an intermediate good of 
quality A, according to the technology
α Ax y = . In the intermediate sector L individuals each 
endowed with one unit of labour can supply this labour to either produce the intermediate good 
(via a one-for-one technology) or in research to improve the quality of the intermediate good. 
Specifically an entrepreneur who invests z units of labour innovates with probability z λ , 
discovering an improved intermediate good of quality  A γ , where  1 > γ . The entrepreneur enjoys 
monopoly power for one period, during which he is constrained by a competitive fringe that 
supplies the intermediate good at cost  1 > χ  units of labour instead of one. The entrepreneur’s 
profits from successful innovation are thus:  ( )wx 1 − = χ π , where w is the wage and x is the 
amount of labour devoted to production of the intermediate good. The entrepreneur will choose 
how many labour units, n, to devote to research so that the marginal cost of research equals the 
expected marginal benefit: the research arbitrage condition  λγπ = w . Using the expression for 
profits, dividing by the wage and using the labour market clearing condition,  L n x = + , yields 
the expression for the steady-state amount of research labour: 
() 1
1
−
− =
χ λγ
L n . 
This expression determines the steady-state rate of productivity growth. An increase in PMC is a 
decrease in the cost structure of the competitive fringe; a decrease in χ . This unambiguously 
decreases the labour resources devoted to research as it decreases the profits from innovation. 
This is the Schumpeter or “discouragement” effect of PMC on innovation. 
King and Levine (1993b) introduce a financial intermediary who can discover the ability of 
individuals to perform research, φ , at cost f labour units. The financial intermediary requires 139 
    
φ f  labour units per successful researcher to break even.
91 This increases the cost of innovation 
producing a new research arbitrage condition: ( ) λγπ φ = + w f 1 . After substitution of profits 
and rearrangement this yields: 
() 1
1
−
+
− =
χ λγ
φ f
L n . 
More efficient information gathering by financial intermediates reduces f, decreasing the cost of 
innovation and increasing innovation. Also, the negative effect of increased PMC (reduction in 
χ ) on innovation is exacerbated when agency costs are high: 
() ()
0 .
1
1
2 >
−
+
=
∂
∂
λγ
χ λγ
φ
χ
f n
, 
() ()
0 .
1
1
2
2
>
−
=
∂ ∂
∂
λγ
χ λγ
φ
χ f
n
. 
The reduction of the return to innovation from increased PMC decreases the incentive to 
innovate more when agency costs are high.   
Escape Competition, with Financial Intermediation 
This section describes the “escape competition” variant of the Aghion-Howitt model, where 
competition is modeled as an improvement in the cost structure of a competitive fringe that 
(rather than competition being an increase in the threat of entry as presented in the main text). 
Again starting with the multi-sector model of step-by-step innovation with a technological 
frontier that exogenously increases the quality of intermediary goods by a factor γ  each period, 
so that it moves each period from  1 − t A  to  1 − = t t A A γ . Three types of sectors exist, denoted by 
{} 2 , 1 , 0 ∈ j  to produce intermediary goods used in the production of a final good. Each sector 
contains an incumbent firm that produces the intermediate good at unit cost and a competitive 
fringe that produces the same good at cost  1 > χ . Sector j starts each period able to produce a 
good of quality  j t A − −1 . Types 0 and 1 innovate with probabilities  0 μ , 1 μ  respectively attaining a 
quality level of  j t A − , type 2 sectors innovate automatically. Therefore sector types 0 and 1 retain 
their type through innovation and type 2 sectors remain type 2 sectors. With fixed probability ε , 
                                                 
91 Break even evaluation price, q, for a financial intermediary when an individual incapable of research has no value 
(as a researcher) is given by:  () wf q = − + 0 1 φ φ , where w is the wage rate.   140 
    
entry by a technologically advanced foreign firm occurs in type 2 sectors changing them to type 
0 sectors.       
The cost of innovation is the units of labour devoted to research plus an evaluation cost of  φ f  
for each unit as before. Also the cost of innovation is increasing in its target quality level,  j t A − −1 γ . 
The firm chooses the optimal level of innovation probability by maximizing its expected profits, 
subject to the cost of innovation:
92  
() ()
⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧ + − ′ − + − − − − −
2
1 1 1
2
1
1 max jt j t j t j jt j t j jt f A A A
jt
μ φ γ δ μ δ μ
μ . 
The solution of this yields the research arbitrage condition for each sector type. Post-innovation, 
type 0 sectors are unconstrained monopolists, whereas type 1 sectors are still constrained by the 
competitive fringe with marginal costχ . The research arbitrage conditions for each sector are: 
() ⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
−
+
= ) (
1
) / 1 (
1
1
0 χ δ
γ
α δ
φ
μ
f
 
()
) (
1
1
1
1
1 χ δ
γ φ
μ
⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
−
+
=
f
. 
The profit function  (.) δ  is strictly increasing in its argument, and  ) 1 ( α δ is the profit of an 
unconstrained monopolist,  () χ δ  is the profit of an incumbent constrained by a fringe with cost 
χ . An increase in PMC is a decrease in the cost of the fringe and, from the expressions above, 
increases innovation effort in type 0 sectors (the “escape” effect) and decreases innovation in 
type 1 sectors (the “discouragement” effect). The effect on aggregate innovation in the full 
economy from an increase in PMC depends on the proportion of type 0 and type 1 sectors. Our 
interest here is how agency costs change the effect of PMC on innovation.  
If we let  () χ δ = Δ , the short-term effect of a decrease in PMC (an increase in Δ) on economy 
wide innovation is given by: 
Δ ∂
∂
+
Δ ∂
∂
=
Δ ∂
∂ 1
1
0
0
μ μ
q q
I
q
, 
 
                                                 
92 Profits increase with the quality of the intermediate good. The factor δ  adjusts profits for the level of competition 
from the fringe, and can differ depending on the sector j and whether or not the incumbent has innovated, as denoted 
by δ′. 141 
    
where  0 q  and  1 q  are the proportion of type-0 and type-1 sectors respectively. This varies with 
agency costs as (after evaluating the derivatives in the expression above): 
⎪ ⎭
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If this second derivative is positive it means that high agency costs increases the extent that PMC 
discourages innovation, or conversely, better financial intermediation increases the positive 
effect of PMC on innovation. Continuing the differentiation yields: 
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If we let the productivity increase from an innovation, γ  tend to one the expression simplifies to:
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This expression is positive if the number of frontier sectors is decreasing in agency costs. In the 
steady state the flow conditions into and out of each of sectors types 0, 1, 2 are: 
( ) 0 0 2 1 μ ε − = q q
  ( ) ( ) 1 1 0 0 1 1 μ μ − = − q q
  ( ) ε μ 2 1 1 1 q q = −
  1 2 1 0 = + + q q q  
It is not immediately obvious that an increase in agency costs decreases the proportion of type-0 
sectors, as a decrease in innovation effort in both type-0 and type-1 sectors increases the number 
of type-2 sectors which increases the number that spontaneously become type-0 sectors through 
foreign entry,  ε 2 q . We can, however, show that  0 q  does decrease in f as follows. From the flow 
conditions: 
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The first bracket must be positive, the second term in the second square bracket is positive from 
the definition of  0 μ  above. Therefore,  0
0 <
∂
∂
f
q
 if: 
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This is true because, from the definitions of  0 μ  and  1 μ :  1
1
1
1
0 <
−
−
μ
μ
 , 
f f ∂
∂
>
∂
∂ 1 0 μ μ
 and both 
derivatives are negative. These properties are consequences of the fact that there are greater 
incentives to innovate in frontier sectors than in laggard sectors, and therefore  1 0 μ μ > . 
To recap: for small productivity gains, agency costs decrease the positive effect of PMC, due 
partly to the dampening of the positive reaction of innovation to competition in frontier sectors 
(1
st term in A2) and due partly to the decrease of the proportion of frontier sectors in the 
economy (2
nd term in A2).  
If we relax the small γ  assumption, it is still likely that A2 is positive. Given that 
1
0
0
1
1
1
μ
μ
−
−
=
q
q
 
from the flow conditions, we can re-write the contents of the first term in A1 as: 
()
() ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−
−
+ −
+
− 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0 0
2 γ
μ
μ
γ φ
φ q
f
. Letting  1
1
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1
0 =
−
−
μ
μ
 (in fact it will always be less than 
one), this expression will only be negative if  2 > γ , which is unrealistically high. 
The second term in A1 could be overall negative if 
f
q
∂
∂ 1  is negative and large in magnitude 
(meaning that the net effect of high agency costs decreases the proportion of laggard sectors, 
which is possible if the flow into type-1 sectors from type-0 sectors that innovate less is 
outweighed by the flow into type-2 sectors from less innovation in type-1 sectors). From the flow 
conditions we can write:  
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From A5 it is clear that  0
1
1
0
1 <
−
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μ
f
 and, therefore, the only negative term in the second 
bracket of A6 comes from the 
f ∂
∂ 1 1 μ
ε
 term above. We can see that the contribution of this term to 
the second bracket of A1 is lower in magnitude than a term of opposite sign that is present in via 
the 
f
q
∂
∂ 0  in A1. This is now sufficient to say that A1 is positive. Using A4, A7 and the 
expression for A1 this is true if: 
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Again using  1
1
1
1
0 <
−
−
μ
μ
 and 
f f ∂
∂
>
∂
∂ 1 0 μ μ
 this must be true for reasonable values of γ  (i.e. <2). 
It is interesting to note that the characteristic of the model that drives these properties is that the 
return to innovation is much larger in frontier (type-0) sectors, therefore innovation effort is 
greater in these sectors in the steady state and reacts more elastically to changes in the cost of 
innovation effort. 
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions 
Variable Description  and  source  Mean 
(s.d.) 
Competition 
ijt
ijt ijt
ValueAdded
s LabourCost ValueAdded −
− 1  
0.6532 
(0.1395) 
Competition 
(including 
capital) 
ijt
ijt ijt ijt
ValueAdded
ts CapitalCos s LabourCost ValueAdded − −
− 1  
0.8845 
(0.4229) 
Value added  Value added at basic prices plus taxes, less subsidies on production, excluding imports 
and VAT. At factor costs for Canada and producer’s prices for USA; OECD STAN 
database.  
9400.532 
(10522.66) 
Labour costs  Wages and salaries plus supplements, such as contributions to social security, private 
pensions, health insurance, life insurance. OECD STAN database 
6156.319 
(7409.27) 
Cost of capital   Yield on USA Government composite bond (10 Years), minus inflation rate, plus 
assumed depreciation of 7%. OECD Main Economic Indicators for bond yields and 
consumer price index.  
 
Capital stock  Calculated using the perpetual inventory method. Depreciation rates are calibrated so 
that the stocks are similar to the OECD estimates when both are available. OECD 
STAN database. 
 
Output gap  Percentage deviation of output from trend; OECD Economic Outlook.  -0.5598 
(1.9456) 
Number of 
Credit 
Institutions 
CESifo DICE (European Commission)  0.04 
(0.03) 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Ratio of deposit coverage limit to GDP per capita. 
CESifo DICE (World Bank).  
1.94 
(1.74) 
 
 
Table A.2: Firm Characteristics 
Country  Average Total Assets ($th)  Average Total Sales ($th) 
Belgium  7,254,373 1,898,202 
Denmark  1,362,743 178,704 
Finland  2,901,841 1,444,286 
France  12,113,114 729,519 
Germany  45,733,020 5,288,165 
Italy  8,263,993 186,011 
Netherlands  22,891,864 5,239,465 
Norway  921,654 144,163 
Spain  4,640,659 1,121,886 
Sweden  5,211,173 808,736 
United Kingdom  44,860,443 1,872,350 
  Notes: Averages are taken for the year 2000 and are characteristics of the listed parent firm. 
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CHAPTER 4 | EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION, 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND INNOVATION 
Rachel Griffith and Gareth Macartney 
 
 
Abstract 
The theoretical effects of labour regulations such as employment protection legislation (EPL) on 
innovation is ambiguous, and empirical evidence is thus far inconclusive. EPL increases job 
security and the greater enforceability of job contracts may increase worker investment in 
innovative activity. On the other hand EPL increases adjustment costs faced by firms, and this 
may lead to under-investment in activities that are uncertain including innovation and other 
technologically advanced activities. In this paper we find empirical evidence that multinational 
enterprises locate more innovative activity in countries with high EPL, however they locate 
technologically advanced innovation in subsidiaries located in countries with low EPL.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Labour market regulations have been a focus of policy concern in the European Union. 
There is now considerable evidence that rigid labour markets are associated with higher 
unemployment.
93 More recently attention has focused on the impact of labour regulations 
on the incentive to invest in productivity enhancing innovation and growth. Here the 
relationship is much less clear. When making its innovation decision a firm considers two 
effects of employment protection legislation (EPL). First, EPL introduces a firing cost to 
any adjustment to employment made by the firm. Second, this adjustment cost increases 
job security for existing workers as it reduces the probability of being fired in response to 
small fluctuations in demand. Efficiency wage arguments suggest that this increases the 
value of employment for the worker and increases their (unobservable) effort, which in 
turn can increase the return to innovation for the firm.
94 On the other hand where 
innovation is radically new and requires new skills, and thus a drastic adjustment to 
employment, EPL may prohibitively increase the cost of such innovation. Existing 
models of radical innovation suggest that countries with low EPL have a comparative 
advantage in radical innovation and experimentation (Saint-Paul 1997, 2002, Samaniego 
2006, Bartelsman et al. 2008).
 95    
There is a small empirical literature on the relationship between labour regulations and 
productivity and innovation, however cross-country evidence remains inconclusive, with 
studies finding divergent results.
96 Such studies struggle to deal with two key 
                                                 
93 See Nickell (2005), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Lazear (1990) and Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
94 See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for the efficiency wage set-up and Boeri and Jimeno (2005) for an 
application to EPL. Although not its central point, workers invest more in general training in the presence 
of search frictions in the labour market when they are less likely to be fired by their present employer in 
Acemoglu (1997). See also Akerloff (1982), Agell (1999) and Chapter 10 of Saint-Paul (1996) for the 
positive effects of EPL.  
95 Also Cunat and Melitz (2007) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that countries with flexible 
labour markets have a comparative advantage in industries with high demand volatility. Caballero et al. 
(2004) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that countries with strong EPL are slow to adjust 
employment, and that this is associated with low productivity growth.  
96 Storm and Nastepaad (2007) find high EPL is associated with greater productivity growth. Bassanini et 
al. (2001) find that EPL has a negative effect in less coordinated countries, in higher coordinated countries 
workers and firms can align their interests better. Similarly, Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) find a significant 
impact of EPL on multi-factor productivity growth when interacted with bargaining coordination, but no 
linear result. Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that differences in specialisation between Germany and the US 
are due to the more market orientated financial and labour market institutions in the US. Bartelsman et al. 
(2008) find that EPL decreases productivity in technologically advanced sectors. See also Akkermans et al. 
(2005). 152 
    
identification problems. One is that the effect of EPL may depend on the nature of 
innovation, and in most data it is difficult to distinguish between incremental and radical 
innovation. Two is that in the cross-section labour regulations may be correlated with 
unobservable characteristics of countries, industries and firms that determine innovation. 
We deal with the first challenge by using an intuitively appealing measure of radical 
innovation: the proportion of citations on a patent application made to scientific journals, 
referred to as non-patent literature (NPL). We tackle the second challenge by basing our 
results on an identification strategy that uses variation within multi-national enterprises 
(MNEs) from 15 different countries, and therefore controls for unobservable 
characteristics of the home country, industry and firm that affect the innovation decision. 
We find that MNEs perform more overall innovation in high EPL countries, but that the 
same MNEs perform more radical innovation in low EPL countries.  
This latter result can be seen in Figure 1, where we use aggregate data and show the 
average proportion of citations to NPL made by all private sector firms in our data.
97 The 
downward sloping relationship suggests that there is less radical innovation performed in 
countries with high EPL.    
  
      Figure 1: Employment Protection Legislation and Radical Innovation (all firms) 
 
Notes: Averages are calculated at the three digit industry level using all private sector firms for  
the years 1997-2003. The y variable is the country average across these industries.  
                                                 
97 This is a very large sample of both listed and unlisted subsidiary level firms, see Macartney (2008). 153 
    
If we focus on MNEs
98 we see statistically significant evidence of both a positive effect of 
EPL on overall innovation, Figure 2, and a negative effect of EPL on radical innovation, 
Figure 3.
 99  
Figure 2: Employment Protection Legislation and Innovation (MNEs) 
 
 
Figure 3: Employment Protection Legislation and Radical Innovation (MNEs) 
 
 
                                                 
98 This is a sample of 1,378 subsidiaries of MNEs, see Section 4 for details of the data used. 
99 In Figures 2 and 3 the fitted line is weighted by the number of subsidiaries. The confidence interval uses 
standard errors clustered at the country level. 154 
    
 
We show that these results are robust to controlling for firm fixed effects and for an 
extensive set of country level regulatory and factor endowment characteristics. 
The main contribution of this paper is empirical. In addition we describe a model that 
incorporates both positive and negative effects of EPL on innovation incentives for 
firms.
100 We distinguish between incremental innovation and radical innovation (RI): RI 
is potentially more profitable than incremental innovation but requires a large and drastic 
employment adjustment as workers with new skills are required to implement it (as in 
Chapter 8 of Aghion-Howitt 1998). EPL increases this cost of adjustment, but it also has 
positive effects on both types of innovation by increasing workers’ effort to further 
increase the productivity of innovations. The model suggest that, for plausible parameter 
values, the optimal level of investment in radical innovation decreases with EPL but that 
the optimal level of investment in incremental innovation increases with EPL.   
The paper is related to several literatures. It is directly related to the growing literature on 
the effects of labour market regulations on productivity and by extension to the papers on 
cross-country patterns of specialization and national institutions.
101 There is a related 
literature on the product life-cycle that distinguishes between different new product 
innovation and mature product innovation, where demand is more certain for the latter.
102 
It also relates to the endogenous growth literature and the model presented builds heavily 
on the framework of Aghion-Howitt, where the distinction between radical and 
incremental innovation is through the employment adjustment required for radical 
innovation.
103 Our paper is also related to the literature on the location of activity by 
MNEs.
 104    
                                                 
100 To our knowledge models of innovation have tended to emphasise the negative effect of EPL on radical 
innovation and then explained country specialisation using comparative advantage.  
101 Nunn (2007), Carlin and (2003). 
102 Klepper (1996) and Breschi et al. (2000), Audretsch (1995), Puga and Trefler (2005), and Saint-Paul 
(1997, 2002). 
103 As opposed to the distinction that radical innovation is less likely to succeed than incremental 
innovation, as in Saint-Paul (1997, 2002) and Bartelsman et al. (2008), we argue that this was appropriate 
for our sample of large incumbent firms, whereas models of risky innovation and high firing costs in the 
event of failure seemed more appropriate for small firms and entry and exit. 
104 Ekholm and Hakkala (2007), Devereux and Griffith (1998). Haaland & Wooton (2003) show that multi-
national enterprises will locate high risk projects in countries with low redundancy costs in the presence of 
industry or economy wide wage bargaining, and when the risk profile of the MNE is different to that of 
domestic firms.  155 
    
This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes a simple model of incremental and 
radical innovation; section 3 describes our identification strategy; section 4 describes our 
empirical specification and data, explaining our measure of radical innovation; section 5 
describes our key results; a final section concludes. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND              
The current literature on the ambiguous effect of EPL on productivity suggests that the 
nature of innovation has a role to play. The model in this section is driven in part by the 
difference between radical innovation and incremental innovation emphasized by the 
endogenous growth literature (see Aghion-Howitt 1998). Where successful, radical 
innovation requires a drastic adjustment of employment as the human capital of existing 
workers is rendered obsolete. EPL increases this cost by way of firing costs. In this model 
radical innovation is more valuable than incremental innovation and more costly.
105 With 
a small uncertainty in future demand EPL also has a positive effect on the returns to both 
types of innovation, in that it increases worker commitment and their efforts in making 
the new technology more productive through learning by doing. The model predicts that 
EPL will increase incremental innovation effort, but at sufficiently high levels it will 
decrease radical innovation effort. The firm will more likely choose to perform radical 
innovation in low EPL regimes and incremental innovation in high EPL regimes, which 
is this central prediction tested in this paper.      
2.1.  General Framework 
The basics of this model are similar to Aghion-Howitt (1998). Innovation improves the 
productivity of intermediate goods supplied by a firm for use in the production of a final 
good. A further improvement on this productivity gain comes via the effort (or learning 
by doing) of production workers. This effort is higher in the presence of employment 
protection legislation (EPL), which takes the form of higher firing costs per worker, ϕ , 
as the firm can credibly commit to sharing some of the surplus with workers.  
We distinguish between two types of innovation: radical innovation and incremental 
innovation. Radical innovation is potentially higher productive, but makes existing 
                                                 
105 Although it is not more risky as in Saint-Paul (1997, 2002) and the model in Bartelsman et al. (2008). If 
it where and the cost of failure (exit) increased with EPL then this would enhance our predictions. 156 
    
human (or physical) capital obsolete. We model this as requiring all production workers 
to be replaced by more highly skilled workers, at firing cost ϕ  per worker. Incremental 
innovation increases productivity, but to a lesser extent, and existing workers can still be 
used. EPL’s effect on worker effort will have an increasing effect on the returns to both 
types of innovation, but due to the firing costs it will also have a negative effect on 
radical innovation.  
Our main interest is in the impact of EPL on innovation incentives. The main impact of 
EPL is on costs, and therefore to focus on this effect we assume away any strategic 
considerations in the product market. A final good is produced using a continuum of 
intermediate goods produced by firms, each one of which is a monopolist in its market, 
using the technology,   
    () () ∫
− =
1
0
1 di x A e Z y i i i
α α
.         
Profits of the intermediate firm are given by,  
    () i i i A e Z δ π =  ,   
where i: indexes firms and industries (since each firm is a monopolist in its industry). 
We consider the following timing of events:  
Intermediate producers draw an initial productivity level 
0
i A . Firms decides whether to 
invest in radical or incremental innovation, and how much to invest (which determines 
the probability of success 
I
i
R
i μ μ , ). If successful, incremental innovation leads to a 
productivity increase of  1 > γ  and, if radical innovation is successful productivity 
increases by a factor of 
2 γ . Innovation incurs a fixed cost.  
Productivity is enhanced by the efforts of workers. However, in the case of radical 
innovation existing workers do not have the required skills to work with the new 
technology and must be fired and replaced by more skilled workers. Production workers 
decide the level of investment in unobservable effort 
j
i e , which increases productivity by 
a factor  () e Z . A demand shock occurs which leads to the possibility of the worker being 157 
    
fired. We assume that the future uncertainty in demand is small enough to be trivial to the 
firm, although of importance to the workers.
106 
Intermediate production occurs, if the firm chooses incremental innovation then it uses 
existing workers. If the firm chooses radical innovation then existing production workers 
are fired at cost ϕ  per worker. They are replaced at zero hiring costs by more skilled 
production workers. Output is sold and surplus shared between the firm and its workers. 
We are interested in the innovation incentives for the intermediate producers. 
Note the key notations are : i: firms; j= 0, I, R: innovation type; ϕ : firing costs per 
worker;  1 > γ :  productivity gain from incremental innovation (if successful); 
2 γ : 
productivity gain from radical innovation (if successful); δ : competition in intermediate 
goods market;  () ϕ s : probability that a worker is fired after incurring effort; β : worker 
bargaining power; 
0
i A : intermediate producers initial productivity level; 
R I F F , : fixed 
costs of innovation; 
j
i e : worker effort, enhances firm specific productivity; 
R
i
I
i μ μ , : the 
level of innovation effort, and the probability of success; 
R
i
I
i c c , : variable costs of 
incremental and radical innovation;  i f : firing cost incurred if radical innovation is 
successful; 
j
i π : profits for each j technology; and 
j
i V : surplus for each j technology. 
Working backwards:  
Output generates surplus for the firm. These are given by, 
  ()
0 0 1 i i V π β − =         ( 1 )  
  ()( )( )
I I
i i
I I
i
I I
i F c V − − − − + − =
0 1 1 1 π β μ π β μ      ( 2 )  
  () ( ) ( )( )
R R
i i
R
i
R
i
R R
i F c f V − − − − + − − =
0 1 1 1 π β μ π β μ     ( 3 )  
 
where 
                                                 
106 The implication is that innovation and production are co-located. Therefore the effect EPL has on 
worker incentives affects the firm’s innovation incentives. Such a co-location is more likely when 
technology transfer costs are high relative to product transport costs (see Ekholm and Hakkala 2007). This 
is consistent with a model where location is endogenous and determined by the effect EPL has on the 
benefits to innovation. That is, if transport costs are low so that production can be located anywhere, firms 
may choose to locate innovation and production in countries where the labour market environment is 
conducive to their intended type of innovation. While over 60% of R&D costs are labour costs, it seems 
unlikely that very highly skilled researchers require job security regulation for motivation.  
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  ()
2
2
1 j
i
j
i
j
i A c μ = .          ( 4 )  
Intermediate production occurs. Output of the intermediate firm is given by  
  ( )
j
i
j
i
j
i A e Z δ π = ,            ( 5 )  
where δ  reflects the shape of the residual demand curve the firm faces. 
If the firm has chosen not to innovate or chosen incremental innovation then it uses 
existing workers. If the firm chose radical innovation then existing production workers do 
not have the skills to work with the new technology and are fired by the firm. EPL is 
modeled as a firing cost of ϕ  per worker (a bureaucratic cost, not a transfer to the 
worker), that makes employment adjustment costly.
107 New workers are hired at zero 
hiring costs. These firing costs take the form 
   ( )
0 0
i i i A e kZ f ϕ =         ( 6 )  
where the term  ( )
j
i i A e kZ
0  is the number of existing workers employed by the firm. 
Demand shock occurs. There is a shock to demand that means that the worker may be 
fired with probability  () ϕ s . This occurs after the worker has committed to an effort level. 
We assume that the future uncertainty in demand is small enough to be trivial to the firm, 
although of importance to the workers (see Acemoglu 1997, and Boeri and Jimeno 2005). 
The firing cost of ϕ  per worker makes employment adjustment in the face of demand 
shocks unprofitable to the firm and, therefore,  ( ) ( ) 0 , < ′ = ϕ ϕ s s s . In this way EPL 
increases workers’ job security and therefore their effort. Specifically, we can show that 
if there is a probability p of a drop in demand from 
h θ  to 
l θ then (see Appendix A):  
                                                 
107 There are conditions where EPL is irrelevant to firm location, specifically when EPL takes the form of a 
redundancy payment rather than a bureaucratic cost to the firm. Pissarides (2001) and Lazear (1990) find 
that with endogenously determined wages, expected redundancy costs are fully reflected in the wage. The 
worker takes into account both the probability of firm bankruptcy and the size of the redundancy payment 
when bargaining over wages. We have assumed this situation away by interpreting EPL as a regulation that 
results only in a (bureaucratic) firing cost to the firm and not a transfer to the worker. However, EPL as 
redundancy will affect location decisions if wage bargaining is conducted at the industry level rather than at 
the firm level and the probability of bankruptcy is private information to the firm and is different to the 
industry average (Haaland and Wooton 2003). The worker accepts a low (high) wage if the industry 
average riskiness is high (low). Therefore a firm that is more risky than the average is worse off, as it still 
has to pay the same wage as other firms but has a higher probability of paying a redundancy payment. 
Therefore risky firms (or firms more likely to make employment adjustments) have an incentive to locate 
their activities in a low EPL country.   
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This function is decreasing in ϕ  at an increasing rate:  ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 < ′ ′ < ′ ϕ ϕ s s . Specifying this 
functional form for  () ϕ s  is not necessary for the qualitative predictions of our model, but 
it will help in discussing the dominant effect of EPL on radical innovation effort for 
realistic values of ϕ . For most of the discussion we will continue to use the general 
function,  () ϕ s .     
Production workers decide level of effort. This is an investment in unobservable effort, 
which increases productivity by a factor  ( ) e Z  (where  ( )( ) ( ) 0 , 0 , 1 0 < ′ ′ > ′ = e Z e Z Z ). 
Workers will choose effort to maximise their expected return (dropping  ( ) ϕ s ’s 
argument), 
   () [ ] e s s
j
i
e
− ⋅ + − 0 1 max βπ        ( 8 )  
and substituting equation (5) into (8) we get the following first order condition: 
   ()
()
j
i
j
i
A s
e Z
βδ −
=
1
1
'   .        ( 9 )  
We assume a functional form for Z that displays diminishing returns to workers effort 
and that is equal to one if workers make zero effort, 
   ( ) 1 + = e e Z .        ( 1 0 )  
Using this we can find optimal worker effort: 
   () ( ) j
i
j
i A
s
e e Z
2
1
1 *
* βδ −
= + = .      ( 1 1 )  
Effort is increasing in the initial productivity draw, and increasing in EPL,  
  ( )
0
2
1
*
>
∂
∂
− =
∂
∂ j
i
j
i A
s e Z
βδ
ϕ ϕ
,                                              (12) 
since  () 0 < ′ ϕ s .  
We have assumed that the workers’ return to learning-by-doing effort is entirely tied to 
the firm, i.e. their efforts enhance the productivity of the firm’s capital but does not 
enhance their own productivity. It is important to discuss at this stage what would be the 
effect of weakening such an assumption. Say the worker gained from their efforts by way 160 
    
of acquiring general skills. Becker (1964) predicts an under-investment in general skills 
as workers are credit constrained and firms are reluctant to fund skills that the worker 
may use elsewhere. As described by Acemoglu (1997) it is likely that a contract could be 
written to mitigate such a problem (penalties for workers who train and quit) and, for our 
purposes, it is not initially clear what role EPL has to play: EPL will not stop workers 
leaving once trained and offered a job elsewhere. Acemoglu (1997) considers a model of 
training and innovation with job market search frictions, where workers can exogenously 
lose their job with probability s.
108 Costly job search means that when a worker and firm 
are matched they bargain over the surplus of the match, and therefore over any increased 
productivity that the worker has achieved through learning-by-doing effort. This leads to 
an under-investment in training by workers, as there is a probability of being fired and 
then, after search, receiving only a partial return to their training efforts. Where EPL 
reduces this probability of being fired, it will mitigate this problem of under-investment, 
which would be qualitatively consistent with our model. 
We have also assumed that the worker’s effort is unobservable, otherwise the firm and 
worker could write a contract specifying e in return for a guaranteed wage in each 
period. We could relax this assumption and assume that such a contract can be written 
and that there is a monitoring technology available to the firm so that a worker can be 
caught shirking with probability q. The efficiency wage paid to the worker so that they do 
not shirk is increasing in the exogenous probability of spontaneous dismissal in the future 
(“economic dismissal”), increasing in the exogenous probability of once dismissed 
getting another job (“flow into employment”) and decreasing in the probability of getting 
caught shirking and subsequently being dismissed (“disciplinary dismissal”), see Shapiro 
& Stiglitz (1984). EPL can then have two effects: it will decrease the probability of 
economic dismissal as we have discussed in the previous paragraph, but it will also 
decrease the probability of disciplinary dismissal. Boeri and Jimeno (2005), argue that for 
big firms (which is the sample for the current paper), where monitoring is very difficult, 
the dominant effect of EPL is that it decreases the probability of economic dismissal and 
therefore increases the value of employment to the worker and reduces the efficiency 
                                                 
108 Our equation 9 is inspired by equation (2) in Acemoglu (1997). 161 
    
wage that the firm must pay them. As this lower wage will increase the return to the firm 
from innovation this will increase the firm’s innovative effort, as in our model. 
Firm decides level of innovation. The problem facing the firm is to choose the optimal 
level of innovation effort conditional on type and on worker effort. For incremental 
innovation, we substitute equation (5) into (2) to get, 
  () ( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ]
I I
i i i
I I
i
I
i
I F c A e Z A e Z
I
i
− − − − + −
0 * 0 * 1 1 1 max δ β μ δ β μ
μ
, (13) 
and substituting in equation (4) and using the fact that 
0
i
I
i A A γ =  we get the firm’s first 
order condition. The optimal innovation efforts are given by the first order condition, 
noting that  ( ) ( )
* 0 *
i
I
i e Z e Z γ = : 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1
* 0 0 * 0 0 2 * 0 = − − −
I
i i i i i i A A e Z A e Z μ γ δ γ δ β ,                               (14) 
which implies that firm innovation effort will be: 
() ()
* 0 * 1
1 i
I e Z δ
γ
γ β μ ⎟ ⎟
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⎝
⎛
− − = .                                             (15) 
This is increasing in EPL as  () 0 < ′ ϕ s .  
With radical innovation we substitute equations (4), (5), (6) into (3) and using the fact 
that 
0 2
i
R
i A A γ =  we get: 
() () ( ) [] ( )() ( ) ()
RI R
i i i i
R
i i i i
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i
R
i F A A e Z A e kZ A e Z
R
i
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(16) 
The optimal innovation effort is given by the first order condition: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1
* 0 2 0 * 0 0 * 0 0 4 * 0 = − − − −
R
i i i i i i i A A e kZ A e Z A e Z μ γ ϕ δ γ δ β ,                    (17) 
which implies that firm innovation effort will be 
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Innovation incentives are increasing in workers learning-by-doing effort and therefore 
EPL has an increasing effect in both cases. Due to the large employment adjustment 
required in the case of radical innovation, firing costs also have a decreasing effect on the 
incentives for radical innovation. Using a Taylor approximation for equation (7), see 
Appendix, we note that the expression for radical innovation is quadratic in firing costs 162 
    
with a maximum turning point, so that radical innovation effort initially increases with ϕ  
and then decreases with ϕ .  
These effects can be seen by differentiating with respect to firing costs: 
() ( )
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It is useful at this stage to use a specific functional form for Z(.). For small ϕ  we can 
write (see equation A9): 
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Inserting this into equation (11) and letting  () () 1
1
1
1
−
−
= α θ θ
α
l h b  we can write:
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Equations (19) and (20) now become: 
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(24) 
Equation (23) is strictly positive as expected. Considering equation (24), the first term 
must be positive for  1 > γ  and the second two terms are negative and increasingly so in 
ϕ . To find the point at which firing costs start to have a negative effect on radical 
innovation, 
R ϕ ˆ , set this expression equal to zero and solve:
110                             
                                                 
109 Note that b is decreasing in the severity of the shock. Its range is between zero and 
α − 1
1
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Therefore, 
R ϕ ˆ  is lower when the productivity gains from innovation are low (low γ ); the 
monopoly price for the intermediate good is low (low  α 1 )
111; and the firms gets a low 
proportion of the return to innovation (worker bargaining power, β , is high). Also, 
R ϕ ˆ  is 
lower when the extent to which ϕ  increases learning by doing is lower: when the 
probability of a negative demand shock, p, is low and therefore the relevance of EPL in 
making workers feel secure in their jobs is lower; when the elasticity of final good output 
with respect to intermediate good input is low ( ( ) α − − 1  is low) as this reduces the 
intermediate good adjustment required in the face of a small demand shock and therefore 
the possibility of getting fired and, again, the relevance of EPL to job security (see 
Appendix).
  
How does 
R ϕ ˆ  compare with realistic values for firing costs? We can show quite easily 
that for reasonable values of the parameters in our model 
R ϕ ˆ  is outside the likely range 
of ϕ . The firing cost ϕ  is likely to be a proportion of the worker reservation wage which 
is normalized at one, and therefore it is realistic to assume that ϕ  is between zero and 
one. Setting  2 / 1 , 1 . 0 , 2 , 2 / 1 = = = = β α p b  we can calculate that  0 ˆ <
R ϕ  for  821 . 1 ≤ γ  
and that for  968 . 1 821 . 1 ≤ < γ , 1 ˆ 0 < <
R ϕ .
112 In this second range of γ  values, EPL 
increases the value of radical innovation initially, but will start to decrease it again as the 
radical firing cost effect starts to outweigh the learning by doing effect. Remembering 
that in this model the productivity gain from an incremental innovation is γ  and that for 
radical innovation is 
2 γ , the values mentioned here are very large:  821 . 1 = γ  corresponds 
to a productivity gain from incremental innovation of 82.1 percent and from radical 
                                                 
111 α  is the elasticity of demand for the intermediate good. 
112 By inserting values into the following expression and solving for γ : 
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innovation of 231.6 percent. Therefore it is likely that in this model that firing costs have 
a strictly decreasing effect on radical innovation incentives.  
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY              
In order to investigate the idea that EPL affects the level and type of innovate activity 
undertaken we consider the decision of MNEs over where to located innovative activities 
across twelve OECD countries. As emphasised above, our identification strategy is to use 
variation within multi-national enterprises (MNEs) from 15 different countries, which 
allows us to control for a large range of potentially unobservable characteristics at the 
firm, industry and home country level. We consider both the total amount of innovative 
activity, and the most technologically new projects, which we interpret as being those 
most associated with employment adjustment and volatility (we show evidence to support 
this interpretation). 
Our main measure of the level of innovative activity is a count of patents. We follow the 
literature (Hausman et al (1984), Pakes (1986), Blundell et al (1999)) and model the 
count of patents with a linear exponential model.  
Consider a multinational firm (m), with a number of subsidiaries (s) each of which 
operates in (potentially different) industry (i) and is located in country (c). We model the 
level of inventive activity measured by patent applications (P) in each location as a 
function of EPL, a range of other covariates (X), multinational effects (η) and an 
idiosyncratic error (u): 
  () . exp ms m ci c ms u X EPL P + + + = η β .         (27) 
 
Our main interest is in the sign and magnitude of β , recall that the theoretical literature 
discussed above is ambiguous about what we expect the sign to be - a positive sign would 
suggest that the dominant effect of EPL is to increases both firms investment in workers 
and worker commitment, while a negative sign would support the idea that higher EPL 
makes employment adjustments more costly. 
While the theoretical literature is ambiguous about the impact of EPL on the overall level 
of innovative activity, it clearly points to a detrimental effect of EPL on more 165 
    
technologically advanced or risky investments. To empirically investigate this prediction 
we also estimate 
() ms m ci ms c ms X CITWP EPL NPL ν η γ β + + + + = ln exp     (28) 
where NPL is a weighted count of  patents that gives a greater weight to patents that are 
more technologically advanced (discussed further in the next section). More specifically, 
NPL is a count of patents weighted by the number of citations made to non-patent 
literature, mainly scientific journals. CITWP is the count of patents from (27) weighted 
by all citations made, to control for heterogeneity across patents in the amount of 
citations made. Our main interest is the sign and magnitude of β  - a negative sign would 
indicate that higher technologically advanced patenting, as a proportion of overall 
patenting, is associated with lower EPL. 
One concern we might have with estimating equations (27) and (28) is that EPL is 
correlated with other institutional variables that also affect innovation incentives. We 
have available country level measures of other labour market regulations. We also have a 
measure of product market regulations, a measure of concentration in the banking sector 
and a measure of the efficiency of the courts, which may affect the value of holding a 
patent.
113 Some of these variables are highly correlated with EPL as we can see from the 
correlation matrix in Table 1 and it is therefore challenging to separately identify the 
effect of EPL, as with all studies using cross-country variation in this way (variable 
definitions and sources are in Table A1). EPL is particularly highly correlated with 
collective bargaining coverage and bargaining coordination, which have been found to be 
determinants of worker bargaining power,
114 and with the OECD overall measure of 
product market conditions. Nevertheless, our results are robust to controlling for these 
institutional variables.     
 
                                                 
113 See Aghion et al. (2005) for the effect of product market regulations that determine competition on 
innovation. See Carlin and Mayer (2003) for the effect of banking concentration on specialisation in high 
tech innovative sectors. 
114 See Calmfors and Driffil (1998), see Flanagan (1999) for Chapter 2 of this thesis for evidence that 
bargaining coordination increases worker bargaining power. 166 
    
Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation and Control Variables 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Employment Protection Legislation  
(Regular Contracts) 
(1) 
1 . 0 0             
Union Density - Average 1997-2003 
 
(2) 
- 0 . 2 2   1 . 0 0            
Collective Bargaining Coverage 
 
(3) 
0.63  0.05  1.00          
Employment Tax Wedge - Average 1997-2003  (4)  0.33  0.24  0.87  1.00               
Bargaining Coordination 
 
(5) 
0.73 0.09 0.59 0.39 1.00             
OECD Product Market Regulations 1998&2003 
Average 
(6) 
0.57 -0.36 0.63 0.53 0.36 1.00           
Credit Institutions per Capita - Average 1997-
2002 
(7) 
0.19 0.52 0.36 0.17 0.52 -0.14 1.00         
Percent of Claim Spent in Court and Attorney 
Fees (where mandatory) 
(8) 
0.10 0.07 -0.20 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.40 1.00       
Log of Real Capital per thousand workers, 2000 
USD, 1995 prices, in year 1997 
(9) 
0.42 0.27 0.65 0.46 0.44 0.38 0.36 -0.47 1.00     
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher Education  (10)  0.16  0.47 0.28 0.26 0.17 -0.45 0.43 0.16 0.06 1.00   
Average working population (mil.) 1997-2003  (11)  0.09  -0.74  -0.07  -0.06  -0.18  0.25  -0.43  0.01  -0.40  -0.41  1.00 
Notes: see table A1 for full descriptions and sources. 167 
    
A further concern we might have is that differences in country-industry specialization 
may influence our results. The trade literature emphasises that countries with a large 
endowment of capital or skills have an advantage in industries that are capital or skill 
intensive, which may include high-tech. We follow Nunn (2007) and use capital 
abundance and investment in skills at the country level interacted with estimates of 
industry capital and skill intensity. Another concern is that country size may be correlated 
with EPL, and production activity locates in large countries to access the product market, 
and where this production is highly skilled it drives up wages for high skilled workers in 
those countries (e.g. see Ekholm and Hakkala, 2007). As market access is less important 
for R&D this may crowd out highly skilled innovation to smaller countries. To control for 
country size we include population. These considerations lead to the following structure 
for  ci X :           
    c c c i i c c i i ci Pop H H h h K K k k X 6 5 4 3 2 1 α α α α α α + + + + + + = ,                              (29) 
where  i k  is the capital per unit output in industry i based on US data (the US is not in the 
sample),  c K  is the natural log of the capital per worker in country c,  i h  is the skill 
intensity of industry i,  c H  is the natural log of the proportion of GDP spent on higher 
education in country c, and  c Pop  is the working population of country c averaged over 
the sample period. 
4. DATA 
In order to estimate equations (27) and (28) we need information on the geographic 
location and level of technological sophistication of MNEs’ innovative activity, along 
with information on EPL and other country and industry characteristics. 
4.1.  Measuring the innovative activity of MNEs 
The data on patents come from the EPO PATSTAT dataset which we have matched to 
information on corporate ownership structure and financial accounts from BVD Amadeus 
(see Chapter 1 of this thesis). Patents filed at the European Patent Office (EPO) are a 
particularly attractive measure of innovative activity. The advantage of this measure is 
that it is administrative in nature with well defined rules that are independent of the 
location of the patent applicant. Furthermore, it is measured at the firm level (in constrast 168 
    
data on firm level R&D expenditure is not widely available for firms in many European 
countries). Patents data has been widely used and found to be closely related to R&D 
expenditure measures, and this is true for our data at the industry level (see Chapter 1 of 
this thesis).   
Of the 37,350 patenting firms in our sample 11,489 have an identifiable ultimate owner. 
Of these, 2,933 are part of a MNE with at least two subsidiaries in different countries. Of 
these firms, 1,378 firms file at least one patent that makes at least one citation.
115 Table 2 
shows how the firms and patent applications are distributed across countries. Column (3) 
lists how the 1,378 firms that make up our baseline MNE sample are distributed across 
countries and column (4) lists their patent application counts. The baseline sample 
includes all patent applications whether or not they have been granted, although we have 
checked the robustness of our results to using only granted patents (available from the 
authors on request). 
Table 2: Firms and Patents 
Country  Number of firms  Number of patents 
filed 
Number of firms in 
MNEs 
Number of patents 
filed by firms in 
MNEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Belgium 853  4,583  36  622 
Germany 11,592  108,431  491 12,998 
Denmark 1,151  4,160 40  380 
Spain 1,149  2,084  34  181 
Finland 869  8,032  5 72 
France  4,043  31,310 322 10,536 
United Kingdom  7,964  23,857  228  2,766 
Italy 4,556  11,833  89  1,027 
Netherlands 2,103  21,442  64  1,765 
Norway 689  1,362  5 54 
Portugal 54  96 2 25 
Sweden 2,327  13,132  62  2,131 
Total 37,350  230,322  1,378  32,557 
 
 
                                                 
115 We show that our results are robust to relaxing this condition by also running regressions using all 
subsidiaries that patent, regardless of whether or not they make citations. 
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To estimate equation (27) we measure innovative activity as a simple count of patents 
(P). We use simple counts rather than weighting patents by citations received as many of 
the patents are relatively new and have not yet received the citations that they will do in 
the future. However our results are robust to using citations weighted patents, suggesting 
that the effect is significant for economically valuable patents. To estimate equation (28) 
we measure radical innovation activity ( ms NPL  ) as a count of non-patent literature 
(NPL) citations made by patents filed by subsidiary s in MNE m over the sample time 
period, and we control for the total number of citations made by the same patents. This 
measure is an indicator of the newness of the innovation, since NPL citations are 
typically citations to scientific journals. Table 3 shows how the proportion of all citations 
made that are to NPL varies across industries. We can see that industries which we might 
expect to require highly scientific innovation, such as food production, transport and 
communications, finance and chemical (including pharmaceuticals) have the highest 
proportion of NPL citations, and industries which we might expect to involve less 
scientific innovations, such as light manufactures, have the lowest proportion of NPL 
citations.  170 
    
Table 3: Industries and Non-Patent Literature Citations 
INDUSTRY  
Percent of Citations to Non-Patent 
Literature 
FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO  0.26 
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE AND COMMUNICATION  0.22 
FINANCE, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE AND BUSI  0.19 
CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS  0.17 
BASIC METALS  0.15 
ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT  0.14 
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY  0.13 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; RESTAURANTS  0.11 
COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NUC  0.10 
MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILE  0.10 
OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT  0.10 
CONSTRUCTION 0.09 
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS  0.09 
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, NEC  0.08 
PUBLISHING, PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION OF  0.08 
RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS  0.08 
TEXTILES, TEXTILE PRODUCTS, LEATHER AND  0.07 
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, EXCEPT MACHIN  0.06 
PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS  0.06 
WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK  0.06 
MANUFACTURING NEC  0.05 
Notes: The values are estimated using the years 1997 to 2003. 
 
Our interest in this paper is on the effect of labour market regulations that affect job 
security for workers and adjustment costs for employees. Increased job security increases 
worker incentives to invest in innovation and therefore increases the return to innovation 
for employers. However, where innovation is uncertain or significantly new, in that it 
requires an adjustment in the skill mix of employees which may involve the replacement 
of existing workers with external workers, regulations that protect existing employment 
increase the cost of innovation. Our expectation is that the second effect will dominate 
the first when innovation is significantly technologically advance, as measured by the 
proportion of citations to NPL. Table 4 supports the appropriateness of this measure. 
From column (1) we see that high NPL innovation is significantly positively correlated 
with the average number of inventors per patent, indicating its complex nature. Column 
(2) indicates that NPL innovation is correlated with employment adjustment within firms 
and column (3) indicates that NPL innovation is correlated with country-sector 
uncertainty, as measured by sales volatility.    171 
    
Table 4: NPL Citations, complexity, adjustment and uncertainty 
 
Average no of 
inventors per patent
Within firm 
employment 
volatility 
Within firm sales 
volatility 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Proportion of citations to 
non-patent literature 
0.2681 0.1158 0.1919 
P-val  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Observations are country-3 digit industries. The values are estimated using the years 1997 to 2003. 
Column (2): employment volatility is the country-industry average coefficient of variation in employment 
calculated for each firm over the time period. Column (3): sales volatility is the country-industry average 
coefficient of variation in sales calculated for each firm over the time period. 
 
4.2.  Employment Protection Legislation 
We use an index of EPL calculated by the OECD (see OECD Economic Outlook 1999 
Chapter 2) and widely used in the literature on the determinants of unemployment 
(Nickell et al. 2005).
116 Our preferred measure is an average of an indicator of the 
legislation for regular contracts (covering procedural inconveniences, direct cost of 
dismissal, notice and trial period). Our results are also robust to using the higher level 
indicator that also includes legislation for temporary contracts (covering types of work 
admissible under temporary contracts and maximum cumulative duration allowed). Key 
for our purposes is that there is real variation in this measure across the countries in our 
sample, as is clearly evident from Figure 1.  
5. RESULTS 
To recap, we have hypothesized an effect on innovation of EPL that is differential across 
the nature of innovation. On the one hand EPL may increase overall patenting, but on the 
other hand it may reduce risky radical innovation. To see whether we find empirical 
support for these ideas we estimate equations (27) and (28), controlling for multi-national 
enterprise (MNE) fixed effects and cross country characteristics.  
The results for equation (27) are presented in Table 5. Column (1) shows results for a 
simple specification with MNE fixed effects. The positive coefficient on EPL indicates 
that within MNEs more innovation is performed by subsidiaries in countries with high 
                                                 
116 Its theoretical effect on unemployment is ambiguous as it may both limit flows into unemployment and 
increase worker bargaining power leading to high wage demands, and empirical evidence is mixed (as 
mentioned in Nickell 2005, also see Blanchard 2005 for discussion). 172 
    
employment protection for workers. Column (2) shows that this is robust to controlling 
for other institutional variables and population. Column (3) shows that controlling for the 
interaction of capital abundance with industry capital intensity, and the interaction of 
investment in higher education interacted with industry skill intensity, to ensure our result 
is not driven by other patterns of comparative advantage (Portugal’s two observations 
drop out as there is no higher education expenditure data). The result is robust to the 
inclusion of institutional control variables in column (2). The coefficient on the 
interaction of capital abundance and capital intensity is positive as we would expect. The 
coefficient on the interaction of higher education expenditure and skill intensity is 
negative. Although the coefficient on EPL retains its sign it loses magnitude and 
statistical significance. Statistical significance is retained in both cases if the regression is 
run with, firstly, just the capital variables and, secondly, just the skills variables.  173 
    
Table 5: Employment Protection Legislation and Innovation 
Dependent Variable: All  Patent 
Application 
All Patent 
Application 
All Patent 
Application 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Employment Protection Legislation  
(Regular Contracts) 
0.4417 0.8479 0.1670 
[0.1220]*** [0.4543]*  [0.1223] 
Union Density - Average 1997-2003    -0.0216   
   [0.0168]   
Collective Bargaining Coverage    -0.0095   
   [0.0452]   
Employment Tax Wedge - Average 1997-2003    0.1222   
   [0.1213]   
Bargaining Coordination    -1.0381   
   [0.2029]***   
OECD Product Market Regulations 1998&2003 
Average 
 -1.3472  
 [0.7726]*  
Credit Institutions per Capita - Average 1997-
2002 
 16.9807  
 [12.1849]  
Percent of Claim Spent in Court and Attorney 
Fees (where mandatory) 
 0.0451  
 [0.0298]  
Average working population (mil.) 1997-2003    -0.0047  0.0036 
   [0.0092]  [0.0068] 
Log of Real Capital per thousand workers, 2000 
USD, 1995 prices, in year 1997 
   -0.3157 
   [0.7646] 
Log of Capital per worker at 1997*Industry 
capital intensity 
   0.6179 
   [0.3523]* 
Industry Capital Intensity      -2.8126 
     [1.5490]* 
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher Education     1.840 
     [0.4307]*** 
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher 
Education*Industry skill intensity 
   -3.4159 
   [1.1935]*** 
Industry Skill Intensity      -1.9069 
     [1.2660] 
Constant 0.7452  0.4226  5.2746 
 [0.0976]***  [0.7208]  [3.3580] 
MNE Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1378  1378  1376 
Notes: All columns show the results of Poisson regression with robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level. In column (3) Portugal is excluded due to a lack of data on expenditure on education. 
 
Table 6 shows the results for equation (28). The dependent variable is now a measure of 
risky innovation - the number of citations to the non-patent literature, with the log of the 
total number of citations as a control, so that we can interpret the results as the effect of 
EPL on the proportion of citations that are to NPL. In column (1) the negative coefficient 
on EPL indicates that within MNEs more technologically advanced innovation is 174 
    
performed by subsidiaries in countries with low employment protection for workers. The 
result is robust to the inclusion of institutional control variables in column (2). The 
coefficient on the interaction of capital abundance and capital intensity is positive as we 
would expect. The coefficient on the interaction of higher education expenditure and skill 
intensity is positive, but not significant. 175 
    
Table 6: Employment Protection Legislation and Radical Innovation 
Dependent Variable:  NPL Citations  NPL Citations  NPL Citations 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Employment Protection Legislation  
(Regular Contracts) 
-0.1245 -0.3706 -0.0671 
[0.0414]*** [0.2099]*  [0.0353]* 
Log of All Citations Made  1.0013 1.0175 1.0142 
  [0.0194]*** [0.0096]*** [0.0118]*** 
Union Density - Average 1997-2003   0.0083  
   [0.0065]  
Collective Bargaining Coverage   0.0603  
   [0.0265]**  
Employment Tax Wedge - Average 1997-2003   -0.0946  
   [0.0640]  
Bargaining Coordination   0.2466  
   [0.1432]*  
OECD Product Market Regulations 1998&2003 
Average 
 -0.6723  
 [0.1628]***  
Credit Institutions per Capita - Average 1997-
2002   -20.0452   
   [6.6221]***  
% of Claim Spent in Court and Attorney Fees 
(where mandatory) 
 0.035  
 [0.0063]***  
Average working population (mil.) 1997-2003   0.0028  -0.0077 
   [0.0050]  [0.0017]*** 
Log of Real Capital per thousand workers, 2000 
USD, 1995 prices, in year 1997 
   -0.6234 
   [0.2740]** 
Log of Capital per worker at 1997*Industry 
capital intensity 
   0.3523 
   [0.1532]** 
Industry Capital Intensity     -1.549 
     [0.6991]** 
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher Education    -0.0221 
     [0.2738] 
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher 
Education*Industry skill intensity 
   0.9525 
   [1.1952] 
Industry Skill Intensity     1.412 
     [1.2615] 
Constant  -0.8759 -2.9932 0.6033 
  [0.1148]*** [0.2334]***  [1.2219] 
MNE Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1378 1378 1376 
Notes: All columns show the results of Poisson regression with robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level. In column (3) Portugal is excluded due to a lack of data on expenditure on education. 
 
What is the economic significance of these estimates? To consider this we look at the 
impact of moving each country to the mean EPL index of 2.3. Consider countries like 
Italy and Germany, which have relatively strong employment protection legislation, so 
that the EPL index measure is 2.8. Reducing their EPL to the mean in our sample of 2.3 176 
    
would result in approximately a 20% fall in overall patents (using the coefficient 
estimates in column (2) of Table 5 evaluated at the mean level of patenting), but an 
increase in radical innovations of around 5%.  
Consider a country like Denmark with a low amount of employment protection, which 
has an EPL index of 1.6, increasing their EPL index to 2.3 would lead to an increase in 
overall patenting of around 37%, but a fall in radical innovations of around 6%. These are 
substantial effects.  
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated the relationship between employment protection legislation 
and innovation activity across twelve European countries. We use unique data on the 
activities of multinational firms operating across different jurisdictions. Our findings 
suggest that multinational firms do more incremental patenting activity in high EPL 
countries and more radical patenting activity in low EPL countries. This is consistent 
with a variant of an Aghion and Howitt style growth model that we outline. However, it 
is also consistent with other theoretical models, such as Saint-Paul’s model of 
comparative advantage, and with the ideas put forward in Hall and Soskice.  
Care must be taken in interpreting these results. While we have attempted to control for a 
number of other characteristics that vary across countries, and for firm specific 
characteristics, identification is still from cross-sectional data. We do not observe 
sufficient time series variation in EPL and our data to identify the effects of changes in 
labour market regimes. Nonetheless, this evidence is suggestive and appears to be robust 
to a number of standard concerns put forward in the literature. 
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APPENDIX 
In a similar vein to Boeri and Jimeno (2005) consider that there is a small probability p 
that demand for the final good will drop from high, 
h θ , to low, 
l θ .
117 So that 
() ∫
−
=
1
0
1
di x ZA y it it
S
t
α α
θ  ,  l h S , = . On the realisation of the demand shock the firm will 
wish to adjust employment from 
h x to the new optimal level 
l x  by firing workers. The 
probability for each worker of being fired is then given by: 
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛ −
= h
l h
x
x x
p s . .                                                           (A1) 
In the presence of EPL it costs the firm ϕ  per worker to adjust employment downwards. 
The loss to the firm of a non-optimal level of employment, x, is given by: 
() () ()( ) ( )
l l l l x x ZA x x ZA 1 1
1 1 1 1 − − − = Δ
− − − − α α α α α θ α θ π ,                         (A2) 
where the first term is the level of profits given low demand but with employment 
l x x >  
and the second term is the level of profits given low demand and the optimal level of 
employment. When 
l x x = ,  0 = Δπ . The firm faces firing costs given by  ( ) x x
h − −ϕ . 
The firm will adjust the employment level until the marginal gain from doing so equals 
the marginal cost of firing an employee. The optimal level of employment, x ˆ , given 
firing costs is then given by: 
  ( ) ϕ α θ
α α − = −
− − 1 ˆ
1 1 2 x ZA
l                                                     (A3) 
Therefore, 
ZA x l
1
1
2
1 ˆ
−
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −
=
α
α θ
ϕ
.                                                        (A4) 
This expression is increasing in ϕ . Note that it reduces to 
l x  in the absence of firing 
costs ( 0 = ϕ ). There will also exist some level of ϕ  where no adjustment occurs. 
Substituting this into (A1) gives the probability of being fired faced by each worker in the 
presence of firing costs: 
                                                 
117 This is simpler than Boeri and Jimeno (2005) in that we consider that demand is normally high, but there 
is a small possibility that it drops. The firm initially chooses employment levels assuming demand will be 
high. 178 
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This probability decreases as 
h l θ θ →  as we would expect.
118 Writing out  () ϕ s  followed 
by its first and second derivatives: 
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As  1 < α  and restricting  [ ) 1 , 0 ∈ ϕ  we have   ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 < ′ ′ < ′ ϕ ϕ s s , that is the probability of a 
worker losing their job is decreasing in ϕ  and at an increasing rate.
119 
Using a Taylor expansion around  0 = ϕ  we can write this as: 
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118 The probability of being fired is non-positive when 
h l θ θ = . Note that  1 < α . 
119 Restricting firing costs to be between zero and one is natural here as the workers reservation wage is 
normalised to one and it is likely that firing costs will be some proportion of that. s tends to negative 
infinity as firing costs tend to one, but we just exclude this and say that at some point firing costs are so 
high that the firm does not adjust employment at all. 179 
    
Table A1: Data and Sources 
Variable Description  and  source  Mean 
s.d. 
Employment Protection 
Legislation (Regular Contracts) 
An average of an indicator of legislation for regular contracts (covering procedural inconveniences, direct cost of dismissal, 
notice and trial period) and an indicator for legislation for temporary contracts (covering types of work admissible under 
temporary contracts and maximum cumulative duration allowed). Nicoletti et al (2000). 
2.425 
.89048 
Union Density - Average 1997-
2003 
Actual union members as percentage of employees. OECD Labour Force Statistics.  42.10833 
25.38686 
Collective Bargaining Coverage  Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining, whether they are union members or not. Nickell (2003), originally 
obtained from Wolfgang Ochel. 
79.66667 
15.69211 
Employment Tax Wedge - 
Average 1997-2003 
Average of the tax wedge for one-earner family with two children and single persons without children. OECD, Taxing Wages, 
2003. 
38.74788 
6.950881 
Bargaining Coordination  The degree of coordination of bargaining: 1- firm level, 2- industry level, 3- economy level. We use coordination index 2 from 
Nickell (2003), originally obtained from Wolfgang Ochel. 
2.083333 
.5149287 
OECD Product Market 
Regulations 1998&2003 
Average 
Top level indicator capturing extent of state control of product markets, barriers to entrepreneurship and trade and investment. 
Source: OECD International Regulation Database. 
1.700718 
.3538945 
Credit Institutions per Capita - 
Average 1997-2002 
Credit institutions are defined by the European Central Bank as any institution covered by the definition contained in Article 
1(1) of Directive 2000/12/EC, as amended. Accordingly, a credit institution is "(i) an undertaking whose business is to receive 
deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account; or (ii) an undertaking or any other 
legal person, other than those under (i), which issues means of payment in the form of electronic money." Source: CESIfo 
Dataset, see http://www.cesifo.de. For Norway, from Eitrheim et al. (2003). 
.0404272 
.0255226 
% of Claim Spent in Court and 
Attorney Fees (where 
mandatory) 
The estimated cost of suing for breach of contract in a hypothetical case as a percentage of the claim amount. Source: Doing 
Business Report. See http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/EnforcingContracts/ for data and exact methodology 
19.44167 
7.113554 
Average working population 
(mil.) 1997-2003 
Source: OECD.  19.92361 
18.70212 
Real Capital per thousand 
workers, 2000 USD, 1995 
prices, in year 1997 
For total economy, averaged over sample period. Calculated using a permanent inventory method using gross fixed capital 
formation. In units of 2000 USD at 1995 prices. Source: OECD Stan. 
 
108.1972 
30.38796 
Industry Capital Intensity  Capital divided by output for each industry using US data, average over the sample period. Source: OECD Stan.    1.16211 
.6363175 
Share of GDP Spent on Higher 
Education 
As a proportion of GDP. Averaged over 1991-1995, making it pre-sample period. Source: OECD.  .3635136 
.1318802 
Industry Skill Intensity  Proportion of workers in each two digit industry in the United Kingdom in 2000 with degree or other higher education. Source: 
UK Labour Force Survey.  
.250483 
.128509 
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